Not taking Tobruk from the Australians. If they had taken Tobruk, it would have opened the flood gates in the Middle East. From there the Germans would have oil and a new passage to Russia. It could have meant the war went the other way.

Originally Posted by AussieNick

Not taking Tobruk from the Australians. If they had taken Tobruk, it would have opened the flood gates in the Middle East. From there the Germans would have oil and a new passage to Russia. It could have meant the war went the other way.

Tobruk fell: I would argue that Rommel was then able to work against OKW orders and press the attack on Alexandria. Had Rommel done what was expected of him, ie. build a better defensive position, no Montgomery victory at El Alamein.

"On May 26, 1942, Rommel renewed the attack, but was blocked by strong resistance and caught between two strongpoints on the Gazala Line. Living up to his nickname of the “Desert Fox,” Rommel wheeled on the British, smashed the defenders of Bir Hacheim, and took Tobruk on June 17. Rommel captured 30,000 defenders and captured the supply dump there."

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/africa.htm

Attacking USSR.

Whoa nice!

Rommel wheeled on the British, smashed the defenders of Bir Hacheim, and took Tobruk on June 17. Rommel captured 30,000 defenders and captured the supply dump there."

Whoa boy! the French at Bit Hacheim held up the German and italian forces and Rommel eventually went around them, the French pulled out later with help from a British rifle regiment after heavy air attacks.

The huge mistakes began immediatly after the fall of France. Hitler should have immediatly put troops in North Africa, viz: Algeria. At the same time he should have taken the French fleet. France would have complained, but they couldn't have done anything. The next German move should have been the complete taking of North Africa, with Egypt as the prize, particularly the Suez Canal. But Hitler's only interest in the Mediterranean was Gibralter. His goals should have worried more commanders than it did. It also shows how muddled Hitler's mind was. The reason he rose no farther in rank than Corporal in the 1st WW is obvious. The man had no strategic sense. He took power because he saw not only the unfairness of the Versaille Treaty but also it's stupidity and he saw it for the black-mailing document it was. If certain allied powers were not happy with Germany's performance the treaty could be changed and the amount of reperations increased. Hitler thus had a giant axe to grind and grind it he did. His political victories were brilliant but he understood little of military things. His grasp of strategy was almost nil. A nation at war lets it's best military people plan and guide the war. They do not let their confused leader call the shots.

Originally Posted by Papashah41

The reason he rose no farther in rank than Corporal in the 1st WW is obvious. the man had no strategic sense. His political victories were brilliant but he understood little of military things. His grasp of strategy was almost nil.

On the contrary, Hitler had a good deal of strategic sense, IMO. He demonstrated in WW2 that he had a firm grasp of German military strategy as laid down by Scharnhorst. Clausewitz etc, by attempting to destroy enemy armies in the field first, seizing economic and industrial targets second and leaving the capture of prestige targets third. His decision in July 1941 to target Kiev, and the vast Soviet armies that lay on Army Group Centre's right flank, was military sound. Not dealing with this threat might have seen the encirclement of Army Group Centre before it even got close to Moscow.

The problem with Hitler was his racial delusions, certain aspects of his personality, his attempt to micromanage the German Army after 1941 and his gradual onset of Parkinson's Disease, not his strategic sense, which was very good.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

On the contrary, Hitler had a good deal of strategic sense, IMO. He demonstrated in WW2 that he had a firm grasp of German military strategy as laid down by Scharnhorst. Clausewitz etc, by attempting to destroy enemy armies in the field first, seizing economic and industrial targets second and leaving the capture of prestige targets third. His decision in July 1941 to target Kiev, and the vast Soviet armies that lay on Army Group Centre's right flank, was military sound. Not dealing with this threat might have seen the encirclement of Army Group Centre before it even got close to Moscow.

The problem with Hitler was his racial delusions, certain aspects of his personality, his attempt to micromanage the German Army after 1941 and his gradual onset of Parkinson's Disease, not his strategic sense, which was very good.

I always believed that attacking Kiev was a terrible blunder as it cost Bock precious time and resources before the Russian winter to attack and take Moscow. Kiev never seemed a good idea to me but I do see your point Doppleganger.

Do you think Hitler was overconcerned about being outflanked by the Russians? Were the Russians at that stage of the war really able to achieve effective counter-attacks into the flanks of Army Group Centre?

Guderian, I believe, wanted to keep pushing straight for Moscow. He was convinced it was the best thing to do with the time available, the disarray of the Russian forces and the Russian winter approaching.

I have my doubts about Hitler's strategic sense. If this was one of his great points, why didn't he pour more resources into the Middle East campaign, take Cairo and eventually all of Palestine, before charging into Russia? I feel that Hitler, too often, thought tactically, and even then stuffed things up by meddling in German High Command decisions and eventually taking away there operational decision making completely.

Originally Posted by errol

I always believed that attacking Kiev was a terrible blunder as it cost Bock precious time and resources before the Russian winter to attack and take Moscow. Kiev never seemed a good idea to me but I do see your point Doppleganger.

Well it was either Kiev or Moscow but Hitler chose Kiev and then was persuaded by his generals to gamble for Moscow. Hitler possibly wanted to wait until 1942 before driving for Moscow which wasn't a bad idea under the circumstances.

Originally Posted by errol

Do you think Hitler was overconcerned about being outflanked by the Russians? Were the Russians at that stage of the war really able to achieve effective counter-attacks into the flanks of Army Group Centre?

Yes he was concerned about being outflanked; anyone with military training would have been concerned. The Russians were very much capable of counter-attacking if they were given the time and space to attack. Leaving 5 Soviet Armies on your right flank and merely employing a screening flank guard might have been tantamount to disaster. Army Group South could not have done much more than check their advance southwards - northwards there would have only been one army, probably 2nd Army, to guard the entire right flank of Centre.

Originally Posted by errol

Guderian, I believe, wanted to keep pushing straight for Moscow. He was convinced it was the best thing to do with the time available, the disarray of the Russian forces and the Russian winter approaching.

Guderian wanted to drive to Moscow before Kiev and felt that Kiev critically delayed his advance, which it did. Guderian was a gambler though and perhaps he was right. Perhaps a rapid thrust to Moscow would have been successful. But it would have been a big gamble...

Originally Posted by errol

I have my doubts about Hitler's strategic sense. If this was one of his great points, why didn't he pour more resources into the Middle East campaign, take Cairo and eventually all of Palestine, before charging into Russia? I feel that Hitler, too often, thought tactically, and even then stuffed things up by meddling in German High Command decisions and eventually taking away there operational decision making completely.

Hitler's racial delusions and aspects of his personality such as overconfidence overrode his good strategic sense. I'm not saying Hitler was a strategic genius - he most certainly was not - but he wasn't an idiot either. The meddling in the German High Command decision making only began after 1941 and steadily got worse; before that Hitler gave his more aggressive Generals (Guderian, Rommel, Hoth etc) a lot of latitude.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

On the contrary, Hitler had a good deal of strategic sense, IMO. He demonstrated in WW2 that he had a firm grasp of German military strategy as laid down by Scharnhorst. Clausewitz etc, by attempting to destroy enemy armies in the field first, seizing economic and industrial targets second and leaving the capture of prestige targets third. His decision in July 1941 to target Kiev, and the vast Soviet armies that lay on Army Group Centre's right flank, was military sound. Not dealing with this threat might have seen the encirclement of Army Group Centre before it even got close to Moscow.

The problem with Hitler was his racial delusions, certain aspects of his personality, his attempt to micromanage the German Army after 1941 and his gradual onset of Parkinson's Disease, not his strategic sense, which was very good.

Really, If he had such a firm grasp on military strategy, why did he have a war going on two fronts? His attack on Russia was the death knell of the German Army, including the SS. It was also the end of The Luftwaffe. A clever conqueror strikes at his enemy at their weakest point. He doesn't butt heads with a giant. And yes, his racial nonsense was just that. Nonsense. The hundreds of thousands of wasted troops and materials, just to murder civilians he personally thought were inferior, smacks of stupidity and a very serious character flaw. I still believe his best course was through North Africa after France. That he did not see the potential just adds weight to my assessment of him. Also, Hitler threw the idea around that the Sickle Cut strategy through the Ardennes was his. It wasn't. The idea and plans came from Manstein with help from Guderian. That the Russian Campaign wasn't a repetition of the blitzkrieg campaigns in the west should have lit a firecracker off in the back of his mind. It didn't, and eventually Russia swallowed the Heer, the SS and the Luftwaffe. You say his decision to take Kiev and the vast Soviet armies on the right of army group center was sound. I say it would have been sound if he had used his armies properly. He did not. Army group North and Army group South were eventually wasted. The three groups should have been sent directly through the center. Moscow should have been taken as the same time as Kiev or at least a little later. By virtually slicing the nation in half, you have done several things. You have not only disrupted communications but because Moscow is the communication hub for the entire country you have destroyed their communications. Set up your strong defenses and choose who you should attack first. Will it be the Leningrad front or Sevastopol and the Industrial hubs in the central and Southwest. But he shouldn't have attacked Russia in the first place. Why was the T34 a surprise? Canaris should have been sacked at once, but he wasn't. For the three pronged attack attempted he did not have enough troops or Tanks or artillery or equipment. He was an Amateur.