Ollie’s thesis of a Soviet Union working on a dwindling industrial lifeline imposed by machine tool wear and calorific limitations is a fascinating one. I also think the higher ratio of combat troops to total military numbers is an important one. However there is an important factor being missed here, Women!

Stalin didn’t only place the female half of the population into industrial production who consume less and usually are more productive than their male counterparts, but also expected them to engage in military duties. The same was true for the Western Allies. This was of course contrary to Nazi doctrine. Speer told Hitler that if he were able to use women in the factories he would be able release at least 3 million more men for the army. Although Hitler compromised a little towards the end it was far too late.

Attacking the USSR before finishing off Britian and declaring war on the USA when he could have kept it off his back.

Attacked to Russia.

I remember Antony Beevor answering questions after a lecture about his book Stalingrad. His view was that Germany's military ability was irretrievably damaged as early as the winter of 41/42 after the toll taken on men and materiel by the weather and conditions. If true the lack of preparation for the Russian conditions may have been Germany's most important blunder.

Originally Posted by perseus

I remember Antony Beevor answering questions after a lecture about his book Stalingrad. His view was that Germany's military ability was irretrievably damaged as early as the winter of 41/42 after the toll taken on men and materiel by the weather and conditions. If true the lack of preparation for the Russian conditions may have been Germany's most important blunder.

Hi Perseus.

It's hard to get a consensus on exact casualty figures for both sides for the Battle of Moscow. Figures I have seen range from about 150,000 to about 250,000 casualties of all types for the Germans during the final stages of 'Operation Typhoon', the German code-name for the assault on Moscow. Many of these casualties were caused by the lack of winter preparedness of the Wehrmacht and if we accept the higher figure these losses are approaching those of Stalingrad. It can be argued then that Beevor was correct although I don't think it was so much the loss of material and men that was so decisive about this battle, more the loss of opportunity. The divertion in August of the schwerpunkt from Moscow to Kiev may have been a decisive blow to the aims of Barbarossa but there is some merit in Hitler's insistance that the threat to Army Group Centre's right flank be met and dealt with first.

I argued in an earlier post that Barbarossa may have worked as a two-season campaign, with the Wehrmacht halting on the line of the River Dnieper until Spring 1942, once it had become clear that the timetable for Barbarossa had irrecoverably slipped. That way, the German Army would have recieved its winter supplies earlier AND be better prepared to meet any Soviet winter counter-attack.

I think their worst mistake is to attack Russia at the wrong time!

Originally Posted by perseus

I remember Antony Beevor answering questions after a lecture about his book Stalingrad. His view was that Germany's military ability was irretrievably damaged as early as the winter of 41/42 after the toll taken on men and materiel by the weather and conditions. If true the lack of preparation for the Russian conditions may have been Germany's most important blunder.

The "defeat at Moscow" thesis fails to accept the industrial nature of warfare during WWII. While it is obvious that "Barbarossa" sputtered and died in the mud and snow -- that is a banality --, the "Moscow" theory takes warfare out of any industrial context. If we try to understand why the Soviet summer losses did not finish off Stalin's regime, while a few hundred thousand losses on the German side ended Hitler's chances for victory, only two answers are possible. The theory would either dictate that German industry was incapable of Russian-style armaments production or that the German state was unwilling to strain the economy. I prefer the following variant: Nazis economic policy retarded economic growth and expansion and therefore castrated the immense productive capacities of German industry. Germany was NOT militarily defeated in 1941/42. The Nazis defeated themselves.

Ollie
Yes I certainly agree that economic expansion was retarded by policy. As I indicated in another post, the opposition to using women in factories and in the military was a significant factor. However, wasn't a solid core of army professionals lost in the Russian winter in a similar way to a core of airmen were lost in the skies over Britain? It must have been difficult to replace these. With Russia it didn’t matter as much since they didn’t have as much experience to lose, and they could rely on numbers and attrition. The quality side has to place their pieces more carefully and not squander them needlessly.

Doppleganger
I think the combined psychological effect of losing Moscow and the logistical complications of cutting the North South rail links would have been decisive, so there may have been 3 or 4 opportunities lost, any one of which could have been decisive

1. Winter Preparation
2. Boldness to take Moscow quickly
3. Economy
4. Some sort of combined operation with Japan

Originally Posted by perseus

Ollie
Yes I certainly agree that economic expansion was retarded by policy. As I indicated in another post, the opposition to using women in factories and in the military was a significant factor. However, wasn't a solid core of army professionals lost in the Russian winter in a similar way to a core of airmen were lost in the skies over Britain? It must have been difficult to replace these. With Russia it didn’t matter as much since they didn’t have as much experience to lose, and they could rely on numbers and attrition. The quality side has to place their pieces more carefully and not squander them needlessly.

Doppleganger
I think the combined psychological effect of losing Moscow and the logistical complications of cutting the North South rail links would have been decisive, so there may have been 3 or 4 opportunities lost, any one of which could have been decisive

1. Winter Preparation
2. Boldness to take Moscow quickly
3. Economy
4. Some sort of combined operation with Japan

I think one way of comparing the 2 sides is to look at the quality of their AFV production. The fact that German tanks were being produced like they were luxury cars and T-34s were rolling out sometimes with only primer paint on their hulls and turrets speaks volumes. I think Olly is quite correct to point at industrial reasons for why Germany lost. Also, the construction of Soviet formations as being top-heavy in fighting men is very significant when you consider that the main military reason why the USSR won was due to them having a strategic manpower reserve.

I'm not so sure that the capture of Moscow would have led to quick Soviet collapse. I agree with your point regarding communication and transport links being cut North to South but the average Soviet soldier had fought so hard since June 22nd I find it hard to believe he would suddenly have lose heart if Moscow was taken. After all, Napoleon actually took Moscow in 1812 and it did him no good, although I accept that Moscow was not nearly as important back then as it was in 1941. If Moscow had been taken the next 3-4 weeks would have been crucial. The German forces were exhausted, over-extended and woefully unprepared for winter warfare. Could they even have held onto their prize?

BTW, any combined operation with Japan would never have been practically possible, or even very effective. The best the Japanese forces could have done was to keep Soviet forces tied down on the Manchurian border so that they couldn't be deployed westward. The Imperial Japanese Army did not have the AFVs nor experience in winter fighting to take on the Red Army in any meaningful way and they knew it.

The best the Japanese forces could have done was to keep Soviet forces tied down on the Manchurian border so that they couldn't be deployed westward.

This is really what I meant. Would this not have prevented the Russian winter offensive and confidence this gave the Russians?