Airbourne invasion of Crete, could it have been avoided?

There was no point as Freyberg was told that the information came from well placed sources in Athens, even he didn't know it was Ultra.

Even if he didn't trust the sources to the point that he ignored them he still failed to react once the invasion began, surely if information you had been given began to look accurate you use it to plan a response.

This extract from the history channel seems to confirm this. Some film coverage as well.

http://ahivfree.alexanderstreet.com/View/501106
 
to my mind Lavarack was the superior officer but as with Blamey he had a political cloud over his head. unlike Blamey it was from a long history of criticising various australian governments before the war and would affect much of his career through the war- Blamey, a pre-war government defender, seems to have taken a particular pleasure in downplaying his abilities. at least he had better judgement than his fellow critic- Gordon Bennett. it is hard to disagree with Bennett's claim that he became a scapegoat for the deficiencies of his 8th Division- but it is equally difficult to accept this as sufficient justification for abandoning his men. whether Lavarack would find it convenient to blame a lack of effort on his part would seem to be contradicted by his conduct throughout the war, but then he never faced a situation similar to Bennett's.
i don't know that Morsehead would have been the preferable choice, nor in the event the most likely. i think if it came to replacing Freyberg with an Australian it would have gone to Makay- and though Freyberg had his faults it is difficult to envisage the scale of the disaster that would probably have ensued had Makay been the commander. as noted, his penchant for sitting in the open in the middle of air raids or fighting in the rearguard seems to mark him down as being overwhelmed by his responsibilities and, as a consequence, suicidal. this is not to imply that he was a coward, but perhaps not the best choice for divisional command.

i am not aware of any British generals, by name, in the immediate theatre who might have been in a position to take command without regard to their (then) current duties.

and in saying this i do not concede your point; i only acknowledge that i will be unlikely to change your mind.
 
The problem with the Cretan campaign is that it was a very close run thing that I believe was winnable by the allies (whether they could have held it given German air superiority in the region is another argument) and as such it highlights Freyberg and his staff's flaws.

It has always struck me that the problem with the defence of Crete was:

1) The failure to take the information about the assault seriously and plan for it (they were still planning for a seaborne assault even though they had captured German documents and Ultra telling them otherwise).

2) The failure to react decisively once the German plan began to unfold in the Maleme sector.

Lets face it Maleme was defensible by the troops that were there they basically just got confused/bored/disinterested and decided to abandon the key positions over night which to me is a failure of leadership.
 
Oh I had almost forgotten about the commander I think performed best during preinvasion preparations and the battle itself.
Lt Col. Ian Cambell.
The rather newly apointed Lt Col. led a wellprepared and agile defence against the two combat groups led by Maj. Kroh and Capt. Wiederman.
 
ULTRA- there were at least seven ULTRA codes that we know about (as ULTRA still forms the basis of some codes it is unlikely that we will ever know how many there were); Air Force, Navy & U-Boat, Foreign Office, Army & Army- West and SS. At no point in the war was every message 100% decrypted- the proportion was usually less than 50% and for some of the codes no more than 10%. the easiest codes belonged to the Air Force and the Foreign Office- being static they used harder codes (more 'wheels') but as a consequence changed them less often which made it progressively easier for Enigma to decrypt. By contrast Doenitz suspected that the U-Boat code had been broken (it actually hadn't) and thus moved to a new code system with regular setting adjustments that prevented Enigma from decrypting more than 10% of any code group for much of the war. To say that Freyberg had full access to ULTRA decrypts, regardless of how they were presented, is wrong. further, it seems likely that as we know that the Allies still expected a seaborne invasion, it would suggest that the Army and Navy codes had not been deciphered to any great extent. As the paratroops answered to the Army it is equally unlikely that detailed plans would have been available through ULTRA.
Captured Documents- Greek neutrality was largely a matter of internal politics; pro- fascist and pro-Allied elements were unable to hold enough power in order to sway the government and people firmly one way or the other. the most pro-fascist element in the government was the Inteligence service, the most likely source of any pre-invasion planning. as the evacuation of Greece preceded the planning it is unlikely that Allied intelligence was yet in a position to capture such documents. given that this was known to the Allies it is unlikely that any captured documents from such a source would have been given a full endorsement. further, since the supporting naval operations were the chief determinant of British action, and this would have been a consideration in any planning effort, and that the Royal Navy refused to engage the enemy (at least with major fleet units) under the circumstances, it is unlikely that the sort of detail required to significantly alter the Allied preparation was forthcoming.
Troops at Maleme- the hardest hit units in Greece were the New Zealanders and the Australians- first in and last out. in both cases the casualties had affected the better units and officers within those divisions. this meant that many units were short, particularly of the leadership element. as command is as much experience as it is talent, it seems more than a little unfair to blame inexperienced officers and NCO's of making mistakes in their first engagement in those roles. and as one who has made the transition from one rank to another it is difficult to fully understand the full requirements of the new rank until called upon to demonstrate those requirements; it would be more difficult as an adhoc appointment. ultimately these adhoc promotions are made by the units themselves- in due course they are endorsed by the senior commander through the advice of his support staff and confirmed by the government. unless he had sat down with every soldier on the island, and broken several regulations in the process, Freyberg had no choice but to rely on the appointments made by his subordinate officers.
also, a point often made in the diaries and journals of the troops themselves- they were still recovering from the shock of Greece when the attack began. as has become increasingly apparent from psychological studies 'fighting spirit' is eroded erratically but can only be restored by degrees. the shock of two major campaigns/ battles in the timeframe involved would have caused severe 'psychological disfunction' in a large portion of the troops engaged; particularly as they had been so comprhensively beaten in the first engagement.
Resources- Lavarack and Bennett were in such disfavour politically as before the war they had publicly, and after the war started, privately, said that the Australian Army was poorly equipped for modern warfare. The same was true of New Zealand, though i do not know of any officer who attempted to speak out. The arrival of four ill-equipped commonwealth divisions, plus assorted Indian and British Units, had effectively depleted the ready resources of the Mediterranean command. follow on resources were used up in mounting the Greek intervention; the next echelon of military stores were only just arriving or else were still on their way when battle began. this covered not only aircraft and ammunition but boots and uniforms. even requisition forms were in short supply. the evacuation from Greece had effectively denuded all the units of transport and heavy weapons- the very resources most required in order to mount an effective defence against any invasion. these 'faults' lay in the parsimony of pre-war governments in ensuring the troops were properly equipped from the outset and that sufficient stores were accumulated to last until wartime measures were enacted. Furthermore- because of the Greek political situation- it is unlikely that anyone could have requisitioned Greek supplies without upsetting the delicate balance between the two sides. although one might be tempted to argue that Greece's neutrality had been violated, the pro-fascist elements were in the ascendant and would be arguing for an accomodation with the Germans.
Command- The senior British and Australian officers had been recalled to Cairo owing to the former's failure in Greece and political considerations for the latter. of the three remaining Australian officers only Makay, a poor performing divisional commander, was available to take command. to my knowledge there was no British divisional commander available on the island or immediately despatchable- otherwise, given British sensibilities, they would have been given command already.
The Mode of Attack- for the first and last time in history an opponent proposed to attack a major target utilising only airborne and airtransportable soldiers. by this stage in the war only two major combat drops had been made by the Germans- Norway and Holland- both of which were expected to encounter nil or limited resistence with ground forces to arrive quickly by sea (Norway) or land (Holland). Allied planners raising the first airborne units on both sides of the Atlantic, and with Commando experience to guide them, suggested that such a mode of attack was so risky that it was very unlikely to be contemplated seriously. this opinion was widely circulated in order to ensure the effective use of the special forces as they became operational and to secure support for the eventual doctrine evolved. Freyberg, viewing the 'experts' opinions and with history as a guide, could not be reasonably expected to do otherwise.

finally, in the matter of spatial relations on the battlefield, the Germans had the resources before the war to think in terms of the three dimensional battlefield and put them into practice; the British and Commonwealth generals continued throughout much of the war to think in two dimensions. whenever faced with equal or superior power in the air, the third dimension, the British and Commonwealth (and French) generals performed very badly; even with air superiority they continued to think in two dimensions in its application. for example, whilst the luftwaffe continued to roam the Forward Edge of the Battlefield (FEBA) until it ceased to be a factor, the British Typhoon was conceived and developed as flying artillery or for interdiction of the first echelon of support. contrast this with equivalent American and Russian aircraft, both of whom practiced German methods. one might even contrasting Slim at Imphal with Montgomery at Market Garden; the former took an active interest in air operations whilst the latter left much of the air element to be worked out by his air staff. one could argue that by virtue of his professional shortcomings Freyberg demonstrated this in abundance; but no other British officer who emerged in the European theatre demonstrated any better understanding and several were considerably worse.

and i still don't expect that it will change your mind.
 
Good post bren.

I´ll read it more closely and then rebuke it, (if I can).
But it was a well thought out post with alot of valid points.
Not alot of that going on around here lately.
Credit where credit is due.
 
Ultra message OL (Orange Leonard) 2167 decoded and recieved on Crete 23.40 4/5 1941 breaks down the german assets involved in the operation.

It clearly states.
operational assets:
7:th Flieger division along with corpsgroups out of 11:th fliegerdivision.
Mission to take Maleme and Candia (Hrlaklion) as well as Retimo (Reythmnon).
Airstrikes on the airfields followed by air assault by remaining parts of 11:th Fliegercorps to include HQ and attached Army units.
Last to be Airlifted in will be AA resources and supplies.

Third mountain Ranger regiment (XII:th Army)attached, as well as parts of mechanized units.
Motorbike groups and AT groups will be detached from Army HQ and attached to 11:th fliegercorps.

Note : This third mountain Ranger regiment were 141 reg´t from the 6:th mountainRanger division that were picked to reinforce the 85:th and 100:th MtnR Reg´t and The 95:th mountainRangerartillery reg´t.
The unit was a Divisional unit and were not at first sheduled to take part in the operation. End note.

OL 2/203 recieved Crete 17.45 13/5 1941.
(British assesments of strenghts and mission on invasion force based on picked up issued operational orders.)

Paragraph 1: The Island of Crete will be attacked by the 11:th Fliegercorps and the 7:th Flieger division.
11:th corps will retain command.

Paragraph 2:All preperations including massing of transports,gliders,bombers, fighters, Stukas along with groundforces for the invasion will be completed 17:th of May.

Paragraph 3: Transport of the saeáborn troops will be in cooperation with Admiral southeast (Shuster)He will provide the german and Italian ships (12 in total) escort by Italian light Naval units.
These troops will be attached to 11:th Fliegercorps as soon as they dissembark at Crete.

Paragraph 4: The invasion will be proceeded with heavy bombings to supress the allied defences.

Paragraph 5: The following operations WILL be executed starting day 1.
7:th Fligerdivision will Air drop and take Maleme, Candia and Rethymnon.
Secondly:Stukas and and fighters aprox 100 of each type will be flown to Maleme and Candia.
Third:11:th aircorps including units attached to them will be flown in.
Forth: seaconvoy with attachments including AA capabilities as well as groundforces and supplies.
It goes on for another 8 paragraphs, but none of it touches on the subject at hand.

Freyberg DID know it would be an Airborne effort.
He overread the saeborne part that clearly stated it to be attachments, AA batteries and supplies divided on 12 ships with a light escort.
Key is that the seaborne part would be attached to 11:th Fliegercorps as soon as they landed on Crete.

I don´t expect you to change your opinion and I don´t mean to cut anyone down.
Wrong guy at the wrong place, happens all the time in combat but when it´s a theater commander the consequences are severe.
 
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my information still suggests that any single message at this stage of the war was less than 50% decrypted and that most were in the region of 10-30% decrypted. My primary source is a discussion of the mathematics of the ULTRA and ENIGMA battle in a periodical (Innovation Magazine), but secondary sources include the books 'The Longest Battle' by Richard Hough; 'Business in Great Waters' by John Terraine; and 'Battle Beneath the Waves' by Robert Stern, all of which provide varying detail of the British efforts with ENIGMA. There was also a television programme on the (Aust) Discovery Channel that discussed ULTRA mathematics as the inspiration for modern Digital Encryption. it noted that for much of the war the decryption of ULTRA was less than 50% in any message, hence the interest in using ULTRA primary source mathematics as the starting point for Digital Encryption. of course being media as opposed to historical presentations it may be that the information was generalised and did not account for some anomalies in the process.
As i understand it, and i readily admit to being wrong in my interpretation of the presentation, each figure in the received message in ULTRA, depending on the machine involved and 'wheels' used, was x-number of steps from the original. Each new figure was determined from the resting position of the previous figure. hence the possible combinations grew as the message lengthened and that the first few words were critical in deciphering the rest of the message. this is apparently where the air force and foriegn Ministry codes became weakest- their first few words usually included the location for the source of the message. with practice this word combination could be identified quickly and help to set the deciphering process on the correct track- but that the increasing complexities of the encryption process made decryption progressively harder. the process was a high degree of reverse engineering on the ENIGMA machine and a fair measure of mathematical skill plus a lot of luck.

i would also like to note that my original contention was not that Freyberg did well, but that there was nobody available to do better, hence the mention of spatial relations on the battlefield and its impact on the performance of the majority of British and Commonwealth general officers. a friend has suggested that the Canadian senior officer, whose name we could not remember and is still annoyingly beyond recall, and Horrocks, where they had the option, also did well in organising air power to support the battlefront.
i think that it is often too easy to 'blame' the professional shortcomings of the officers involved in some of these 'forlorn hopes' when the general systems in which they were trained, and the support provided by their governments, was more responsible for the outcome than any effort made by the commander themselves. Whether the Duke of York in the 1790's or Lord Raglan in the 1850's or Lord Gort in 1940, these were honourable, if unspectacular, men who tried their best but were ultimatley let down by the lack of support at their disposal; the ultimate outcomes of their various campaigns would not have been altered by any of their contemporaries given the support provided. i think the same consideration applies to Freyberg at Crete.
either way, it was the lack of preparation by the British and Commonwealth governments in the lead up to the second world war that led to the early disasters; as an example of this lack of preparation the majority of machine guns available for Australian home defence in the early years of the war were drawn from the stock of deactivated German MGs taken after world war one and distributed as prizes to various towns and RSL groups. it should also be noted that the decision to take back these weapons was only made after the war had started.
 
As you can see in my post above the pertinent information was available and NOT acted on.
That was the point I was debating.
Your point on allied commanders on a level higher then fullbird is a valid one but that has nothing to do with the fact that IMO Freyberg did a pisspoor job.
You say noone would have done a better job?
Well we can´t know that can we?

As you know when it comes down to it you can´t blame other people for your misstakes in the military and I still think ALOT not could have but SHOULD been done better based on the available intel.
All I´m saying.

The critcal fact is the Maleme field were to be the chokepoint of the entire operation.
With his failiure to dispose his forces the right way the Maleme field were lost and so the Island of Crete.
 
in researching this topic i may have discovered a source for Freyberg's intransigence in persisting with a defence predicated on an amphibious landing. the decrypt you provided, according to my reading, may not have come from Ultra, but it could have come from the Italians. it was felt that, given that Crete fell within the Italian sphere and the close relationship between Mussolini and Hitler, the Germans should inform the Italians of the operation. this in itself is inconclusive as an envoy would have been used to convey the information. But the general who eventually led the Italian amphibious operation against the island in support of the Germans communicated to the Germans his willingness to launch an invasion on the day the paratroops landed. this, by inference, required that he be informed of the operation which may have been done by way of a coded message in a cipher the British had long broken. The Germans, apparently, declined the offer to the Italian high command but not the man on the spot. His preparations went ahead as he fully expected the attack to run into trouble and that his forces would be required sooner rather than later. So it may be that, in light of Italian preparations and decrypts, that Freyberg learnt of the intention to land Italian troops but not that the Germans were proceeding with their plan to send airborne troops only. this is all speculation of course and i have no information that points definitively to this scenario being correct, but it does fit the facts.
i did discover, however, that Freyberg had recommended that all airfields and harbour installations be destroyed to prevent their seizure by the Germans and Italians. no mention is made as to whether this was related to any intelligence information, rather to the lack of reality in the thinking of some officers at the time. the request was denied on the basis that the Staff higher up believed that the island could be utilised for a return to Southern Europe in the very near future.
as for the contention that we will never know who would have done a better job i admit that we couldn't know, but i thought that this was what the post was about? to find scenarios by which the invasion could have been defeated? if, as you contend, Freyberg was so inferior a general then one of those scenarios would, surely, be to speculate who might have done better? in my opinion the British lacked any officer at that time and in that theatre who might have done a better job. we could point to Horrocks or Slim from later and ask 'what about him?' but neither was in a position to do so, though i believe Slim would have done better had he been present at the time. similarly Horrocks could have been a good choice but i do not know that he commanded an infantry force in the war so it is difficult to speculate on his responses given similar circumstances without armour to rely on.
i also should acknowledge that i erred when i contended that there was no armour on the island. it turns out that there were 8 Matilda tanks which Freyberg tried to use as mobile pillboxes. unfortunately all broke down or were destroyed in the first twenty- four hours. one wonders if these vehicles were expected to play more of a role in a mobile defence than circumstances allowed.
 
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