Originally Posted by Dean

I did say that some units did prepare themselves, and these may be the fortifications to which you are referring. But I know that I am correct in stating that the vast majority of the Soviet Army was completely unprepared for Barbarossa. One of the Soviet Army's great strengths has been it's engineers. they have always been good, and I am sure that they realized that the frotifications facing Poland were next to useless. So I am also sure they decided to replace a lot of them... when Stalin allowed it. How many were replaced? Not a whole lot..

I agree, the troops have been uprepared for the defence. But this readiness is completely different from the preparedness for the attack.
The troops getting ready for the attack are the most vulnerable. The Germans got the taste of it when they were about to attack at Kursk...
Fortifications. The problem here was that the old ones were built about 200-300 kilometers from the new border and could have been used until the the new ones were built(without causing an ire of Germans). But they were dismantled right away. The easiest explanation is stupidity. But could be another...
There were also a lot of fortifications left from the WWI - and in very good shape. They were blown up only after the war - the authorities didn't want to leave them as a refuge for the guerillas and the common criminals. We were using their walls for climbing. I have even built a summer home right next to one of those forts . A very few of the forts on the old border that were not dismantled yet (near Mogilyov) have kept the Germans for days(so they were not obsolete, after all!)


I was referring to the GRU chap whom you quoted earlier on in this thread.

Have you read his book "the Icebreaker"? I have not seen it in English. Or just the critique of this book?
One could agree or disagree with his interpretation of history, however, there are a lot of mute points in the official version.
One of the higlights - he produces excerpts from the military directives(without saying whose directive it was) and asks the reader to guess. He does it to prove his point - both sides before June 22nd where issuing almost identical orders!

Just out of curiosity Boris, Where in Russia are you from?

I was born in Ukraine, but have moved a lot around USSR. The last 13 years I have lived in Western Belorussia(the same place we are talking about in this thread!). The very place where Napoleon had crossed the Neman River to invade Russia in 1812 was just couple of miles from my home!

The Purges were the dumbests things Stalin has done. One of the reasosn why Hitler attacked that the time.

Yup, that was done by the NKVD. The grandfather of the KGB.

Believeing Hitler woudn't attack and not attacking Japan until a few days before the Wars end.Also thinking they could capture Hitler.

Originally Posted by Ashes

What were the Soviets top mistakes.

1. Winter War with Finland. Neutral of friendly Finns could be much better as Finns as enemies. If not more, than lack of front in border with Finland provide opportunity to free a bunch of divisions, which could be used against Germans in West.

2. Wrong organization of armored forces - the practice of war showed that there is no need for large armored corps with thousands of tanks. Tank brigades or divisions were more efficient. At the same point - in Soviet tank division of 1941 was too much tanks and too less infantry. Germans had better organization of tank divisions and perform much better.

3. Existence of political officers in units with rights, equal with rights of CO. Not always, but for some situations political officer's point of view was not right from point of view of military theory and practice, although unit must act `politically correctly`. Actually, Stalin's order from November of 1942, which strictly limited rights of political officers, was not just for fun - I am sure it has a reasonable basis (mistakes in previous battles, made by influence of `politically`, not military, correctly decisions).

Supostat

What do you think about the purges of the experienced military leaders by Stalin prior to WW2, where these not even more important?

What about the Soviet armies dispositions on the eve of war. Did these unpreparedness hinder them, or actually help them, since many were well behind the front line and couldn't be immediately surrounded?

Did the winter war with Finland allow the Soviets to gain experience on 'how not to do things' and prepared them for the much greater battle ahead?

Originally Posted by perseus

Supostat

What do you think about the purges of the experienced military leaders by Stalin prior to WW2, where these not even more important?

Controversary, purges had both positive and negative effects. Some Revolution-time stagnates in fact should be removed from their seats (and from military point of view there is no much difference were their shot or just retired), while due to purges also some talented commanders (for example Rokossovsky) were arrested and released only after beginning of the war.

What about the Soviet armies dispositions on the eve of war. Did these unpreparedness hinder them, or actually help them, since many were well behind the front line and couldn't be immediately surrounded?

Unpreparedness hinder them, because density of troops in first line was much too low for successful defense. Therefore Germans with such density of troops, as they were on June 22, 1941, could not be stopped.
Here are some maps with densities of troops:
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/oborona-b-1.jpg
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/oborona-c-2.jpg
There are more than 3 German corps vs. 1 Soviet Corps in directions of main offensives.

But this is not a mistake, since Soviets had no stable reason to concentrate troops more earlier. Concentrate troops just for fun, without political reason - it is expensive and diplomatically dangerous move.

Did the winter war with Finland allow the Soviets to gain experience on 'how not to do things' and prepared them for the much greater battle ahead?

No. Halkin-Gol and Lake Hasan did it, where large mechanized and air armies were involved (which was way what WW2 was). Winter war was too specific, it was closer to anti-guerilla warfare than conventional, symmetric combat.

Suvorov's AKA Rezune's ideas have no basis in reality, his mistakes are infamous and there are still those, sadly, who refuse to believe that he only misquotes, misinterprets, and lies about what happened in 1941.

As for the topic of this thread, the biggest mistake the Soviet Union made was not mobilizing before the German invasion, but that couldn't be helped. The purges were detrimental to the Red Army but most have exacerbated their affects, in fact around 17,000 were either imprisoned, sent to camps, or executed.

Originally Posted by Fox

Is that true if the russian soldiers are retreating back to line and russian soldiers on the line will shoot russian soldiers if they are retreating? I'm just curious.

This only happened when soldiers retreated without orders and then it wasn't a rule, many times soldiers would simply be stopped and returned to their units.

Originally Posted by Supostat

2. Wrong organization of armored forces - the practice of war showed that there is no need for large armored corps with thousands of tanks. Tank brigades or divisions were more efficient. At the same point - in Soviet tank division of 1941 was too much tanks and too less infantry. Germans had better organization of tank divisions and perform much better.

Soviet Mech Corps circa 1941 did not have 'thousands of tanks' within their ranks, in fact they had a bit over 1,000. This is comparable to a German Panzer Corps. Also, most of the Mech Corps in 1941 were not at full strength.