The bombing Tied up thousands of German fighter aircraft to defend Germany, also there were about million people involved in Air Defence in Germany. Now if this bombing was not taking place then all these people would have been in the front line fighting. It was a way that we could open a second front while getting troops ready before an invasion. Also it added an extra strain on German resources which could have also been used else where.

Tactical airpower was the needed ingredient for Allied victory. How do you think that useless armour and infantry should advance against German tactics....through willpower? Come on!

Yes it happened. Australian soldiers rarely had air superiority, if any air cover at all. Australian soldiers were never a priority for allied command. They were a usefull tool to be expended. And through sheer-bloody mindedness they would advance on foot into the German war machine.

It's the same will power that allowed them to defeat the Japanese at Kokoda, who outnumbered them 10 to 1. And the Australians heaviest weapon was the Bren gun and 2 inch mortar for much of that campaign. We didn't even have "useless" armour or air support, let alone artillery for much of the PNG campaign.

Not quite true. The Australians did have air cover in PNG although at times it was a bit thin on the ground. Milne bay is a case were Air cover played an important role. As far as against the German war machine went, they had the air cover that was available. In Greece air cover was practicaly non existant but in north Africa they had the desert airforce.
They were not neglected, British ground forces in those areas were suffering the same lack of air support.
On a final note about heavy weapons on the Kokoda campaign, in the latter stages they did have support from 25 pounders. I have seem one of the 25 pounders that they man handled up to Imita ridge. I walked up Imita ridge, I have no idea how they managed to drag that thing from owers corner accross the goldie river and then up the golden staircase to Iimita. Early on in the campaign the 39th div was equiped with very few Brens and were resupplied with brens still in grease and had not really been trained with them. Initially they were equiped with Lewis Guns.
Cheers
ST

Not quite true. The Australians did have air cover in PNG although at times it was a bit thin on the ground. Milne bay is a case were Air cover played an important role. As far as against the German war machine went, they had the air cover that was available. In Greece air cover was practicaly non existant but in north Africa they had the desert airforce.
They were not neglected, British ground forces in those areas were suffering the same lack of air support.
On a final note about heavy weapons on the Kokoda campaign, in the latter stages they did have support from 25 pounders. I have seem one of the 25 pounders that they man handled up to Imita ridge. I walked up Imita ridge, I have no idea how they managed to drag that thing from owers corner accross the goldie river and then up the golden staircase to Iimita. Early on in the campaign the 39th div was equiped with very few Brens and were resupplied with brens still in grease and had not really been trained with them. Initially they were equiped with Lewis Guns.

I wasn't refering to the whole Kokoda campaign. There were times when we only had 4 planes in PNG. As for the heavy weaponry issue, I'm well aware of that. My great uncle was a Bombadier in PNG. The Bren gun comment was intended to show that during the early stages we had very little. I would hardly consider the Lewis gun to be a big contributing factor.

I was not saying that the Lewis Gun was a big contributing factor. I was actually trying to make the point that in the earlier stages they were very poorly equiped.
Cheers
ST

I tend to agree with Ollie on most of his points. I have never heard, read, or seen any evidence that strategic bombing accomplished any of the objectives they set out to do. As I see it, the roles of strategic bombing were as follows. 1. Destruction of Germany's industrial base. This could be accomplished through the destruction of any factories that produced any war materiel, and it was later extended to any active factory. While most (if not all) of the factories in Germany and the occupied territories were indeed destroyed, Germany maintained an industrial base right up to the end of the war. Although I cannot find any figures to back it up, I believe that Germany lost virtually all of its industries to the continued advances on the two fronts. As the Russians or Western armies advanced, the took factories and installations that the Germans could no longer use. In addition, the Germans were very successful at dispersing their industries, which rendered them impervious to bombing raids.
2. Destruction of morale: I have never been able to find a single instance of when a bombing campaign effectively destroyed the morale of a belligerent. The Germans, then the Allies both tried to destroy the morale of the other side's civilians, the theory being that if they were bombed enough, they would force their government to seek a diplomatic solution. While it was an attractive point of view, (it justified attacks on enemy cities) it never worked, it would never work, and it never will work. This is why terrorism will never win, humans are simply too stubborn when faced with a crisis. We always fight back.
3. Interfering with the enemy's movement. At no time did the bombing campaigns effectively stop the Germans from moving their troops to where they wanted to put them.
If you can't accomplish your goals, you lose. Strategic bombing did not accomplish anything useful, (unlike its tactical counterpart) so it was a failure.

Dean.

Originally Posted by Dean

I tend to agree with Ollie on most of his points. I have never heard, read, or seen any evidence that strategic bombing accomplished any of the objectives they set out to do. As I see it, the roles of strategic bombing were as follows. 1. Destruction of Germany's industrial base. This could be accomplished through the destruction of any factories that produced any war materiel, and it was later extended to any active factory. While most (if not all) of the factories in Germany and the occupied territories were indeed destroyed, Germany maintained an industrial base right up to the end of the war. Although I cannot find any figures to back it up, I believe that Germany lost virtually all of its industries to the continued advances on the two fronts. As the Russians or Western armies advanced, the took factories and installations that the Germans could no longer use. In addition, the Germans were very successful at dispersing their industries, which rendered them impervious to bombing raids.
2. Destruction of morale: I have never been able to find a single instance of when a bombing campaign effectively destroyed the morale of a belligerent. The Germans, then the Allies both tried to destroy the morale of the other side's civilians, the theory being that if they were bombed enough, they would force their government to seek a diplomatic solution. While it was an attractive point of view, (it justified attacks on enemy cities) it never worked, it would never work, and it never will work. This is why terrorism will never win, humans are simply too stubborn when faced with a crisis. We always fight back.
3. Interfering with the enemy's movement. At no time did the bombing campaigns effectively stop the Germans from moving their troops to where they wanted to put them.
If you can't accomplish your goals, you lose. Strategic bombing did not accomplish anything useful, (unlike its tactical counterpart) so it was a failure.

Dean.

Actually, Dean, the factories were not destroyed. That is the point. An industrial infrastructure cannot produce without raw materials and equipment. The Germans ran out of raw materials...not machines.

Alkett-Berlin--I think I have mentioned this tank plant--is a great example. It was the largest in Germany and produced, among other things, the PzKW IV, artillery and even certain rockets. While the city of Berlin was subjected to countless raids during the war, only one raid targetted the Alkett facilities. These facilities were located in a remote corner of Berlin and, if you actually go there, you see that the plant was quite large. Well, the plant kept producing and most of the equipment survived the war. Alkett was only one of thousands of facilities. Most of these facilities were bombed only once or, suprisingly, never at all.
[Germany "lost" all factories to the Allied advance by May 1945.]

By the way, while I like the relationship between terrorism and strategic bombing, I do not think the officers of the period would have shared that point of view.

The supply of the Tiger tanks had been greatly reduced by bombing, also the attacks on the shipyards that produced the submarines had been very effective. There were many war supplies that had been been reduced by bombing of the factories, power stations and roads and bridges. There were also a million people tied up in Air Defence that could have been used in the Army if had not been for the bombing, which could have dragged the war out even longer.

Originally Posted by LeEnfield

The supply of the Tiger tanks had been greatly reduced by bombing, also the attacks on the shipyards that produced the submarines had been very effective. There were many war supplies that had been been reduced by bombing of the factories, power stations and roads and bridges. There were also a million people tied up in Air Defence that could have been used in the Army if had not been for the bombing, which could have dragged the war out even longer.

What about the number of AA guns used. For example 88mm, which could have been used for anti tank, instead of AA.

Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy

Actually, Dean, the factories were not destroyed. That is the point. An industrial infrastructure cannot produce without raw materials and equipment. The Germans ran out of raw materials...not machines.

Alkett-Berlin--I think I have mentioned this tank plant--is a great example. It was the largest in Germany and produced, among other things, the PzKW IV, artillery and even certain rockets. While the city of Berlin was subjected to countless raids during the war, only one raid targetted the Alkett facilities. These facilities were located in a remote corner of Berlin and, if you actually go there, you see that the plant was quite large. Well, the plant kept producing and most of the equipment survived the war. Alkett was only one of thousands of facilities. Most of these facilities were bombed only once or, suprisingly, never at all.
[Germany "lost" all factories to the Allied advance by May 1945.]

By the way, while I like the relationship between terrorism and strategic bombing, I do not think the officers of the period would have shared that point of view.

If you re-read the post, Ollie, you will see that I never stated that German factories were destroyed by bombing. I simply stated that it was one of the objectives of strategic bombing and that it never worked. In fact, I have seen WW II era air photos of "destroyed" German factories. problem was that they had smoke coming out of thier smokestacks even though the factories to which they were attached looked like they were ruins.

Dean.