This is how you do it through political AND Military means.
Continued.
How can a small group of political dissidents take on a much larger, better resourced and entrenched Establishment?
The failure of any radical group to answer, or even seriously ask, this question over the last century or so has given the British elite a free hand and the luxury to indulge itself in ever greater extremism.
No radical strand is guiltier of thoughtless and futile kamikaze strategies than the radical right over the last forty years. Any objective assessment of the “achievements” of first the NF and the BNP would have to conclude with a sentence in which the words “abject” and “pathetic” figured prominently. In fact the record of both groups was worse than simple failure; their performance was so poor that it actually encouraged the establishment to disregard any potential political threat from the right which it might otherwise have imagined.
The phrase “counter productive” is not adequate to do justice to the extent of the political disaster the radical rights attempts at resistance in the last 20th century wrought.
And so it is that we now survey the wreckage of the BNP and consider the future strategy and tactics of the radical right in the UK. Inevitably there is a chorus demanding the immediate construction of another conventional political party driven on by sheer cultural momentum and the apparently lack of a viable alternative. This essay will seek to offer a viable alternative to repeat of the carnage which the elite so enjoyed on the last two performances and looks forward to repeating over the next ten years.
I draw my inspiration for the ideas laid out here from the development of Asymmetrical warfare techniques in the post war period. Over this period apparently numerical superior better armed better organised and better resourced Western Armies have been systematically and comprehensively defeated in Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan (twice), Iraq and Lebanon. Even in Northern Ireland it took over thirty years for the might of the British State to bring an end a tepid insurgency and even then not on entirely satisfactory grounds from their point of view. In the entire period the only really successful counter-insurgency campaign from the perspective of the elites was the Sri Lankan State’s annihilation of the LTTE, and that only came about after an ill judged decision by the later to go to a conventional model of warfare.
How have these disparate rebel movements achieved success against such apparently overwhelming odds? The basic principals of asymmetric conflict are simple; however they are counter intuitive and far removed from our cultural traditions. They require radicals to step outside the historical norms of our society’s conventional thinking.
The first thing you need for an asymmetrical war is some dead people since it isn’t a war unless someone dies. However what is the purpose of killing a few soldiers when the army you face might have several hundreds of thousands? Clearly an attack upon them has no conventional military significance. There are two major objectives when such an attack is launched.
Firstly an attack upon an army is news; it’s hardwired by convention into the media culture that such an event must be prominently covered. This coverage allows the insurgents to communicate to their potential supporters that someone is resisting and that resistance can be (apparently) effective. It also communicates to the opposition’s domestic audience that there is a cost to whatever their state is trying to do in terms of the lives of its soldiers. As a bonus there will usually be some sort of public debate on the insurgents’ goals which communicates the objective of the insurgents to everyone.
Continued.