Originally Posted by perseus

The failure to develop long range aircraft early in the war was not only a British issue.
I don’t agree with this statement, many of the Japanese naval aircraft of the period had an impressive range. Take some of the aircraft which attacked force Z, the ‘Betty’ for example (I am not sure which version was used but take you pick, G4M1 3,130 miles, G4M2 2,980 miles, G4M3 2,262 miles) The German FW Condor also had an impressive range (2,210 miles / 2,760 miles) . Surely aircraft with substantial range was an obvious requirement for a maritime nation?

The British government under Specifications P/13/36 and B/12/36 for four- and two-engined bombers developed a series of long range bombers noteably in terms of range the Wellington (range 2,200miles) and Stirling (range 2,330miles). There was also the Short Sunderland (range 3,000miles).

So I dont accept your case, but if your point was that Britiain make enough for Costal Commands needs you would be on to something.

Originally Posted by perseus

[i]Employing commanders of battle groups without an understanding of air warfare I assume you are referring to Prince of Wales and Repulse? Yes, but there was a big gun mentality in the Royal navy, hence the obsession with attempting to sink the Bismarck by shelling. Another example of inappropriate use of air power (which did nothing to dispel this myth) was the aircraft carrier Glorious when returning from the Norwegian campaign. She had posted no lookout and no aircraft at instant readiness and was subsequently sank by the Scharnhorst. Are not carriers supposed to surprise battleships, not the other way round?

The sinking of Glorious was a sad loss. The Gloorious was sailing back to Scapa Flow at the time. It would seem over confident to send a carrier back to port with only 2 destroyers as escort. It seems that as it was the ships fifth trip the admirality was over confident. It would have been prudent to send the ship back with a larger escort. If the ship had followed different courses of action the outcome may have been affected. However the ship only had 5 torepdo planes.

The German commander was removed from command for disobeying orders and endangering his ships by attacking an old carrier.

The Royal Navy did employ carrier battle groups. However throughout the war there was a limited supply of carriers. British carriers had one area of superiority to American carriers in that they had armoured flight decks.

I am interested in the assessment of British history of combined ops. Dieppe on its own isnt proof. Some more example please to support your case.

Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy

As far as the German Navy was concerned, the existence of a few ships does not constitute a navy. The German "fleet" was nothing in comparison to the other navies of the day. Raeder was in no way capable of emulating Tirpitz' "risk theory". How was the German fleet a threat? Only isolated raiders sailed the high seas...and, incidentally, were blown to pieces.

A few powerful ships could have caused havoc to the convoy system. Britain, nor any other country would have enough battleships to escort every convoy. The actions of Tirpitz prove my point when it encountered convoys. You dont need a huge fleet to be a threat. The German navy possessed, although not a large number, modern warships.

Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy

Nor was the German u-boat arm spectacularly large. It was much smaller than that of Britain and France. German production after 1939 turned the u-boat arm into a "menace". The u-boats were nevertheless backward and outdated...more submersible coffin than modern weapons system. The decision to employ bombers against German kids and not against the u-boats permitted the German pieces of junk some measure of success. Hence Perseus' comment.

Britain depended upon the sea trade, so even as you put "a few" u-boats would be a problem.

The German airforce also attacked cities, as polish, dutch, russian and british civilians will testify. Which shouldnt be forgotten when talking about anglo/american bombing. I agree in this modern world bombing of civilians should not occur.

Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy

It is not enough to make the argument that the very existence of a small German navy represented a "threat" to British interests and therefore a factor in the declaration of war. This is imperialist logic. If you use this logic, then virtually every aspect of modern states (from population to steel production) follows a similar pattern.

Never thought the existance of the German navy was a factor in the declaration of war, I thought it was the (imperialistic) invasion of Poland. But if you have some evidence I am sure you will post it.

The British government under Specifications P/13/36 and B/12/36 for four- and two-engined bombers developed a series of long range bombers noteably in terms of range the Wellington (range 2,200miles) and Stirling (range 2,330miles). There was also the Short Sunderland (range 3,000miles).

The Sunderland certainly had an impressive range in theory, so I stand corrected on this one. However, coastal command constantly stressed the need for long-range aircraft, so this did not seem to meet their full needs, despite being a specialised maritime aircraft.
The Wellington's theoretical range of 2,200 miles was achieved at a sacrifice in bomb load (only 1,500 lb). The Wellingtons in fact had an effective outward range of only 400 miles with 2 hours on station resulting in a large air gap in the Atlantic. As a consequence a squadron of consolidated B-24 liberators were used in 1941 which could provide protection to convoys for up to 750 miles. The Very Long-Range (VLR) Liberator closed the vital Atlantic Gap and was the only aircraft with the range to do so.
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Consolidated+B-24+Liberator
However, there were too few of these made available and the ability to carry a decent load over the mid Atlantic and remain on station for a useful time remained a problem until the later stages of the war.
The need for a decent maritime fighter (or fighter of any type) with suitable range was a constant handicap for the British, so they were totally outclassed by the Zero. Japan also had more modern carrier capacity and could also rely on island hopping in the West Pacific, so it was less critical for them anyway.

The German commander was removed from command for disobeying orders and endangering his ships by attacking an old carrier.

I suspect the real reason was allowing the Scharnhorst to get torpedoed by a Destroyer.

I am interested in the assessment of British history of combined ops. Dieppe on its own isnt proof. Some more example please to support your case.

Norway was a botched combined operation, but I was also thinking of the pre WW2 historic pretexts, such as Gallipoli. Now I wonder who was behind this one?

Originally Posted by perseus

The Sunderland certainly had an impressive range in theory, so I stand corrected on this one. However, coastal command constantly stressed the need for long-range aircraft, so this did not seem to meet their full needs, despite being a specialised maritime aircraft.
The Wellington's theoretical range of 2,200 miles was achieved at a sacrifice in bomb load (only 1,500 lb). The Wellingtons in fact had an effective outward range of only 400 miles with 2 hours on station resulting in a large air gap in the Atlantic. As a consequence a squadron of consolidated B-24 liberators were used in 1941 which could provide protection to convoys for up to 750 miles. The Very Long-Range (VLR) Liberator closed the vital Atlantic Gap and was the only aircraft with the range to do so.
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Consolidated+B-24+Liberator
However, there were too few of these made available and the ability to carry a decent load over the mid Atlantic and remain on station for a useful time remained a problem until the later stages of the war.
The need for a decent maritime fighter (or fighter of any type) with suitable range was a constant handicap for the British, so they were totally outclassed by the Zero. Japan also had more modern carrier capacity and could also rely on island hopping in the West Pacific, so it was less critical for them anyway.

We agree then that there were too few, not that there were none.

It is some 3,000miles between England and the USA, and covers, to say the least a considerable area. It is a tactical issue of how many were available and where they were based. Costal Command wanted more bombers, but lost out to Bomber Command due to their needs.

The fleet arm was substaintially under funded, especially considering the aircraft it started the war with.

Originally Posted by perseus

Norway was a botched combined operation, but I was also thinking of the pre WW2 historic pretexts, such as Gallipoli. Now I wonder who was behind this one?

You seem to have this fashionable revisionist ideas about Churchill. Whilst he had his faults, he also had his pluses. I can see his faults. Who would you have had in his place? He didnt overrule his military.

If your using Gallipoli to justfy British combined operations in WW2, we could go back to the 19th, 18th & 17th century.

As for Gallipoli its a seperate issue and has its own thread. The blame was initially attached to Churchill, but the following inquiry and reviews since generally a more balanced view has arisen.

We agree then that there were too few, not that there were none.

There seems to be no British aircaft capable of the Liberators role throughout the war as far as I can see, and none were available before 1941. We were dependant upon lend lease for America to supply these valuable aircraft.

Regarding Churchill, I thought it was fashionable to rate him a great leader, hence the popular vote. It seems to be the historians who have examined the details have decided otherwise. However, I agree Churchill was a great figurehead who ideally should have been kept in that role (I am sure the German generals would have said the same about Hitler). Churchill didn't overule his military he just sacked them, or put influence on others who did! The number of veiled threats to his leaders were numerous. Churchill was certainly behind Somerville's board of enquiry for covering a Medditeranean Convoy rather than chasing faster Italian Battleships.

Churchill was an inspiring leader, brave, imaginative (too much sometimes), politically astute especially with the Soviets, and with a sense of greatness based on a linearage going back to a genuinely great military leader John Churchill. However, it was a case of a little knowledge is worse than none at all. I am afraid the more I study him, the similarities with Hitler become frightning too obvious.