Airbourne invasion of Crete, could it have been avoided?

[perseus]

I’ve been wondering if there was anything more that General Freyberg commanding the Allied force on Crete could have done to prevent the German airborne invasion given that he knew most of the details in advance via Ultra intelligence.

Under his command were about 14,000 mostly lightly equipped Commonwealth troops in addition to 9000 Greek and 25,000 recently evacuated troops from Greece. The latter were of variable quality, some without weapons. In addition there was a large number of Civilian militia mainly armed with obsolete, ancient or improvised weapons of various types. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Crete

German forces consisted of 750 glider troops and 10,000 paratroops. We can probably assume these were of the highest quality. 5000 airlifted mountain troops and 7,000 amphibious troops were also allocated for the invasion, few of which were involved in the early stages due to intervention from the Royal Navy, although some mountain troops were flown in later. At the Critical battle around Maleme airfield, the first assault involved gliders and approximately 2,000 parachutists jumped in waves of 200 each at fifteen-minute intervals. Therefore, during the first assaults these paratroops were considerably outnumbered, armed with only grenades and a pistol during the drop with their heavier weapons parachuted separately in containers. http://www.feldgrau.com/cretewar.html

I suggest that the paratroopers would have been highly vulnerable whilst landing and so an infantryman equipped with a pistol, bayonet, stake or knife could easily finish them off whilst still rolling on the ground. So it seems that even poorly equipped soldiers could have made a useful contribution assuming they were distributed widely under the drop zones, and as far as I could see only the valleys, dried riverbed and coast were suitable locations. See map at http://www.nzetc.org/etexts/WH2Cret/WH2CretP002a.jpg

However, Freyberg wanted to send many of the ‘unarmed’ soldiers back to Egypt. Although the National Militia took their toll of the paratroops, perhaps they could have been better co-ordinated with the full time troops as well.

Another approach might have been to increase mobility so more widely spaced forces can be rushed to the appropriate drop zone. There were only a few tanks that were serviceable and these quickly broke down, but surely there were motorised vehicles around that would be useful against light infantry? With a car, or truck you could take the windows out, place sandbags in front, cut out a ‘sunroof’ for the gunner, place a Bren gun on top, hang chains to protect the tyres, and cover it with olive branches for camouflage. These could then be quickly driven to any of the flatter exposed landing spots within minutes, all of which had adjoining roads. Each wave of enemy paratroops would then be taken in turn whilst landing by saturating them with mobile machine gun fire at close quarters.

One problem is that Freyberg couldn’t make his preparations look too obvious since this may have compromised the source of information. On the other hand airborne troop landings had been attempted on several occasions during the previous year and some changes may have been expected due to his recent appointment and the German occupation of mainland Greece. Many detailed criticisms of the defence are documented here, http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/the-battle-for-crete/the-controversies

However, here I’m mainly questioning whether the poorly equipped personnel could have been better deployed and whether some ‘armoured’ vehicles could have been improvised.

 

[MontyB]

This may turn into a heated discussion as I am not a huge fan of Freyberg but the entire Crete campaign revolved around the the capture of Malame airfield he knew it through ULTRA, the Germans knew it as did every other officer and soldier with half an IQ point on the island yet Freyberg I believe had already lost the battle mentally the day they put him in charge as he basically just wanted to use the place as a transit point to withdraw back to Egypt.

However even though the troops defending the island were not well equiped or supplied knowing the point of attack and the primary objectives of the Germans the island was eminently defendable and he failed to do it through his own inept leadership, quite frankly he should have been left on the island and at least we would have avoided his other monumental **** up at Monte Cassino.

 

[perseus]

Well at least there were two good outcomes, the Germans remained ignorant of Ultra (a good reason not to leave Freyberg on the island) and the troops guarding the island were effectively interned for the duration of the war.

What do you think about the mass use of poorly trained and armed troops to combat parachutists? Is is realistic or would they run at the first sight of a professional force descending upon them? Images of the Home Guard here in a SE England invasion scenario. I assume many must have used bayonets in WW1 so perhaps they may have put up a better show than we think.

Once again though I don't think they would have been distributed at the key drop zones behind the beaches, relying instead of attacking in groups thereby allowing the parachutists to group and consolidate themselves.

 

[MontyB]

Well at least there were two good outcomes, the Germans remained ignorant of Ultra (a good reason not to leave Freyberg on the island) and the troops guarding the island were effectively interned for the duration of the war.

Not really because the same units fought New Zealand troops again at Monte Cassino inflicting heavy casualties, I would suggest that the garrison forces on Crete were just that.

What do you think about the mass use of poorly trained and armed troops to combat parachutists? Is is realistic or would they run at the first sight of a professional force descending upon them? Images of the Home Guard here in a SE England invasion scenario. I assume many must have used bayonets in WW1 so perhaps they may have put up a better show than we think.

I think it clearly worked and given the casualties caused by local militia and civilians with old shotguns and pitchforks I am 100% convinced that had Maleme been held for even a few more days Crete would have been in the losses column for the Germans.

The failure to hold Crete was very simply a New Zealand failure at officer level to perform, they were essentially incompetent, in fact I will go as far as saying that had someone such as Australian 9th Division commander of the time General Leslie Morshead been left to run the show there would have been a very different result.

Once again though I don't think they would have been distributed at the key drop zones behind the beaches, relying instead of attacking in groups thereby allowing the parachutists to group and consolidate themselves.

I really don't think Crete was a battle that required armour and when you consider that the Royal Navy controlled the sea's thus preventing any reinforcement that way it really just left airborne troops to do the work and without the islands airfields they would have had limited supply and no heavy equipment (exactly the same issues the British had with Arnhem).

Probably the one thing the defence could have used was a fighter squadron or two.

 

[LeEnfield]

It is one of those battles where Britain and the Commonwealth were trying to do so much with to little resources. Had we put more troops into Crete from Egypt then we could have lost Egypt as well. I am firm beliver that had we made that extra push in North Africa rather than going to Crete then the war might have been over in North Africa before Rommel even arrived there. There again lifes is full of ifs and buts

 

[MontyB]

It is one of those battles where Britain and the Commonwealth were trying to do so much with to little resources. Had we put more troops into Crete from Egypt then we could have lost Egypt as well. I am firm beliver that had we made that extra push in North Africa rather than going to Crete then the war might have been over in North Africa before Rommel even arrived there. There again lifes is full of ifs and buts

There are a lot of cases early in WW2 where I would agree completely but Crete isn't one of them, the allies had roughly 40-45000 troops on the island (I accept that they were not well equipped) almost twice what the Germans had available to them, they controlled the seas and they knew exactly where, how and when the enemy was going to attack and what his primary objectives were and still they screwed it up.

On top of this even with all the complete ineptitude on behalf of Freyberg and the New Zealand senior staff they still very nearly held on, as I recall had the first few German aircraft been unable to land on Maleme airfield when they did the operation was to be abandoned. Further to this when you consider the amazing efforts of the Cretan population in fighting the German landings with little more than pitchforks, knives and pre-ww1 personal weapons you would have to assume that a trained soldier with a bayonet and a captured rifle couldn't have at least replicated those efforts.

The defence of Crete did not need anything more than capable and agressive commanders for it to be successful.

 

[Partisan]

There are a lot of cases early in WW2 where I would agree completely but Crete isn't one of them, the allies had roughly 40-45000 troops on the island (I accept that they were not well equipped) almost twice what the Germans had available to them, they controlled the seas and they knew exactly where, how and when the enemy was going to attack and what his primary objectives were and still they screwed it up.

On top of this even with all the complete ineptitude on behalf of Freyberg and the New Zealand senior staff they still very nearly held on, as I recall had the first few German aircraft been unable to land on Maleme airfield when they did the operation was to be abandoned. Further to this when you consider the amazing efforts of the Cretan population in fighting the German landings with little more than pitchforks, knives and pre-ww1 personal weapons you would have to assume that a trained soldier with a bayonet and a captured rifle couldn't have at least replicated those efforts.

The defence of Crete did not need anything more than capable and agressive commanders for it to be successful.

Whilst I would agree with you about the ineptitude of the higher command, I think that you need to consider the terrain. Mounatinous, damn near impassable in many places it is a real barrier to effective communication. I think that the flaw was a lack of decisive defensive plans, relying too much on if they do x, we'll do y. Whereas the Germans were told - take and hold. So a lot of the allies were busy shuttling themselves up and down mountain roads, walking into areas held by the Germans. When communication links were cobbled together, it was to rescue what was left of a tired, footsore and bemused force.

The Cretans themselves helped the allies escape, having shared a glass of wine or 2 with some of them, they told me that they understood that island was lost & just wanted the allies to have good thoughts so that they would come back, but in the end, holding Crete was their problem.

I don't mind saying they are a kind and gracious people, but I can imagine that they would be a nightmare to subjugate.

I think that the biggest irony is that the bulk of the Cretan tourist industry seems to come from Germany - something the old boys didn't like, but always smiled - saying we'll take their money.

 

[MontyB]

Whilst I would agree with you about the ineptitude of the higher command, I think that you need to consider the terrain. Mounatinous, damn near impassable in many places it is a real barrier to effective communication. I think that the flaw was a lack of decisive defensive plans, relying too much on if they do x, we'll do y. Whereas the Germans were told - take and hold. So a lot of the allies were busy shuttling themselves up and down mountain roads, walking into areas held by the Germans. When communication links were cobbled together, it was to rescue what was left of a tired, footsore and bemused force.

The Cretans themselves helped the allies escape, having shared a glass of wine or 2 with some of them, they told me that they understood that island was lost & just wanted the allies to have good thoughts so that they would come back, but in the end, holding Crete was their problem.

I don't mind saying they are a kind and gracious people, but I can imagine that they would be a nightmare to subjugate.

I think that the biggest irony is that the bulk of the Cretan tourist industry seems to come from Germany - something the old boys didn't like, but always smiled - saying we'll take their money.

The main thing for me is that I do not believe Crete was a lost cause primarily due to the information the allies had in the form of Ultra and as such the state of allied communications and transportation is a non-factor.

If I told you that you were about to be attacked by 8000 enemy, they will be landing at point A, B and C and they will have to capture point Z or the campaign will not succeed and they cannot be supplied by sea here is 40000 trained but lightly equipped troops and sizable number of irregulars how do you think you would have gone because I am reasonably confident that no one could have done a hell of a lot worse than Freyberg.

I am somewhat more passionate about Crete than many other battles simply because it was in the end a failure associated with New Zealand and I had an uncle who served in Greece, Crete, North Africa and Italy so it is something I have looked at with interest.

If you read some of the unit war diaries of the campaign as well as books such as those of Antony Beevor I think it is clear where the campaign failed from an allied point of view, I do not believe that New Zealand troops failed as they receive very high praise from many sources during the evacuation for their desire and ability to fight but they were horrible let down by their command.

 

[Partisan]

The main thing for me is that I do not believe Crete was a lost cause primarily due to the information the allies had in the form of Ultra and as such the state of allied communications and transportation is a non-factor.

If I told you that you were about to be attacked by 8000 enemy, they will be landing at point A, B and C and they will have to capture point Z or the campaign will not succeed and they cannot be supplied by sea here is 40000 trained but lightly equipped troops and sizable number of irregulars how do you think you would have gone because I am reasonably confident that no one could have done a hell of a lot worse than Freyberg.

I am somewhat more passionate about Crete than many other battles simply because it was in the end a failure associated with New Zealand and I had an uncle who served in Greece, Crete, North Africa and Italy so it is something I have looked at with interest.

If you read some of the unit war diaries of the campaign as well as books such as those of Antony Beevor I think it is clear where the campaign failed from an allied point of view, I do not believe that New Zealand troops failed as they receive very high praise from many sources during the evacuation for their desire and ability to fight but they were horrible let down by their command.

I agree, but by being wordy (1 beer too many?) I didn't get across that communications were/are a nightmare. As far as I was aware the info available was that the Germans are coming, there were some logical places to defend, but the moving of soldiers to meet the threat failed to happen, due to poor communication and an indecisive leadership.

I'm currently engrossed in Richard Holmes Sahib, but will put Mr Beevor back on my to read list.

 

[bren122]

You make too many assumptions based upon subsequent events and do not allow for the psychological impacts of the Greek campaign. Following a hard fought campaign in which a significant proportion of the personnel had been lost in battle or simply left behind, including many of the better officers and men, plus almost every bit of equipment and supply, the men were then asked to defend the island with even fewer resources than they had had in Greece.
The RN 'could not guarantee' that it could maintain command of the sea in the central or eastern Mediterranean. The Italian Navy was still a formidable force on paper and by reputation; German u-boats were 'known' to be operating in the Mediterranean; and neither the FAA nor the RAF had the resources to fly to the island in significant force or for sufficient time.
It is merely a speculation that Freyberg had complete access to Ultra, or that Ultra had been completely broken. there was not one Ultra Code but several- that of the Luftwaffe was one of the most difficult to decrypt and while Freyberg might have had full details of the German plan by the end of the campaign his initial troop deployments suggest that he was not fully informed as to the 'total' details from the first. remember this remains the only all airborne campaign in history. he had to make allowances for a beach landing because it was unlikely that the operation was simply an all airborne affair.
Finally the operation unfolded predictably. Once heavy weapons became a factor (anything heavier than a rifle) then the only thing you can expect of a lightly armed body of men is to become casualties- which is precisely what happened. Even had Freyberg deployed 40 000 men to Maleme, without heavy weapons his forces were without hope. There were no handheld weapons to bring the planes down and not nearly enough anti aircraft artillery to stop enough planes getting through to leave significant units on the ground somewhere. this was the lesson that the allies drew from the attack and their subsequent training of their paratroopers to operate in adhoc groups or oversized sections was vindicated in Normandy. It should also be noted that the first air landed re-enforcements arrived under fire; and that the appearance of these formed bodies of men in the midst of the battle were the straw that broke the camel's back.

 

[perseus]

I suggest that some weapons could have been acquired from the German crates if the landing zones were already overrun or under contest. This is what happened to many of the British supplies along the path to Arnhem. Heavy weapons should have been to the defenders advantage, initially at least. I still think the defenders could have caused carnage even with light and antiquated weapons, in fact they did in some areas but didn't take full advantage of the situation.

 

[KJ]

I submit that even a company from the 19:th Bde Inf (Rathymnon sector) placed on/around Maleme field in wellmade positions could have faltered the entire german operation.

At times during the fight the Scene commander said that even an extra platoon would have made an inpact on the fighting.

The single greatest error were the strength of reasources earmarked to repell an amphibious assault, an assault that was really a resupply convoy to the troops already on the Island with a Btn of mountainrangers.

I believe that Freyberg should not have been put in charge of the defence as his actions and decisions showed again and again his indecicivness and unability to think outside of the box when engaging the fallshirmjaegers.

But it is sure easy to be an armchair general some 60-70 years after the fact.

 

[MontyB]

I submit that even a company from the 19:th Bde Inf (Rathymnon sector) placed on/around Maleme field in wellmade positions could have faltered the entire german operation.

At times during the fight the Scene commander said that even an extra platoon would have made an inpact on the fighting.

The single greatest error were the strength of reasources earmarked to repell an amphibious assault, an assault that was really a resupply convoy to the troops already on the Island with a Btn of mountainrangers.

I believe that Freyberg should not have been put in charge of the defence as his actions and decisions showed again and again his indecicivness and unability to think outside of the box when engaging the fallshirmjaegers.

But it is sure easy to be an armchair general some 60-70 years after the fact.

As much as I feel I should be arguing against this as a New Zealander I can't and I wont, I believe that the campaign and the troops defending the Maleme were let down by Freyberg and his command.

 

[bren122]

Again- you are letting the experience of subsequent events colour your perceptions- Freyberg demonstrated throughout his career an ability to think outside the box. it was his decision to swim ashore at Bulair at Gallipoli in 1915 and create a single handed distraction which enabled the troops assigned there to be available sooner in the main operation.
this remains the only operation conceived and executed as an all airborne operation. Freyberg had no reason to believe in his initial planning that the seaborne component of the operation was other than the invasion itself with the paras in support.
for my mind- given the commanders immediately available for the defence- it would be hard to pick anybody who would have done better.

 

[KJ]

I disagre with those statements.

Freyberg had Ultra intelligence telling his the seaborne opertaions were mearly a resupply and still did not act by displacing his troops accordingly.
Simple fact is he froze when faced with something new (to him) as the airborne assault were.

No offence but he did a pisspoor job.
Not only before the invasion, but he made several critical errors all through the campaign.
This makes one believe he got the post because he once proved he could swim.
I bet several others on the Island of crete could too...

The only thing that worked semigood on the allied side where the spirit and will to fight in it´s troops.
(And some command decisions in the (Rathymnon) sector.

That´s it, otherwise the entire operation from an allied standpoint was a total and utter fiasco.

 

[MontyB]

I disagre with those statements.

Freyberg had Ultra intelligence telling his the seaborne opertaions were mearly a resupply and still did not act by displacing his troops accordingly.
Simple fact is he froze when faced with something new (to him) as the airborne assault were.

No offence but he did a pisspoor job.
Not only before the invasion, but he made several critical errors all through the campaign.
This makes one believe he got the post because he once proved he could swim.
I bet several others on the Island of crete could too...

The only thing that worked semigood on the allied side where the spirit and will to fight in it´s troops.
(And some command decisions in the (Rathymnon) sector.

That´s it, otherwise the entire operation from an allied standpoint was a total and utter fiasco.

I agree and it pains me to say so but throughout WW2 Australian commanders proved themselves to be better for this kind of job than their New Zealand counterparts (although I did like Kippenberger), I tend to think that pretty much any one of them on the island would have done a better and more aggressive job than Freyberg and his staff.

The only mitigating factors for Freyberg that I can see was that he took over command of the island very late in the process and very little had been done to fortify the island prior to his taking over but I am not sure how that really helps his case when you consider that he knew the attack would be airborne and he had a full set of operational orders for the 3rd Parachute Regiment and a summary of the whole operation before it began.

As I have said previously given knowledge of the enemies operations, the numbers involved and the landing points I can not for the life of me see how you can fail especially since he had at least twice the number of troops available to him than the attacking force.

 

[perseus]

The only mitigating factors for Freyberg that I can see was that he took over command of the island very late in the process and very little had been done to fortify the island prior to his taking over but I am not sure how that really helps his case when you consider that he knew the attack would be airborne and he had a full set of operational orders for the 3rd Parachute Regiment and a summary of the whole operation before it began.

The other major mitigating factor was that he could not make it look too obvious or else he would have compromised Ultra. Is is possible he received instructions from high not to make his dispositions obvious to oppose a paratroop landing? Perhaps if so this should have appeared in his memoirs.

 

[MontyB]

The other major mitigating factor was that he could not make it look too obvious or else he would have compromised Ultra. Is is possible he received instructions from high not to make his dispositions obvious to oppose a paratroop landing? Perhaps if so this should have appeared in his memoirs.

There was no point as Freyberg was told that the information came from well placed sources in Athens, even he didn't know it was Ultra.

Even if he didn't trust the sources to the point that he ignored them he still failed to react once the invasion began, surely if information you had been given began to look accurate you use it to plan a response.

 

[bren122]

There were four Australians in the theatre of operations who were in a position to take command- Blamey, Makay, Lavarak and Morsehead. Blamey was unpopular with the home government for failing to inform them of his reservataions about the entire campaign; Lavarak and Morsehead were both new appointments to their positions and not on the island. Makay had already proven himself unable to 'control' a battle- whilst it might be heartening to have the division commander in the midst of the rear guard in Greece, one does feel compelled to ask who was actually running the division at its moment of crisis? his actions in Greece and Crete (including sitting in the open during air raids) suggest a suicidal tendency- a classic response of a general who can not cope with the situation around him.
which of these do you honestly think could have done better?
i am not trying to suggest that Freyberg was a genius- then or later- but i do think that the defence of Crete, like the entire Greek campaign, was doomed before it began. Freyberg may have made mistakes- but it is a bit fallacious to suggest that he had access to every thought of the enemy via Ultra. and in the final analysis- could you say to your men; "Here's a pigstick; go attack those Hun paratroopers wil you; there's a good chap."

 

[MontyB]

There were four Australians in the theatre of operations who were in a position to take command- Blamey, Makay, Lavarak and Morsehead. Blamey was unpopular with the home government for failing to inform them of his reservataions about the entire campaign; Lavarak and Morsehead were both new appointments to their positions and not on the island. Makay had already proven himself unable to 'control' a battle- whilst it might be heartening to have the division commander in the midst of the rear guard in Greece, one does feel compelled to ask who was actually running the division at its moment of crisis? his actions in Greece and Crete (including sitting in the open during air raids) suggest a suicidal tendency- a classic response of a general who can not cope with the situation around him.
which of these do you honestly think could have done better?

I would have picked Morshead without hesitation.

He had proved himself as an able and aggressive commander during WW1 and later went on to prove his quality throughout WW2, Freyberg on the other hand managed to lose Crete and blew up a Monastery which ended up killing more allies than helped..