17 september 1939

@ panzercracker

Where did I said I agreed..... I could never agree with any nazi propaganda........

I posted that pic. coz I thought that as you said, it hold some twisted truth and irony...meanwhile, I clearly stated the word "propaganda"



It is foolish to assume that whole responsibility should go to allies...... But indeed they did nothing even when they could have been a great help to polish cause.........
 
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How does any expect the Allied troops to break through the German Western Wall a heavily fortified defence line which had only just been completed in 1939. Hitler built this to protect his western flank while he attacked Poland, now have any of you who say that the Allies could have swept over Germany ever taken the time to study these defeces. Also you go on about Britain bombing Germany now have you studied the bombers that we had in service at this time. They were the Single engine Fairy Battle which were shot down in squadrons when they tried to stop the German advance into France, then there was the Bombay and the Whitley both twin engined and very slow and could not be used for day light bombing raids as they were such an easy target. the fastest bomber the RAF was the Hampton which was already out of date when the war started and this aircraft suffered huge losses when it was used during day light raids. Now navigation in those days was all dead reckoning where you worked out the airspeed and direction of the aircraft plus the winds plus heavy cloud cover stopping you from picking up landmarks and changing winds when on a night bombing mission you were lucky to get with in five miles of your target. It was until Bomber Harris took over at Bomber Command did he set up the path finders and many other aids to navigation which made the RAF a proper fighting force. Bombing Germany just done by single bombers going for different targets which were mainly nuisance raids. It was until late 1940 that the Wellington bomber came into service which was an improvement and it was 1941 before the four engine bombers started to arrive which could then take the war to Germany.
 
How does any expect the Allied troops to break through the German Western Wall a heavily fortified defence line which had only just been completed in 1939.
Its incredible man, you're like a f*cking brick wall, i can write the same over and over and you ignore it.

The West Wall was neither completed nor armed nor staffed, it was not heavily fortified, it was in no state to repell any sort of attack.

The pillboxes and forts that you quote either did not exist, did not have any weapons whatsoever or were being built, in fact the West Wall was and you continually ignore the fact that people defending the West Wall in 1939 were nothing short of militia units without any heavy weapons, reserves or training.

Are you related to Chamberlain or just enjoy ignoring people.
 
How does any expect the Allied troops to break through the German Western Wall a heavily fortified defence line which had only just been completed in 1939. Hitler built this to protect his western flank while he attacked Poland, now have any of you who say that the Allies could have swept over Germany ever taken the time to study these defeces. Also you go on about Britain bombing Germany now have you studied the bombers that we had in service at this time. They were the Single engine Fairy Battle which were shot down in squadrons when they tried to stop the German advance into France, then there was the Bombay and the Whitley both twin engined and very slow and could not be used for day light bombing raids as they were such an easy target. the fastest bomber the RAF was the Hampton which was already out of date when the war started and this aircraft suffered huge losses when it was used during day light raids. Now navigation in those days was all dead reckoning where you worked out the airspeed and direction of the aircraft plus the winds plus heavy cloud cover stopping you from picking up landmarks and changing winds when on a night bombing mission you were lucky to get with in five miles of your target. It was until Bomber Harris took over at Bomber Command did he set up the path finders and many other aids to navigation which made the RAF a proper fighting force. Bombing Germany just done by single bombers going for different targets which were mainly nuisance raids. It was until late 1940 that the Wellington bomber came into service which was an improvement and it was 1941 before the four engine bombers started to arrive which could then take the war to Germany.

The German Western Wall (The Siegfried Line) was not a heavily fortified defense line.

The Siegfried Line was much more valuable as a propaganda tool than as a military defense. German propaganda, both at home and abroad, repeatedly portrayed the line during its construction as an unbreachable bulwark.

For Germans the building of the line represented the regime's defensive intentions, whereas for neighbouring countries it appeared threatening and reassuring at the same time. This strategy proved very successful from the Nazi point of view both at the start and at the end of the World War II. At the start of the war, the opposing troops remained behind their own defense lines, allowing the Germans to attack Czechoslovakia and Poland, and at the end of the war, the invading forces spent more time than necessary at the half-finished, now-gutted Siegfried Line, thus allowing military maneuvers in the east. In this light, the Siegfried Line can be seen as the Nazis' greatest propaganda success, with wide-ranging consequences.

That the Siegfried Line was, despite its real weakness, seen as a major obstacle by the Allies is shown by the fact that they even went to the trouble of making up a defiant song about it:

The RAF did not attempt to bomb German military installations because, as the Air Staff concluded on September 20: "Since the immutable aim of the Allies is the ultimate defeat of Germany, without which the fate of Poland is permanently sealed, it would obviously be militarily unsound and to the disadvantage of all, including Poland, to undertake at any given moment operations ... unlikely to achieve effective results, merely for the sake of maintaining a gesture."

The Chiefs of Staff agreed, informing 10 Downing Street that "nothing we can do in the air in the Western Theatre would have any effect of relieving pressure on Poland." And so the RAF decided instead to drop propaganda leaflets. But the RAF was capable

The first serious RAF raid was an attempt to bomb the German navy at Wihelmshafen in December 1939. It was a disaster because Prime Minister Chamberlain had issued strict orders that the RAF was not to bomb private property

Another early RAF raid was that of 25 August 1940 on Berlin, when about 50 Wellington bombers actually got through and bombed an astonished German capital in the mid evening. It didn't do much damage but it gave the Nazi regime the shrieking ab-dabs.
 
Why Britain and France didn’t attack Germany

No one, in September 1938, quite knew where the British Army was going to fight. By that date military arrangements were more or less complete for the impressive total of two divisions to be transferred to France, if a decision were taken that way; but there was no plan for their employment, nor had any promises been made to the French. On the air side, in the same way, a scheme was reasonably complete for the despatch to France, if necessary, of an Advanced Air Striking Force; but though arrangements for the reception, maintenance and defence of the Force had been discussed with the French, no agreement had been sought on its use. The Advance Air Striking Force, in fact, was to be what its name implied, it was to go to France, if it did go, not to help the French Army, or even the British Army, but to get the shorter-ranged bombers within striking distance of German industry. As befitted their degree of importance, arrangements of this nature had been concerted largely through the Attachés. But if it was a question of framing a joint system of command and a joint strategy, full Staff Conversations on a higher level would clearly be required. And now, after Munich, the Chiefs of Staff at length agreed with the Foreign Office that the advantages of these would outweigh their dangers.

The time was indeed ripe. Not only was the German threat mounting in Europe; it was opening up fearful vistas of simultaneous conflict all over the world. At some stage it would almost inevitably encourage Japan to attack in the Far East. Still more certainly would it lead to trouble in the Mediterranean and Middle East. For Mussolini, smarting from 'sanctions', convinced of French decadence, lusting for easy loot, and lost in a mixture of ear and admiration of his Nordic imitator, already seemed determined to range Italy alongside Germany. In February 1939 the Cabinet accordingly endorsed the view of the Chiefs of Staff that we should now concert detailed arrangements with France, and if possible with Belgium and Holland, for the event of war against Germany, Italy and Japan. The die was cast; but the casting was done with due discretion. Anxious to avoid either general alarm or 'precipitate action on the part of Herr Hitler', the Chiefs of Staff delegated the duty of conducting the Conversations to the less conspicuous Joint Planning Committee.

Two weeks before the British and French delegations were due to meet, Germany added further point to their deliberations by occupying Prague and dismembering Czechoslovakia. Even those who have given Hitler the benefit of the doubt the previous September were now convinced: behind the fervour of the fanatic they at last perceived, what indeed had been there all too obviously from the start, the morals of a gangster. To tolerate further aggression from such a source would be merely to invite Britain´s own ultimate downfall. Anglo-French guarantees were therefore hastily extended to the next potential victims; and the Cabinet, having by now concluded that more than two divisions must be earmarked for the Continent after all, decided to double the Territorial Army and introduce conscription.

The Anglo-French Staff Conversations which opened in London on 29th March 1939, continued at various places, stages and levels, until they were caught up in the closer collaboration of war. They revealed from the start a broad identity of view. Germany and Italy, initially the stronger both on land and in the air, but unable to increase their potential during the conflict to the same degree as their opponents, would stake their chances on a short war. It was thus the interest of the democracies to buy time and gather strength—to interruption, to build up armaments, to ensure 'the benevolent neutrality or active assistance of other powers, particularly the U.S.A.', to apply economy pressure and harass Axis trade—but not to launch a major offensive, either by land or air. Rather must the Allies await the German offensive and, if it took the form of a land movement through Holland, Belgium or Switzerland, hold it as far forward as possible.

The German assault once contained, the Allies could then proceed to capture the Italian colonies, eliminate Italy, and, in the fullness of time, defeat Germany—though 'no date and no possible line of action' could yet be fixed for this final task. As for the broad chances of success, the Allies should probably be able to win only with the help of further allies if Japan intervened; but if Japan remained neutral, 'once the Allies had been able to develop the full fighting strength of the British and French Empires they should regard the outcome of the war with confidence.

This appreciation was arrived at before the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland. When that guarantee was accepted, it became necessary to consider in detail the implications of the Polish alliance. The small Polish Air Force, it was concluded, might compel Germany to keep one-fifth of her fighters and anti-aircraft guns in the East. This would reduce Germany's power to resist British and French air attack in the West. The Polish contribution on land would be still more important; for though Germany could certainly knock out Poland by concentrating against her in force, the divisions required to hold down a captive Poland a guard against a possible Russian attack might be scarcely fewer than those required for the initial conquest. All the same the Poles could not survive for any length of time unless they were supplied by a friendly Russia. Against a German invasion Britain and France could give them no direct help, either by land, sea or air.

The real power behind an enduring Eastern front was thus acknowledged to be Russia. This was a fact on which the French placed greater stress than the British. The British view was that the Russian army, for all its 200 divisions, could not overcome the effect of purges, political commissars, and poor communications, and would be incapable of operating outside its own country. The Russian Air Force, too, in spite of its numbers, was thought to show many weaknesses. The Eastern force could probably not reinforce the Western, there was no great store of reserves, most of the bombers were slow and obsolescent, and the fighters were not up to British or German standards. Although the vital importance in the East of a neutral and friendly Russia was clearly recognized, Britain thus placed equal, or even greater, emphasis on the benefits of an alliance with Turkey.

This, then, was the shape of things to come as it appeared to the Allies. Poland would be a useful, but far from decisive helpmate; she could be restored to the map of Europe after an Anglo-French victory, but not saved from conquest meanwhile. The basic strategy of gathering strength and friends, holding the German offensive, knocking out the Italian colonies and then Italy, and finally attacking Germany, remained unaffected. And indeed the course of the war, in its broadest outline, was to conform remarkably to this general conception; though no one foretold that the German onslaught in the West would sweep unchecked through Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France before it faltered and failed in the skies of Britain.

As the spring and summer of 1939 wore on, and all the sickeningly familiar preliminaries to a fresh German aggression were set in train over Danzig, Anglo-French plans crystallized. The reception of the Advance Air Striking Force, the protection of British bases and airfields in France, the collaboration of British bombers with the Allied Armies in resisting a German attack through the Low Countries, the arrangements for liaison and command, the division of labour in an air counter-offensive against the Luftwaffe—all these matters were arranged in some detail. In this spirit of preparation, bombs for the Advanced Air Striking Force were laid down in the Rheims area under the guise of a sale to the French Air Force; and a link between Jersey and the Cherbourg Peninsula, forged largely by the energy of the British Post Office, brought into being a new cross-Channel cable at a respectful distance from the Belgian frontier. Many other subjects of mutual concern, however, received less attention. Discussion of a joint air offensive against German war industry, for instance, was still in its infancy. This was not because British plans were insufficiently advanced. It was partly because they did not contemplate operations of this character for the opening phase of the war, partly because the French had no bombers capable of penetrating German territory.
 
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As the arrangements between Great Britain and France proceeded, and as the international situation grew steadily worse, the two countries quickened their efforts to gain allies. But a request for staff conversations with Belgium was rebuffed on the orders of a King wedded to the hope of neutrality, and there seemed little point in seeking contacts with the Dutch if the Belgians refused to cooperation. With the Turks a more realistic attitude prevailed, and by June a political agreement had been concluded and military discussions initiated. Meanwhile, in the direction which mattered most, a blank greeted all efforts. For reasons best known in Moscow, but which certainly included the understandable reluctance of the Poles to allow a Russian army on their soil, the democratic advances were met with an early but choice example of negotiation à la Molotov. An Anglo-French Military Mission at length arrived in the Russian capital, only to cool its heels while the Russians concluded their agreement with the Germans. With the Kremlin thus deliberately showing Hitler the green light, the world waited for war.

There was not long to wait. The Russo-German Pact was announced on 21st August. On 22nd August the German Commanders-in-Chief foregathered at Obersalzberg; many of them, having already heard from their Führer's lips on 23rd May that he would attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity, had spent the summer months perfecting the necessary plans. Now they were informed by Hitler that, after a 'special step' on his part, an agreement with Russia had been reached the previous day: that Poland at last was where he wanted her: and that living space in the East must be acquired while Germany was still guided by his own unique self. Italy by Mussolini, Spain by Franco, and England and France by no one more significant than the 'miserable worms' he had seen at Munich. France, Hitler assured his commanders, lacked men, arms and stomach for the venture; as for Britain, her vaunted rearmament was largely a sham, with the naval programme in arrears, the Expeditionary Force limited to three divisions, and only 150 anti-aircraft guns available for home defence. 'We need not be afraid of a blockade,' the Führer continued, 'the East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc … I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.' All was ready; frontier incidents would be created; and the attack would begin the following Saturday, 26th August.

The day after this meeting, on 23rd August, the British Cabinet decided to initiate various confidential measures scheduled for an emergency, and in the evening Royal Air Force Units received orders to mobilize unobtrusively to war establishment. On the morning of 24th August green envelopes bearing the word 'MOBILIZATION' in large letters—a curious divulgence, hastily rectified by over-stamping—began to descend on the homes of the Auxiliary Air Force, the main body of the Reserve, and 3,000 of the Volunteer Reserve; while visitors to the Royal Air Force Club in Piccadilly noted with surprise the floods of telegrams which threatened to engulf the entrance. The Reservists made their brief farewells and hastened off to the mobilization centres—some, indeed, who were caught up on their annual training, had no need to travel. But Hitler, as it turned out, was smitten by a momentary doubt—a doubt which arose, not from the appeals of Chamberlain or Daladier or Roosevelt or the Pope, but from the fact that on 25th August the British guarantee to Poland was confirmed by a hard and fast alliance between the two countries. It was thus now abundantly clear, even to Ribbentrop, that an attack on Poland would mean a general European war; and at the same time Hitler also learned that in such a war he would not at the outset receive the help of his ill-prepared Italian ally. The operation against Poland was therefore postponed for a few days while the Führer made a cursory effort to secure the fruits of conquest without resort to arms. The attempt failed; and on 31st August the order was given to march against Poland the following morning.

The last week of peace saw British and French Staff delegations—this time led by the military advisers designate to the Supreme War Council—again conferring in a series of formal meetings in London. Since the Italians seemed as yet to have little zest for a conflict—Hitler had force the pace before they were quite ready—and since Italian neutrality was preferable to Italian hostility, British commanders overseas had already been ordered to avoid any action which would bring in Italy against Britain. The French were now invited to issue similar instructions. British commanders had also been instructed to limit bombardment to purely military objectives in the narrowest sense of the term; and it was agreed to issue a joint declaration of this policy and of determination to observe the rules concerning gas, submarines and air attack on shipping. This was the logical outcome not only of a sincere desire to limit the horrors of war, but also of Britain’s decision to stand on the defensive until they had gathered strength—a decision which naturally entailed avoiding all provocative action.

While bombardment was so far restricted, Britain should, of course, be unable to carry out its most far-reaching plans, including those for attack on German industrial resources. But this aspect of the matter did not unduly disturb the Air Staff, who had long before perceived the solution … 'this delicate and difficult problem may well be solved for us by the Germans, who are perhaps unlikely to refrain, for more than a limited period at most, from actions that would force the Allies from all legal restrictions'.

With the invasion of Poland on 1st September, full mobilization was publicly proclaimed in Great Britain. By that time the process was already virtually complete in the Royal Air Force. Units, both at home and overseas, had moved to war stations; the air defence system was manned, and 'look-out' begun; civil aircraft and airfields were about to be requisitioned; Coastal Commands' North Sea patrols were on the watch for German commerce-raiders. In the afternoon of 2nd September, the ten Battle Squadrons of the Advanced Air Striking Force winged their way across to the heart of the champagne country, landed, refuelled and bombed up. When, shortly after eleven o'clock the following morning, the embittered accents of a disillusioned Prime Minister announced that Britain were at war with Germany.
 
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I wonder if any people have seen any thing at all about the Western Wall. It was massive undertaking. one million tons of Concrete was poured, and lorries were requisition from all over Germany. Ten of thousands of men were conscripted into building teams including the Hitler Youth..The tank traps stretched some 400 miles in an unbroken line and these were covered in barb wire. The Bunkers were up to 12 feet thick and heavily reinforced with steel girders. These defences went out of use when Hitler over run France but were put back into use when the Allies arrived at the German Border. Or does every one think that these defences were only built after the Allies were threating Germany. Yes there was an unwritten agreement that neither air force would bomb the Civilians and that lasted until the Germans bombed London in 1940, first of by mistake then the whole thing changed.
 
I wonder if any people have seen any thing at all about the Western Wall. It was massive undertaking. one million tons of Concrete was poured, and lorries were requisition from all over Germany. Ten of thousands of men were conscripted into building teams including the Hitler Youth..The tank traps stretched some 400 miles in an unbroken line and these were covered in barb wire. The Bunkers were up to 12 feet thick and heavily reinforced with steel girders.
All true Lee but these were not around in 1939, the dragon teeth were not there, the main forts such as "Cats Head" were not there, the Siegfried Line aka Westwall that you quote became reality in August 24, 1944 when 20.000 forced laborers and massive supplies of concrete were redirected from the Atlantic Wall to Westwall.

In 1939 Westwall was nothing but light field fortifications, trenches, woodworks and minefields with an odd pillbox, the large bunkers were not there neither were the pillboxes that would give allies so much trouble, the only concrete structures were those from Hindenburg Line.

You point is pointless so to speak, there were no serious defence lines in place in 1939, the only thing between over half a milion French and hundreds of tanks, thousands of guns and planes was less then 200.000 people with bolt action rifles and about 200 WWI era guns huddling in makeshift trenches and wood/earthwork bunkers.

Yes there was an unwritten agreement that neither air force would bomb the Civilians and that lasted until the Germans bombed London in 1940, first of by mistake then the whole thing changed.
Germany bombed civilians in Poland and Russia, UK knew and didnt care which only deepends how hideous and massive the betrayal of Poland was.
 
So all the photographs of the dragoons teeth on the German borders strectching mile after mile in the papers of the day were all false, well its nice to know that after all these years.
 
Germany bombed civilians in Poland and Russia, UK knew and didnt care which only deepends how hideous and massive the betrayal of Poland was.

The Anglo-French basic strategy was to gathering strength and friends, holding the German offensive, knocking out the Italian colonies and then Italy, and finally attacking Germany. Poland would be a useful, but far from decisive helpmate; she could be restored to the map of Europe after an Anglo-French victory, but not saved from conquest meanwhile.

And indeed the course of the war, in its broadest outline, was to conform remarkably to this general conception; though no one foretold that the German onslaught in the West would sweep unchecked through Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries and France before it faltered and failed in the skies of Britain.

That’s what I would call a “betrayal of necessity”.
 
So all the photographs of the dragoons teeth on the German borders strectching mile after mile in the papers of the day were all false, well its nice to know that after all these years.

Lee; Panzercracker is right.

The Siegfried Line was much more valuable as a propaganda tool than as a military defense

This text is from the book: Germany’s West Wall by Neil Short.

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So all the photographs of the dragoons teeth on the German borders strectching mile after mile in the papers of the day were all false, well its nice to know that after all these years.
Show me one photograph of dragons teeth belts on the Siegfried Line in 1939 and i'll conceed everything.

Yes there were local dragon teeth blocking roads, bridges but the belts of them did not exist untill 1944, basically if you wanted to you could drive around them.

The belts themselves were proposed by Speers subordinate (lost the name going to go into publications to find it) and installed from materials prepared for the Atlantic Wall in 44.

In 1939 Westwall is trenches, earthworks, an odd WWI bunker without weapons and some minefields, all of it guarded by elderly or teenage reservists with bolt action rifles.

UK and France can pat themselves on the back for bravery and military foresight on that one, then again if your ancestors had as much balls as you its no wonder UK and France betrayed Poland.

The Anglo-French basic strategy was to gathering strength and friends, holding the German offensive, knocking out the Italian colonies and then Italy, and finally attacking Germany. Poland would be a useful, but far from decisive helpmate; she could be restored to the map of Europe after an Anglo-French victory, but not saved from conquest meanwhile.

Really? How would they win without Poland? Last i checked Poland was the only country that managed to tie down the Wechrmacht in anything resembling a stalemate all the way untill Stalingrad.

While Polish army was a bunch of guys with sticks there was over a million of them and unlike French they wanted and could fight, failing to support a minor power that could bear the brunt of the offensive and tie down Germany's most valuable units was nothing short of stupidity.

Also c'mon tell me what on earth could Germans do if France attacked? I think that we can agree no amount of military genius could help Germany hold its Western border, shifting units quickly was impossible, France could have easily capture Germany all the way to Berlin by the time Germans could shift.
 
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Maybe the Allies could have reached the west bank of the Rhine without too much difficulty in the first few weeks of the war - all the Germans could do would be to fight a delaying action. Crossing the Rhine and exploiting a bridgehead would be very difficult without command of the air.

The one thing no-one has mentioned so far is the Luftwaffe, which unlike the German Army was stronger in 1939 than the French and British air forces put together. Remember the British and Americans had quite a tough time fighting the German Army in 1944-45 even with the benefit of total air superiority!

I think the Allies would have been pushed out of Germany by the main German army after its return from Poland, in the winter of 1939-40.

But French military strategy for war with Germany was to remain on the defensive, until France’s own army was strong enough to seize the initiative.
 
its no wonder UK and France betrayed Poland

The pact said they would declare War on Germany if she invaded Poland.
This they did.
The strategy was clear. A long term effort to defeat Germany rather than hasty local offensives to save Poland in the short term.
It worked.

You get the usual carping from those who never entered the conflict willingly and hung back till it was nearly over but hey that's just their latent guilt surfacing!
 
The pact said they would declare War on Germany if she invaded Poland.

The pact was much more than that single line........Read the whole pact and you "ll know it was utter betrayal....But polish should have known this given the recent betrayals of britain and france
 
I think the Allies would have been pushed out of Germany by the main German army after its return from Poland, in the winter of 1939-40.
Since you seem to know a lot about Sept campaign i dont have to tell you that Germans were by 15Sept stalemated by Poles and actually sent quite desperate letters to Stalin to attack, the Winter of 1939 was a winter of a century so its unlikely the war in Poland would be over with France involved and Poland not invaded by Russia.

Agree about Luftwaffe but it still needed to be divided between two fronts.
The pact said they would declare War on Germany if she invaded Poland.
This they did.
The strategy was clear. A long term effort to defeat Germany rather than hasty local offensives to save Poland in the short term.
It worked.

You get the usual carping from those who never entered the conflict willingly and hung back till it was nearly over but hey that's just their latent guilt surfacing!

Why wasnt Poland told then? Poland was promised direct military support with all available forces not leaflets and declarations, i dont care what the covert stategies of the West were, they did not meet their promises to their ally and in fact hastened said ally downfall with their requests such as delaying polish mobilisation.

Thats betrayal.

Aslo Poland never joined a conflict willingly? Twice it saved Europe, under Vienna from Turkey, under Warsaw from Russia, it fought to defend Hungary, Austria, Germany, it brought safety and stability to Ukraine and its the only country in history to actually invade and succesfully occupy Russia, twice. So your point is?
 
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Why wasnt Poland told then? Poland was promised direct military support with all available forces not leaflets and declarations,

It was. The fact that it was not what they wanted to hear has no bearing on what was planned for.


i dont care what the covert stategies of the West were, they did not meet their promises to their ally and in fact hastened said ally downfall with their requests such as delaying polish mobilisation.

Comprehension problems? The aim was to declare war on Germany and defeat her IN THE LONG TERM.


Thats betrayal.

No it is Realpolitik. I.E politics or diplomacy based primarily on practical considerations, rather than ideological notions or moralistic premises.

Aslo Poland never joined a conflict willingly? Twice it saved Europe, under Vienna from Turkey, under Warsaw from Russia, it fought to defend Hungary, Austria, Germany, it brought safety and stability to Ukraine and its the only country in history to actually invade and succesfully occupy Russia, twice. So your point is?

Brought stability to Ukraine? I think you will find Polish actions in Ukraine include a number of mass killings and other violations of the norms of war. Not all one sided but Poland certainly was not on the side of the Angels in that one.
Anyway I was having a dig at another nation that made a habit of late entry into a conflict and then claiming all the credit for the victory.................
 
See Pictures and stories about the Western Wall 1939

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siegfried_Line#Tank_traps

Lovely.

1. None of the Limes have been armed or equipped with comms or even the armored doors in 1939.

2. Dragon teeth belts were all laid in 1944, one of the pictures you posted comes from an article about fighting in Hurtgen forest and the other (black and white) is a post war photograph, if you want me to i can actually dig up articles from which they're in.

3. Your own article admits that the line was completely unfit to defend, read the sources you quote.


@Mkenny.

Poland was promised immidiate and substantial aid and relief via military action, Poland was not privy to any of the longer term plans instead it was directly reassured of the immidiate and decisive support it would receive even during the war.

Dress it up as Realpolitik if you want, the unconditional fact is however that the UK and France promised one thing and delivered nothing, thats lying and in the broader perspective treason.

Poland was used as a shield and lied to so the West could utilise said meat shield most effectively which it did not, not only was Poland betrayed but the time it bought with its enormous efforts was completely wasted by both countries (France and UK).

While morally unredeemable i could understand selling Poland out and betraying her if it served a strategic purpose, as it is polish involvement created the one and only possibility to decisively and quickly destroy the 3rd Reich with agressive involvement of France and to a lesser degree UK.

To cover that up both countries would later on completely cover up the sheer magnitude of the campaign in Poland in 1939 and today you have people like Ijdaw jawdroppingly find out that in September 1939 Poles launched offensives with 250.000 men or fought battles larger and more hard fought then the entire Ardennes Campaign.

So not only was this treason nasty but it has academic repercussions in diminishing the enormous opportunity Poland created for the West in 1939 and the sheer magnitude of the strategic blunder that was not attacking Germany then and there.

As for Ukraine.

Poland brought safety from the Tartars during the renessaince, built magnificent cities, schools, hospitals and universities, introduced advanced technologies and improved infrastructure, untill Ukrainians got uppity and tried to take away Polish regions of Ukraine there was no trouble, sorry but after 500~ years of building the region up from a bunch of unwashed podunk villages to our country's cultural and industrial jewel while Ukrainians herded pigs and got dead drunk we werent going to just give up our property so its only natural we kicked their asses.

Also Poland did not commit any attrocities in Ukraine, you will find that Ukrainian UPA partisans who collaborated with Hitler did so fighting bravely against women and children.
 
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Poland used the situation in 1938 to bully and demand cocessions from her neighbours.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1938_Polish_ultimatum_to_Lithuania

I doubt if Lithuania and Czechoslovakia thought Poland was a good neighbour!http://www.amazon.co.uk/Polish-Atrocities-Ukraine-Emil-Revyuk/dp/1154946649

while Ukrainians herded pigs and got dead drunk we werent going to just give up our property so its only natural we kicked their asses.

Sounds just like how the Nazis thought of the Poles. Perhaps you recognise the irony?


Also Poland did not commit any attrocities in Ukraine, you will find that Ukrainian UPA partisans who collaborated with Hitler did so fighting bravely against women and children.

Even the most basic Google shows the folly of such a claim.
Example:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Polish-Atrocities-Ukraine-Emil-Revyuk/dp/1154946649
 
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