Originally Posted by LeEnfield

The Generals advised Hitler not to invade France, and what happened there ????

That's new to me. But the Germans overwhelmed France quickly....

Why would the Generals advised Hitler not to invade France since most of the French equipments are from World War 1?

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

It can be argued that there were in fact 2 major wars that occurred from 1939-1945. The first, a European war, lasted from September 1st, 1939 until September 30, 1941 (i.e. 2 years), which Germany decisively won. The 2nd war, which started when Hitler declared war on the USA they obviously lost, at least in the short-term. The other thing to consider is who won the war in the long term? Did Germany really lose long-term?

Anyway, the reason why Germany didn't 'win WW2' was simply because they failed to achieve a decisive victory over the Red Army in the Battle of Moscow, which started on September 30th, 1941. Had they done so it wouldn't have mattered one bit whether Hitler declared war on the USA or not. if Hitler knocks Stalin out of the war everything changes.

In fact, let's narrow it down further. There is much contention over this but the reason that Germany lost WW2 might be because of the 'Lötzen Decision'.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%B6tzen_decision

Sorry I have missed this post for so long but if people are going to use the Lotzen Decision as reason for defeat then surely you would have to go back even further to the need to bail out the Italians in Greece and Albania, that set operation Barbarossa back 6 weeks and cost valuable men and material.

Originally Posted by MontyB

Sorry I have missed this post for so long but if people are going to use the Lotzen Decision as reason for defeat then surely you would have to go back even further to the need to bail out the Italians in Greece and Albania, that set operation Barbarossa back 6 weeks and cost valuable men and material.

Not so much the men and material but the time, though I also think now that the Lotzen Decision was perhaps the correct one. What wasn't correct was the thinking that both Kiev and Moscow could be captured in the same campaign. The other thing to realize also is that it wasn't lack of men or materials that really defeated the Wehrmacht at Moscow but rather the lack of a robust enough logistical infrastructure, which would have existed whether Barbarossa had started 6 weeks early or not.

True and this was one of the things I have read a lot lately, in almost all campaigns throughout the war the Germans struggled logistically.
There have been references to this break down in several books I have read lately and some cite things such as having to choose whether to send reinforcements, food, ammunition, medical supplies or winter equipment to troops at the front while they had all that was required in the rear supply areas they did not have the ability to get it all to front in sufficient time and quantity for it to be of use.

I have found this quite odd given that through out the war the Germans were particularly adept at shifting whole tank divisions around to meet a threat or exploit a breakthrough and yet for some reason they couldnt sort out supply?

The problem was they did not have the man power or the equipment for all the different fronts that they were fighting on

Originally Posted by MontyB

True and this was one of the things I have read a lot lately, in almost all campaigns throughout the war the Germans struggled logistically.
There have been references to this break down in several books I have read lately and some cite things such as having to choose whether to send reinforcements, food, ammunition, medical supplies or winter equipment to troops at the front while they had all that was required in the rear supply areas they did not have the ability to get it all to front in sufficient time and quantity for it to be of use.

I have found this quite odd given that through out the war the Germans were particularly adept at shifting whole tank divisions around to meet a threat or exploit a breakthrough and yet for some reason they couldnt sort out supply?

Simple. They both underestimated the harshness of the Russian countryside (in Barbarossa) and they focused too much on the operational level and not enough on the grand strategic level. It took them a long time to gear up their industry in line with the demands of their armed forces.

Remember too that the German Army in Russia was the first army in the world to employ machines on such a large scale. They did not adequately grow their logistical infrastructure in line with their increase in tanks and troops. They relied too heavily on horses (over 600,000, most of which died in the first year in Russia) and captured softskinned vehicles that proved an absolute nightmare to keep in service due to the huge numbers of different parts that were required to be sourced/made. They also vastly overestimated the effectiveness of air supply.

About two hours ago, saw an interesting thing (Military Channel) on how our folks used some German WWII tactics in the initial invasion of Iraq. Very interesting and it was also interesting how we suffered some of the exact same drawbacks as the Germans who used the strategy. I would assume this was kind of a boo boo by Tommy Franks that he may have assumed we might have been able to avoid with the advanced technology.

Originally Posted by AikiRooster

About two hours ago, saw an interesting thing (Military Channel) on how our folks used some German WWII tactics in the initial invasion of Iraq. Very interesting and it was also interesting how we suffered some of the exact same drawbacks as the Germans who used the strategy. I would assume this was kind of a boo boo by Tommy Franks that he may have assumed we might have been able to avoid with the advanced technology.

same huh? Same problems huh? Imagine that.
Boo boo by Tommy Franks LMAO, man can I use that?

So how much of an effect did the breaking of German Air, Naval and Army codes play?

I have been very skeptical of German military intelligence during WW2, it seems to be completely off the mark in determining the enemy strengths and weaknesses and it flatly refused to believe that its codes had been broken for at least the last 3 years of the war.

Allied intelligence played a huge part but really the industrial might of the allies was overwhelming in the end. It didn't matter how many mistakes we made, the Germans didn't have the material might from about 43 onwards.