Because I am at work enjoying this here forum I can't give the title and author of a book which goes into detail about tank warfare in Normandy. It's a book which uses extensive eye witness stories of both allied and axis troops.
Two stories are from English and German troopers relating the superiority of the German tanks. If somebody is interested I'll put the ISBN number, title etc on the forum. I recommend it to anybody who's interested in teh Normandy campaign.

What puzzles me is that with all this fighting going on all over the world America had done so little to rearm in case it was attacked.

After reading some of the answers to the question, and being in agreement with most of them, I think it is time to give the problem a little twist and some spice. Did American industrial production give the United States government and military a "get out of jail free card". That is, did industrial output minimize serious mistakes that would have crippled other states?

Here are a few examples:

(A) Think about the P-51. The German fighter pilot Adolf Galland in his memoirs agreed that the plane led directly to the defeat of the Luftwaffe, but mainly because (1) the quality of German pilots deteriorated owing to losses against the bomber fleets and in Russia, (2) Hitler and Goering refused to expand the fighter arm until far too late, (3) the German manufacturers experimented with too many designs instead of concentrating on the FW-190, and (4) the Allies completely outnumbered the Germans. If Galland's points were valid, it appears that the P-51's success (or the Spitfire or any other fighter) was guaranteed. Galland tried to pressure Goering into authorizing higher fighter production in 1940. The British in fact surpassed German aircraft production levels in that year. The P-51 was "doomed" to succeed. (sort of like the entire Allied war effort).

(B) WWII American tactics and ground force weapons systems were poor. Think about the MG-42 or "Panther" or nearly all German equipment in relation to that of their American enemy. Van Creveld's work in comparing the American and German military systems demonstrates the American deficiencies. The list of American/ British mistakes on the western front is also quite long. Think about the many operations aimed at breaking out of Normandy, why they failed, and why the Allies ultimately broke the back of the German military. The answer is simple. Given enough time, the attrition rate doomed the German military. Numbers counted far more than quality. [The same is true of all Allied encounters against German troops]. It is self-serving to argue that victory meant fighting excellence. American strategists, industrialists and workers won the war...the generals were incompetent and the GIs nothing more than cannon fodder.

My hypothesis: The United States policymakers and military leaders, despite many small weapons procurement errors and grotesque tactical or operational mistakes, were able to wield an industrial sledgehammer that shattered Hitler's empire. How much this superiority was caused by (1) an equally grotesque German industrial policy or (2) eastern front operations is the issue to answer...but not whether the American military was actually a highly skilled fighting force during the period under question.

One more point: When discussing the abilities of the various military organizations of WWII, it is amazing how much (1) the outcome of the battle or (2) bias influences our decisions. The Soviet forces, for example, lost far more troops at Stalingrad (1942-43) and Berlin (1945) than Germany, yet historians often applaud Soviet fighting skill instead of addressing their infantile and shockingly crude horde tactics. Second, the British army was totally routed in France (1940) yet historians sometimes celebrate Dunkirk like a victory. Third, the Americans (and this is important) could not encircle and destroy the remnants of OB West after the Germans desperately broke out of the Falaise pocket and retreated by foot in the direction of the German border. This is the most serious indictment of any military that I can think of. Either the Germans, who restored a defensive line in France/Belgium/Netherlands, were the best fighting force on a level never before seen in the annals of human history, or the Americans were just plain green, inexperienced or stupid. I prefer the latter argument.

Ollie Garchy

Nice peice Ollie with some interesting questions. Now with time pressing I will just pick out a couple bits to write on. Dunkirk....was not classed as a victory but more as a deliverance, I think if you read Churchill's books even he said it was defeat, and should not be thought of as a victory. Now why was Britain defeated in France, well with the all the other armies falling back the the British had fall back as well or be cut off. Now I am not saying that we were well enough equipped to take on the Germans we were not, the Artillery was to small and there was not enough of it. The tanks were well armoured but under gunned and again we did not have enough to make any difference. Britain had not gone in for rearmament in case it set of an even larger arms race and our forces paid the price for this for years to come.
Yes the Russian tactic's were crude they had millions of men that they just threw at a problem and over run the Germans by a sheer weight numbers. If a Russian soldier retreated then he was made to lead the attack to retake the position, which soon got around that that you fight and die were you are. Many of the Russian troops that were captured by the Germans and managed to survive their time as slave labour were sent of to the Gulags when they got home for surrendering in the first place.
The P51 fighter was made to British requirements before America was in the War and America did not want the plane at first as they wanted mainly plane with a radial engine. Mind you they helped then selfs to the first few hundred P51 that came of the production that Britain had already paid for. The P51 did not become a war winner until the RAF fitted a few of them with the Merlin Engine, then it was in a class of it's own. The Merlin increase it's range, improved it's speed and operational ceiling.

Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy

After reading some of the answers to the question, and being in agreement with most of them, I think it is time to give the problem a little twist and some spice. Did American industrial production give the United States government and military a "get out of jail free card". That is, did industrial output minimize serious mistakes that would have crippled other states?

Well in a word, yes. One obvious example is the M-4 Sherman tank. Servicable to begin with, it gradually become further and further outclassed as the war went on. One only has to look at the accepted tactics of both the British and American armoured formations when fighting German panzer units. Up to 6 Shermans were often needed to deal with a single Panther or Tiger, with several Shermans as bait while the rest attempted to get round to the rear of the German tank where the armour was obviously thinner. Although this tactic often resulted in the German tank being knocked out, it came at the expense of several of the Shermans. This tactic was only possible because of:

1) The mobility of the Sherman (one of the few good things about it)
2) The ability of the Allies, in particular the US, to churn out thousands of them
3) The logistical ability of the US forces in general

The fact that the Western Allies had virtual Air Supremacy for long periods, partly as as result of German mistakes and most certainly as a result of US industrial might being applied, also was a major factor in Western Allied success.

So to paraphrase what you said, yes the Sherman was "doomed" to succeed. Compared to the later German tanks it was poor but it didn't matter. Rather like say a human can kill many wasps before succuming to the accumalation of stings so thousands of Shermans could be knocked out but that the end result would be that there would still be more Shermans than Panthers or Tigers left operational on the battlefield.

Coming back to your comment regarding the outcome of battles it's a truism that the victor writes history. Anyone delving deeper into the actual details will see that the Western Allies fought a shell of the Wehrmacht that had marched into Russia 3 years earlier. Mainly because the Wehrmacht facing the Western Allies at this time had:

1) Very little air support
2) Very poor mobility due to lack of fuel and a deeper problem regarding the mechanisation, or lack thereof, of panzergrenadier formations
3) Combat replacements usually comprising green troops who sometimes had as little as one weeks basic training, ex training personnel, men who previously were deemed too young or too old for service, men previously deemed unfit for military service and ex Luftwaffe pilots who no longer had planes to fly

Given the above its clear that the Wehrmacht was an army whose combat abilities were in serious decline.

This was no fault of the Western Allies though and they fought what was in front of them. However, any achievements lauded upon US and UK commanders need to take all the facts into consideration. US servicemen had on average about 6 months basic training before being assigned to combat units and whilst I don't quite agree that their performance was as bad as Ollie is suggesting it's definately true that their advantages in logistics, industrial output and air cover did save them from what otherwise might have been humiliating reverses.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

This was no fault of the Western Allies though and they fought what was in front of them. However, any achievements lauded upon US and UK commanders need to take all the facts into consideration. US servicemen had on average about 6 months basic training before being assigned to combat units and whilst I don't quite agree that their performance was as bad as Ollie is suggesting it's definately true that their advantages in logistics, industrial output and air cover did save them from what otherwise might have been humiliating reverses.

Hey Doppleganger, it was not my intention to write such a tasty post. I started out with the desire for something "spicy" and then dumped too much on the subject.

I accept that the western Allies raised formations capable of "handling" the finest German divisions on occasion. The Canadian 3rd Division, for example, blunted the 12th SS drive at the outset of the campaign. The Canadian penetration and holding action owed more to their skill and courage than just a successful industrial policy or even air cover. The ground forces performed well. The same can be said of the American and British soldier.

Now, things change when evaluating the skills and capabilities of those "in charge". My post was intended to raise the possibility that external factors lessened the seriousness of Allied operational errors...errors that complicate the evaluation of military performance.

I will write more at a later date,

Ollie Garchy

Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy

A) Think about the P-51. The German fighter pilot Adolf Galland in his memoirs agreed that the plane led directly to the defeat of the Luftwaffe, but mainly because (1) the quality of German pilots deteriorated owing to losses against the bomber fleets and in Russia, (2) Hitler and Goering refused to expand the fighter arm until far too late, (3) the German manufacturers experimented with too many designs instead of concentrating on the FW-190, and (4) the Allies completely outnumbered the Germans. If Galland's points were valid, it appears that the P-51's success (or the Spitfire or any other fighter) was guaranteed. Galland tried to pressure Goering into authorizing higher fighter production in 1940. The British in fact surpassed German aircraft production levels in that year. The P-51 was "doomed" to succeed. (sort of like the entire Allied war effort).

valid points, I agree with most of it.

(B) WWII American tactics and ground force weapons systems were poor. Think about the MG-42 or "Panther" or nearly all German equipment in relation to that of their American enemy. Van Creveld's work in comparing the American and German military systems demonstrates the American deficiencies. The list of American/ British mistakes on the western front is also quite long. Think about the many operations aimed at breaking out of Normandy, why they failed, and why the Allies ultimately broke the back of the German military. The answer is simple. Given enough time, the attrition rate doomed the German military. Numbers counted far more than quality. [The same is true of all Allied encounters against German troops]. It is self-serving to argue that victory meant fighting excellence. American strategists, industrialists and workers won the war...the generals were incompetent and the GIs nothing more than cannon fodder.

I agree with most of it, apart from the last line.. While on a tactical level the german units fought well, the performance of the german generals was shockingly bad. it was they who were forced to use German soldiers as cannon fodder in an effort to counter allied superiority in material*. Throughout the campaign it was they who were forced to react to Allied moves, they never once gained the initiative.
In the end the Germans spirited defence only lead to the destruction of their army.

*Even during Operation Goodwood the battle cost the Germans more in casualties than the allies, nearly 6000 compared to 4000 allied casualties

Originally Posted by redcoat

"I agree with most of it, apart from the last line.. While on a tactical level the german units fought well, the performance of the german generals was shockingly bad. it was they who were forced to use German soldiers as cannon fodder in an effort to counter allied superiority in material*. Throughout the campaign it was they who were forced to react to Allied moves, they never once gained the initiative.
In the end the Germans spirited defence only lead to the destruction of their army.

*Even during Operation Goodwood the battle cost the Germans more in casualties than the allies, nearly 6000 compared to 4000 allied casualties

(1) The conventional argument is that German generals really only performed poorly on the strategic level. In terms of the tactical or operational levels, the old Prussian general staff system still pumped out the best.

(2) According to Creveld, the casualty ratio was between 1.2-1.4:1 against the western Allies. This ratio has come under considerable fire by critics, but I am unsure of alternatives. Know any?

(3) Normandy was a strange affair. I watched a few of the "Band of Brothers" films a few years ago. I got the impression that the German troops were great at getting "wacked". Dudes who ran around in random fashion like decapitated chickens until they were put out their misery. This does not accord with my own reading of the subject. In any case, it seems reasonable to argue that the men on both sides got "wacked". The only way that you can account for the higher German losses, since theory dictates a minimal superiority of 3:1 for a successful offensive and about the same in acceptable losses, is to argue (1) the Germans were actually decapitated chickens, (2) lots of prisoners were taken, (3) lots of prisoners were shot, or (4) your stats are wrong and Creveld's are right.

(4) Being on the defensive is not necessarily a bad thing. I agree with Clausewitz concerning the superiority of the defensive. The German problem in 1944 related to insufficient reserves and this problem goes back to a miserable industrial policy that failed to utilize the world's largest machine-tool capacities. And this problem can be attributed to the insane level of corruption in Nazi-Germany. (While the taxation level for American industrialists increased to help pay for the war effort, it actually shrank to zero in Germany during the war. Krupp & Co. paid nothing. Ole' Fritz or Hans, on the hand, saw his taxes rise astronomically. The average German was expected to pay for raw materials, build the armaments and die in battle! This was NOT the Prussian way. This was the Hitler way. Total war in Germany was only "total" for the masses. That is, you got "totally screwed". Now forget about the Holocaust for a moment. If I had lived during the war and my taxes were increased to about 8x pre-Hitler levels, I'd get my gun and bring down the government. It tells you something about the average "Hans" in Germany during that period. A German Chomsky (provided he did not end up in Dachau) would have helped).

Ollie Garchy

Ollie, I think you fail to take into account WWI, the Great Depression and the subsequent increase in the German economy following Hitler's rise to power when you say that you would not stand to pay 8x the amount of taxes to pay for the war effort. Your nation went from the most powerful on Continental Europe, down to the poorest nation which was occupied for an enemy Army, and then you had a chance to become the most powerful again and get back some of that Prussian pride you keep touting. Are you seriously going to try and tell me you would shout for Hitler's head on a pike after he had made you great again?

Originally Posted by Damien435

Ollie, I think you fail to take into account WWI, the Great Depression and the subsequent increase in the German economy following Hitler's rise to power when you say that you would not stand to pay 8x the amount of taxes to pay for the war effort. Your nation went from the most powerful on Continental Europe, down to the poorest nation which was occupied for an enemy Army, and then you had a chance to become the most powerful again and get back some of that Prussian pride you keep touting. Are you seriously going to try and tell me you would shout for Hitler's head on a pike after he had made you great again?

How do I respond to this view? Well, I will try:

(1) Take a look at the economic statistics of Germany/France/Britain for the period under question. You will notice that Germany was hardly the poorest nation in Europe. You are joking, arn't you?

(2) Hitler's economic policies during the 1930s were a continuation of the projects developed in Weimar. Like the Autobahnen, they aimed at developing the civilian infrastructure. Nazi policies did not make Germany great. In any case, Marshall in 1947 (as Secretary of State) built the Marshal Plan on German industrial productivity with the United States supplying the capital for the acquisition of raw materials. This hypothesis replaced the earlier model during the 1980s and is now the standard interpretation. Germany never lost the position of industrial dominance after 1918, 1929 or 1945. The State Department (if you look at the Foreign Relations series) points this out clearly.

(3) Hitler's weapons procurement policy was the primary reason why Germany lost WWII. I have written other posts addressing this subject.

(4) The "8x" number explains the increase that the German people paid. The industrialist tax rate however fell to zero. If the major corporations and large firms had paid their fair share, instead of nothing, then the German people would not have been "screwed" to the same degree.

(5) I do not tout Prussian pride. The Prussians developed the world's first general staff and was then copied by other countries 100 years later. (see Peter Paret) The Prussian university model became the standard copied by the United States (see Peter Novick). Industrialization kicked off an intense boom in science and university activities in Prussia/Germany (see Modris Ecksteins). These developments help explain how WWI/WWII happened and influenced the nature of combat. They are facts. (I do, however, have a strong liking for the work of Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Moltke, Seeckt, Guderian and Manstein. Their work was modern or even revolutionary. The modern American military would agree. They do not however tout Prussian pride...they recognize the work.)

(6) Hitler did not make Germany great. Far from it. He destroyed Germany and left a raped corpse behind. Any half-assed conservative would have done a better job...without killing hundreds of thousands of oppositional Germans and millions of innocent civilians. Stresemann during the 1920s is the best example here. The man however died of a heart-attack, being totally obese, and left the cons waffling about trying to find a leader strong enough to protect Germany from the communists and nazis. Imagine a communist Germany in 1933. The world would be different today. We would either be singing praises to Marx and Engels or slowly dying in a Gulag in northern Canada or Norway.