Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Not sure why you think that Monty but it certainly was superior to the Me-109, Spitfire Mk V and P-51a. The only reason why it did not wholly replace the Me-109 was due to the fact that Germany was embroiled in a titanic struggle with the the USSR. If there was no war against Russia then I'm certain the Fw 190 would have fully replaced the Me-109 in Luftwaffe squadrons.

I can not understand why you would think that either as even Kurt Tank only saw the FW-190 as a stop gap measure until the TA-152 came into service, one of its biggest selling points to Luftwaffe High Command was that it used a radial engine so it wouldnt affect ME-109 production.

The FW-190 while being a great fighter early on (A series) and ground attack aircraft was hopeless above 20000 feet which made it no good in an anti-bomber role and due to the requirements for more armour and firepower it became less an less manouverable in its fighter role meaning that replacing the Me-109 would have left Germany without a competitive fighter and lacking the ability to take on bombers.

Originally Posted by chief_darkcloud

Hello everyone, this my first post but have been following this thread. I think many of the reasons stated are valid points which certainly contributed to their defeat. My opinion is logistics & lack of mobility for most of the German army is what prevented a German victory. While they were masters of Blitzkrieg tactics their army was mostly unmechanized or dependent on horses for transport.

There are many notable examples of panzer units having to stop and wait for infantry support and supply to catch up. This negated some of the tactical advantages of Blitzkrieg. Had the German army been fully mechanized army with equally mobile supply then outcome could have been much different. The added mobility would have yielded even greater encirclements and gotten them closer to Moscow much sooner.

I am of this opinion as well, I think Germany became over extended and lost the focus it had in 1939-1941, couple this with a woefully inadequate logistical system and a state that wasn't full committed to war production until it was far too late and any engagement that lasted more than a few months was always going to cause them issues.

I think when you look at the 1941 Russian winter where German major supply depots reported having all the materials they needed to supply the front but had to make decisions whether to ship reinforcements, ammunition, medical supplies or winter uniforms as they could provide one but not all it becomes apparent that it just wasn't going to work without a consolidation period and some massive investment in western Russian infrastructure which is time they simply did not have.

I cant recall where I saw it but there has been a theory going around that the modern military seem to always run into logistics problems around 250 miles from their start points no matter how meticulously things are planned I wonder if there is anything in this.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I can not understand why you would think that either as even Kurt Tank only saw the FW-190 as a stop gap measure until the TA-152 came into service, one of its biggest selling points to Luftwaffe High Command was that it used a radial engine so it wouldnt affect ME-109 production.

At the end of the day Monty, aircraft development became so rapid that you could argue that many designs were essentially stop-gap measures. In 1939, no-one would foresee that bombers would be able to operate at 40,000 feet in the case of the B-29. The Me-109 wouldn't have been much use against the B-29 either. What is generally agreed is that the Fw 190 was an improvement on the Me-109 in several key areas and under ideal circumstances it would have replaced more of the ME-109 squadrons, until an improved design was ready for service.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I am of this opinion as well, I think Germany became over extended and lost the focus it had in 1939-1941, couple this with a woefully inadequate logistical system and a state that wasn't full committed to war production until it was far too late and any engagement that lasted more than a few months was always going to cause them issues.

I think when you look at the 1941 Russian winter where German major supply depots reported having all the materials they needed to supply the front but had to make decisions whether to ship reinforcements, ammunition, medical supplies or winter uniforms as they could provide one but not all it becomes apparent that it just wasn't going to work without a consolidation period and some massive investment in western Russian infrastructure which is time they simply did not have.

Agreed and I've stated this many times before too. The Wehrmacht was never geared up for long engagements and suitably, their logistical and industrial structure was geared up for short, sharp wars. They severly overestimated the ability of the Soviet Union to put armies in the field and their will to resist. Operation Barbarossa, which really only lasted from June 22nd until September 30th, should have, in the German's eyes, been enough to defeat the Red Army. It wasn't and a 2nd Operation, Typhoon, was required to attempt to achieve an objective that wasn't even one of the major objectives of Barbarossa, namely the capture of Moscow.

But yeah, lack of logistical supply was one of the major factors that broke the Germany Army's hopes for victory in the East. For example, in Autumn 1941 Army Group Centre needed 30 trains worth of supplies; they were receiving around 12-20. Bureaucratic inefficiency and infighting made that situation even worse. Germany in WW2 could be summed up as follows; brilliant in the tactical and operational sense but indecisive, delusional and ineffective in the strategic sense.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I cant recall where I saw it but there has been a theory going around that the modern military seem to always run into logistics problems around 250 miles from their start points no matter how meticulously things are planned I wonder if there is anything in this.

It might in relation to fuel, or lack of it. Certainly that was the reason why the 2003 invasion of Iraq ground to a halt; it was stupendously expensive to fuel a large number of modern tanks, especially in the case of the Abrams. Lack of fuel was one of the major factors why the German thrust on Moscow failed too.

Germany lost WW11 because they ignored the oldest military maxim in the world :-

"You cannot hold a hot sausage in your hand".

Doppleganger

Would it have been feasible to supply the German army via the Black sea and Baltic using the various rivers that flow inland? Barges could be sailed almost directly from Germany down the Danube. The Russian navy wasn't up to scratch as far as I know.

Originally Posted by perseus

I am not sure why you need a fleet of ships with the carriers, what are they going to be attacked by? Swordfish Biplanes? surely mincemeat for any fighter aircraft. The Germans already had a good supply of fuelling ships. Perhaps a mix of carriers and heavy cruisers may have been a better option. The aircraft would attack the large ships the heavy cruisers the destroyers and the Uboats the dispersed convoy.

A suitable time for invasion would have been summer 1942 especially if the USA could be kept out of the war. The FW 190 was superior to the Spitfire V as demonstrated over Dieppe and was available in suitable numbers. Of course this may have been academic since no convoys, no fuel, no ships, no aircraft.

As a sailor I can tell you that the north atlantic is not aircraft carrier friendly. Carriers of the day would have a difficult time operating most of the year. Try Feburary in the North Sea or the North Atlantic

Also what happend when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau met HMS Glorious and 2 or 3 destroyers? We know what happened the British lost 1500 men.

HMS Glorious had 18 war planes onboard but they would have had to turn in the wind which was the same direction of the Germans in order to a launch. Also the Germans scored a direct hit early in the battle, possibly damaging the flight deck.

Originally Posted by Topmaul

As a sailor I can tell you that the north atlantic is not aircraft carrier friendly. Carriers of the day would have a difficult time operating most of the year. Try Feburary in the North Sea or the North Atlantic.

The small Escort carriers managed http://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/ESCORT/

Originally Posted by Topmaul

Also what happend when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau met HMS Glorious and 2 or 3 destroyers? We know what happened the British lost 1500 men.

Using aircraft carriers without aircraft is worse than battleships without guns, hardly a true indication of the potential of the aircraft carrier

Germany lost the war because she did not have the human and material resources to fight such a prolonged conflict compared to the economies of her enemies. John Ellis's book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War is an excellent account of the strengths and shortcomings of both sides in the Second World War and I thoroughly recommend it if you want a clear picture of where the Allies and Axis got it wrong and right. Regrettably, I think it may now be out of print.

Originally Posted by Union404

Germany lost the war because she did not have the human and material resources to fight such a prolonged conflict compared to the economies of her enemies. John Ellis's book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War is an excellent account of the strengths and shortcomings of both sides in the Second World War and I thoroughly recommend it if you want a clear picture of where the Allies and Axis got it wrong and right. Regrettably, I think it may now be out of print.

I think it is still in print as Amazon has both new and used versions for sale.

The thing about Germany's failure is that until the industrial might of both Russia and the USA became fully available in 1943 the Allies were really in no better position logistically and had things gone to plan for Germany they would have already been in control of Europe by then and had all those resources at their disposal.

Originally Posted by perseus

Using aircraft carriers without aircraft is worse than battleships without guns, hardly a true indication of the potential of the aircraft carrier

I believe HMS GLORIOUS had 18 war planes onboard at the time it was sunk. And who's fault was it that it was out there with only 2 small escorts?

Originally Posted by perseus

Doppleganger

Would it have been feasible to supply the German army via the Black sea and Baltic using the various rivers that flow inland? Barges could be sailed almost directly from Germany down the Danube. The Russian navy wasn't up to scratch as far as I know.

Interesting idea but I'm guessing that the idea of using rivers as supply routes was considered and dismissed as unnecessary by Hitler and the General Staff. They expected to defeat the Red Army in 6-8 weeks so probably didn't think that setting up a system of barges was worth their while.

Would it have been feasible? Well I think it may have helped to a certain degree until the rivers froze. That's the major problem I see. In 1941 though, it may have partly helped the Germans get round the problems caused by reconfiguring the Soviet railroad system to the Western standard gauge. In 1942 it would be possible to ferry stuff down the Danube to the Black Sea and then ferry stuff up the Dnieper but it's a roundabout way of getting supplies to where the German armies were in 1942. Plus, the Dnieper freezes up in winter too (along with most Russian rivers) so that wouldn't be too helpful.