Why Britain and France didn’t attack Germany
No one, in September 1938, quite knew where the British Army was going to fight. By that date military arrangements were more or less complete for the impressive total of two divisions to be transferred to France, if a decision were taken that way; but there was no plan for their employment, nor had any promises been made to the French. On the air side, in the same way, a scheme was reasonably complete for the despatch to France, if necessary, of an Advanced Air Striking Force; but though arrangements for the reception, maintenance and defence of the Force had been discussed with the French, no agreement had been sought on its use. The Advance Air Striking Force, in fact, was to be what its name implied, it was to go to France, if it did go, not to help the French Army, or even the British Army, but to get the shorter-ranged bombers within striking distance of German industry. As befitted their degree of importance, arrangements of this nature had been concerted largely through the Attachés. But if it was a question of framing a joint system of command and a joint strategy, full Staff Conversations on a higher level would clearly be required. And now, after Munich, the Chiefs of Staff at length agreed with the Foreign Office that the advantages of these would outweigh their dangers.
The time was indeed ripe. Not only was the German threat mounting in Europe; it was opening up fearful vistas of simultaneous conflict all over the world. At some stage it would almost inevitably encourage Japan to attack in the Far East. Still more certainly would it lead to trouble in the Mediterranean and Middle East. For Mussolini, smarting from 'sanctions', convinced of French decadence, lusting for easy loot, and lost in a mixture of ear and admiration of his Nordic imitator, already seemed determined to range Italy alongside Germany. In February 1939 the Cabinet accordingly endorsed the view of the Chiefs of Staff that we should now concert detailed arrangements with France, and if possible with Belgium and Holland, for the event of war against Germany, Italy and Japan. The die was cast; but the casting was done with due discretion. Anxious to avoid either general alarm or 'precipitate action on the part of Herr Hitler', the Chiefs of Staff delegated the duty of conducting the Conversations to the less conspicuous Joint Planning Committee.
Two weeks before the British and French delegations were due to meet, Germany added further point to their deliberations by occupying Prague and dismembering Czechoslovakia. Even those who have given Hitler the benefit of the doubt the previous September were now convinced: behind the fervour of the fanatic they at last perceived, what indeed had been there all too obviously from the start, the morals of a gangster. To tolerate further aggression from such a source would be merely to invite Britain´s own ultimate downfall. Anglo-French guarantees were therefore hastily extended to the next potential victims; and the Cabinet, having by now concluded that more than two divisions must be earmarked for the Continent after all, decided to double the Territorial Army and introduce conscription.
The Anglo-French Staff Conversations which opened in London on 29th March 1939, continued at various places, stages and levels, until they were caught up in the closer collaboration of war. They revealed from the start a broad identity of view. Germany and Italy, initially the stronger both on land and in the air, but unable to increase their potential during the conflict to the same degree as their opponents, would stake their chances on a short war. It was thus the interest of the democracies to buy time and gather strength—to interruption, to build up armaments, to ensure 'the benevolent neutrality or active assistance of other powers, particularly the U.S.A.', to apply economy pressure and harass Axis trade—but not to launch a major offensive, either by land or air. Rather must the Allies await the German offensive and, if it took the form of a land movement through Holland, Belgium or Switzerland, hold it as far forward as possible.
The German assault once contained, the Allies could then proceed to capture the Italian colonies, eliminate Italy, and, in the fullness of time, defeat Germany—though 'no date and no possible line of action' could yet be fixed for this final task. As for the broad chances of success, the Allies should probably be able to win only with the help of further allies if Japan intervened; but if Japan remained neutral, 'once the Allies had been able to develop the full fighting strength of the British and French Empires they should regard the outcome of the war with confidence.
This appreciation was arrived at before the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland. When that guarantee was accepted, it became necessary to consider in detail the implications of the Polish alliance. The small Polish Air Force, it was concluded, might compel Germany to keep one-fifth of her fighters and anti-aircraft guns in the East. This would reduce Germany's power to resist British and French air attack in the West. The Polish contribution on land would be still more important; for though Germany could certainly knock out Poland by concentrating against her in force, the divisions required to hold down a captive Poland a guard against a possible Russian attack might be scarcely fewer than those required for the initial conquest. All the same the Poles could not survive for any length of time unless they were supplied by a friendly Russia. Against a German invasion Britain and France could give them no direct help, either by land, sea or air.
The real power behind an enduring Eastern front was thus acknowledged to be Russia. This was a fact on which the French placed greater stress than the British. The British view was that the Russian army, for all its 200 divisions, could not overcome the effect of purges, political commissars, and poor communications, and would be incapable of operating outside its own country. The Russian Air Force, too, in spite of its numbers, was thought to show many weaknesses. The Eastern force could probably not reinforce the Western, there was no great store of reserves, most of the bombers were slow and obsolescent, and the fighters were not up to British or German standards. Although the vital importance in the East of a neutral and friendly Russia was clearly recognized, Britain thus placed equal, or even greater, emphasis on the benefits of an alliance with Turkey.
This, then, was the shape of things to come as it appeared to the Allies. Poland would be a useful, but far from decisive helpmate; she could be restored to the map of Europe after an Anglo-French victory, but not saved from conquest meanwhile. The basic strategy of gathering strength and friends, holding the German offensive, knocking out the Italian colonies and then Italy, and finally attacking Germany, remained unaffected. And indeed the course of the war, in its broadest outline, was to conform remarkably to this general conception; though no one foretold that the German onslaught in the West would sweep unchecked through Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France before it faltered and failed in the skies of Britain.
As the spring and summer of 1939 wore on, and all the sickeningly familiar preliminaries to a fresh German aggression were set in train over Danzig, Anglo-French plans crystallized. The reception of the Advance Air Striking Force, the protection of British bases and airfields in France, the collaboration of British bombers with the Allied Armies in resisting a German attack through the Low Countries, the arrangements for liaison and command, the division of labour in an air counter-offensive against the Luftwaffe—all these matters were arranged in some detail. In this spirit of preparation, bombs for the Advanced Air Striking Force were laid down in the Rheims area under the guise of a sale to the French Air Force; and a link between Jersey and the Cherbourg Peninsula, forged largely by the energy of the British Post Office, brought into being a new cross-Channel cable at a respectful distance from the Belgian frontier. Many other subjects of mutual concern, however, received less attention. Discussion of a joint air offensive against German war industry, for instance, was still in its infancy. This was not because British plans were insufficiently advanced. It was partly because they did not contemplate operations of this character for the opening phase of the war, partly because the French had no bombers capable of penetrating German territory.