USA WW2 Lend Lease

1) NO

2) The Germans had lost the war in the east in august 1941,the fall of Moscow would have no impact .

I have always believed that the fall of Moscow would have been more detrimental to the Germans than the Russians as it would have left Army Group Centre a massive salient to defend through the winter with Army Group North back at Leningrad and Army Group South at Kiev.

The result could lead to Moscow becoming AGC's Stalingrad.


The Germans had lost the chance to win the war against Britain at the end of june 1940 when Britain decided to continue the war :all Britain had to do was to continue the fighting till the intervention of the US and than it would be over for Germany .

Not so sure about this (it is after all purely speculative) but had Germany knocked Russia out early enough I m not sure a US/Anglo invasion of Europe would have been possible against a full strength German Army.

Germany still could not have crossed the channel nor the Atlantic so in the end it may well have become a stalemate.
 
1)Yes,but with the caveat that the fact that the US had the strongest economy ,was almost annulled by the fact that tthe US were more remote from the front than the others: most US soldiers nver left Conus.

2)The Allied land,sea and air campaigns were much more important than LL to the SU and more important than LL to Britain

3) No : it did not take a combination of efforts to defeat Germany : Germany would be defeated by Britain and the SU, by the SU,by the SU and the US,by the US (although one can argue that without Britain a US intervention in Europe would be impossible).

1) you ever here of the Merchant Marines? What about all those convoys?
The US had nearly 3 million active soldiers in Europe at it's peak of involvement 44-45.

2) they were both of great importance and both facets of the allied involvement took pressure off of the USSR.

3) we disagree, see all my previous post for stated reasons.
 
I have always believed that the fall of Moscow would have been more detrimental to the Germans than the Russians as it would have left Army Group Centre a massive salient to defend through the winter with Army Group North back at Leningrad and Army Group South at Kiev.

The result could lead to Moscow becoming AGC's Stalingrad.

The loss of Moscow could have been the end of the USSR. The psychological blow of losing the seat of government and the nation's capital would have been a grievous loss to the USSR perhaps more than they could bear after the disastrous summer and fall of 41.

To repeat Germany proved that after the Moscow loss they could still soundly defeated the Soviets at Kharkov and the Izyum salient crushing more soviet army groups. Does this sound like the actions of a defeated army? The defeat at Moscow merely slowed down the Nazi onslaught. It wasn't until Hitler's went for the symbolic victory at Stalingrad that the German army started to get bleed dry in the resulting 6 month battle of attrition. Even then the Soviets were not entirely in the clear until their 1st major Soviet summer victory at Kursk. Do not forget that while the Stalingrad was underway the Germans were also defeated at El Alamein. The point is claims can be made for when the downfall of Nazi Germany occurred. They are all theories.

I still make the claim that the defeat of Nazi Germany was a slow and gradual process that took the forces and resources of the western Allies and the USSR. However if I had to pick the straw that broke the camels back it would likely be Stalingrad.
 
Not so sure about this (it is after all purely speculative) but had Germany knocked Russia out early enough I m not sure a US/Anglo invasion of Europe would have been possible against a full strength German Army.

Germany still could not have crossed the channel nor the Atlantic so in the end it may well have become a stalemate.

Why should an invasion be needed ? There would be and was the A Bomb.

If ,after the fall of the SU,the war with Britain and the US continued,the fall of the SU would not benefit Germany .

Exemple : if the war against the US and Britain still was going on in 1947 (the SU being eliminated in 1941),Germany would not have the means to occupy the SU till the Urals,occupy the rest of Europe and defend the Reich against allied air attacks .

Even if and Britain and the SU were eliminated and the war with the US was over (or if there was no war with the US),Germany was condemned :to occupy Europe from the Pyrenees to the Urals,the WM would need 5 million men in peace time,and this for generations : Germany could not afford this and would be bankrupt in a few years .

Imagine the US with armed forces of 20 million men in peace time to the end of this century .

NO country could occupy Europe definitively :Napoleon failed,Germany would not succeed.Even the SU would fail(what was one of the reaons they did not try it).
 
Why should an invasion be needed ? There would be and was the A Bomb.

If ,after the fall of the SU,the war with Britain and the US continued,the fall of the SU would not benefit Germany .

Exemple : if the war against the US and Britain still was going on in 1947 (the SU being eliminated in 1941),Germany would not have the means to occupy the SU till the Urals,occupy the rest of Europe and defend the Reich against allied air attacks .

Even if and Britain and the SU were eliminated and the war with the US was over (or if there was no war with the US),Germany was condemned :to occupy Europe from the Pyrenees to the Urals,the WM would need 5 million men in peace time,and this for generations : Germany could not afford this and would be bankrupt in a few years .

Imagine the US with armed forces of 20 million men in peace time to the end of this century .

NO country could occupy Europe definitively :Napoleon failed,Germany would not succeed.Even the SU would fail(what was one of the reaons they did not try it).


I agree but I am not sure economics were at the fore front of Hitlers thinking when he embarked on a global war, if it was he would not have invaded Poland.

But given that WW2 was Hitlers ideological wet dream and the invasion of Russia was clearly his priority at least as far back as his writing of Mein Kampf there was always going to be a war with him in power.

Based on the fact that he could not get to Britain because he had no Navy of a standard capable of taking on the Royal Navy long enough to defeat Britain the only hope for Germany was a quick war against the Soviet Union and once that did not happen (by Winter 1941) the war was effectively lost.
 
Why should an invasion be needed ? There would be and was the A Bomb.

If ,after the fall of the SU,the war with Britain and the US continued,the fall of the SU would not benefit Germany .

Exemple : if the war against the US and Britain still was going on in 1947 (the SU being eliminated in 1941),Germany would not have the means to occupy the SU till the Urals,occupy the rest of Europe and defend the Reich against allied air attacks.

Had the war continued Germany may very well of had it's own Atomic Bomb and the missiles to launch it with. Historian Rainer Karlsch and others claim that Nazi Germany did conduct small scale atomic experiments. During the last months of the war, a small group of scientists working in secret under Diebner and with the strong support of the physicist Walther Gerlach, who was by that time head of the uranium project, built and tested a nuclear device. The thing is Nazi Germany simply ran out of time and resources for an atomic weapon. However had the war been delayed or prolonged Hitler may very well have have gotten his A-Bomb.

Also Nazi Germany did not plan to administrate to the conquered Soviet and Polish peoples. The long term plan planned to eliminate - kill them or exile them to Siberia. Himmler planed "in the short term" to kill > 30 million to 50 million Soviets outright. This was a war of racial extermination. This was one of the reasons the Red Army fought so hard the alternative was to perish. They picked the worse of the 2 evils. Guderian stated that had they conducted the war in the east differently and acted as liberators they would have easily won.
 
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US mobilized 14 million men during the war,but most of them did not leave Conus .


~ 3 million Americans were in the European theater. That's is a lot of men. Combine this with > 2 million British - common wealth troops in Europe and you have an extremely large allied presence in Europe.

The Germans forces in the west were generally outnumbered by at least 2:1 by the allies. In terms of hardware (AFV, Planes, trucks, etc.) the ratio was much higher.
 
Hi.

Although his debating style is somewhat blunt, lljadw makes some good points at times, although I disagree with him about precisely when Germany was defeated; he says in the summer of 1941 and I say after the Battle of Moscow.

But anyway.

I think some of the opinions put forth on this thread are a bit naive and certainly seem to indicate a general rather than a detailed knowledge of the subject. A case in point is believing that Germany was only defeated after the Battle of Stalingrad and that LL was instrumental in the eventual Allied success. Neither are true, although LL did speed up the Soviet advance, not least because of the impact it had on the Soviet railroad system. By the time this kicked in however, Germany was already defeated. A good book to read, although heavy going and ponderous at times, is 'The Wages of Destruction', by Adam Tooze. Basically it examines the Nazi economy, both before and during the war. Having read it, you can't make any case for Germany winning the war unless they were able to knock the Soviets out of the war quickly and make peace with the UK. Declaring war on the USA was the final arrogant stupidity of the Nazis, although by this time they had probably already lost.

Bottom line, LL didn't make any difference to the outcome of WW2, although it did speed up the Allied victory.
 
Hi.

Although his debating style is somewhat blunt, lljadw makes some good points at times, although I disagree with him about precisely when Germany was defeated; he says in the summer of 1941 and I say after the Battle of Moscow.

But anyway.

I think some of the opinions put forth on this thread are a bit naive and certainly seem to indicate a general rather than a detailed knowledge of the subject. A case in point is believing that Germany was only defeated after the Battle of Stalingrad and that LL was instrumental in the eventual Allied success. Neither are true, although LL did speed up the Soviet advance, not least because of the impact it had on the Soviet railroad system. By the time this kicked in however, Germany was already defeated. A good book to read, although heavy going and ponderous at times, is 'The Wages of Destruction', by Adam Tooze. Basically it examines the Nazi economy, both before and during the war. Having read it, you can't make any case for Germany winning the war unless they were able to knock the Soviets out of the war quickly and make peace with the UK. Declaring war on the USA was the final arrogant stupidity of the Nazis, although by this time they had probably already lost.

Bottom line, LL didn't make any difference to the outcome of WW2, although it did speed up the Allied victory.


Wait didn't I just say that?

:)

I can understand the argument that Germany lost the war at Stalingrad as it is the easiest battle to pick as the decisive one (I think in the very early days I backed Stalingrad as the decisive battle of WW2 which I now no longer believe) as before then it was all forward and afterwards it was all backwards.
You look at the writings of German Generals such as Raus and Manstein who have claimed bailing out of Kursk cost them the war it isn't hard to see why the view has held for this long.

PS: Good to hear from you again.
 
My point is the following : WWII in the east was a war between 2 industrial giants who both used enormous resources and enormous manpower (in 1941 4 million Germans against 9 million Soviets) and such a war could not be decided by one battle ,be it Stalingrad ,Kursk or Bagration .
In 1941 the Germans lost 830000 men in the east (for 6 months),in 1942 some 1.1 million,in 1943 1.7 million,in 1944 2 million.Against these figures,the losses of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk,Bagration are paling .

As WWI,WWII was, on all fronts, a war of attrition.
 
Hi.
although I disagree with him about precisely when Germany was defeated; he says in the summer of 1941 and I say after the Battle of Moscow.
Bottom line, LL didn't make any difference to the outcome of WW2, although it did speed up the Allied victory.

One can find historians to backup anyone number of points at which Germany supposedly lost the war: starting from the fall of 41 to the loss at Kursk. Or was it simply a war of attrition and economics that Germany lost due to the scales being eventually tipped against it. I disagree on Lend lease and the fact that the allied forces drawing off forces away from a consistence flat out use of all German military on the USSR, believing it to be a combination of factors that lead to Germany's defeat. The 1st true battle of attrition was Stalingrad and the Germans proved they couldn't beat the Reds in this type of conflict. So I opt for Stalingrad. It was also the battle that gave the Red Army the confidence that they just might win. An army that had fought hard, but had been defeated and demoralized for 1.5 years. Also if we look at the effect of lend lease by the battle of Stalingrad lend lease was coming in substantially.
The Soviet Union suffered severe defeats in 42, after their singular victory at Moscow. Germany dealt the USSR major blows at Kharkov and the Izyum salient. They then went on to advance to the Volga and nearly to the Caspian Sea. Doesn't sound like a defeated army? My take.
 
As I have pointed out before, cut the head off a chicken and it doesn't drop dead on the spot but the fact that it carries on for minutes after the event does not mean it is going to get better.

By the end of 1941 the German army was done but it still had the momentum and initiative that the Russians did not which is why it was still advancing in late 1942 however throughout 1942 the Russians got stronger and the Germans continued to weaken culminating in Stalingrad.
 
My point is the following : WWII in the east was a war between 2 industrial giants who both used enormous resources and enormous manpower (in 1941 4 million Germans against 9 million Soviets) and such a war could not be decided by one battle ,be it Stalingrad ,Kursk or Bagration
As WWI,WWII was, on all fronts, a war of attrition.

There is wisdom in this statement! Even the losses on the western front such as occurred in Normandy were very high with the combined allied losses at ~ 250 thousand and the German losses at nearly 300 thousand. During a 7 week period.
During a similar time frame lasting 8 weeks the Germans incurred even high losses during operation Bagration with 300 to 500 thousand casualties with Red Army losses running as high as possible 800 thousand.
These were dual hammer blows the Wehrmacht could ill afford.
 
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One can find historians to backup anyone number of points at which Germany supposedly lost the war: starting from the fall of 41 to the loss at Kursk. Or was it simply a war of attrition and economics that Germany lost due to the scales being eventually tipped against it. I disagree on Lend lease and the fact that the allied forces drawing off forces away from a consistence flat out use of all German military on the USSR, believing it to be a combination of factors that lead to Germany's defeat. The 1st true battle of attrition was Stalingrad and the Germans proved they couldn't beat the Reds in this type of conflict. So I opt for Stalingrad. It was also the battle that gave the Red Army the confidence that they just might win. An army that had fought hard, but had been defeated and demoralized for 1.5 years. Also if we look at the effect of lend lease by the battle of Stalingrad lend lease was coming in substantially.
The Soviet Union suffered severe defeats in 42, after their singular victory at Moscow. Germany dealt the USSR major blows at Kharkov and the Izyum salient. They then went on to advance to the Volga and nearly to the Caspian Sea. Doesn't sound like a defeated army? My take.
A lot of these historians are basing their opinions on old or outmoded data sources. If you ask a reputable historian/analyst today I don't think any of them would say that Kursk or Stalingrad was a turning point.

Stalingrad wasn't the first true battle of attrition as the whole campaign in the East was a giant battle of attrition. The difference between the Germans and the Soviets was that the Soviets could replace their lost manpower - Germany couldn't. So it doesn't matter that the Germans won victory after victory if they couldn't deliver the killer blow. The only chance to do this was to a) inflict enough losses in the field on the Red Army and b) topple the political apparatus by taking Moscow and/or deposing Stalin. By failing to take Moscow and losing any hope of a quick resolution to the war, Germany was doomed to ultimate defeat.

Moreover, they were not prepared for a war lasting more than 6 months against the USSR. In October, they had already switched a lot of their industrial focus to beefing up the Luftwaffe for a strategic war against the USA/UK. They had ramped down production of ammunition and had no hope of replacing the manpower losses suffered in 1941, even though they were operationally victorious. The cream of German manpower had been committed to Barbarossa and there was very little left in reserve. That the Germans continued to do very well (even to the end in pockets) is down to their superior tactical ability, mission based orders system, superior mobility and the fact that the Red Army was still operationally quite poor.
 
A lot of these historians are basing their opinions on old or outmoded data sources. If you ask a reputable historian/analyst today I don't think any of them would say that Kursk or Stalingrad was a turning point.

Stalingrad wasn't the first true battle of attrition as the whole campaign in the East was a giant battle of attrition. The difference between the Germans and the Soviets was that the Soviets could replace their lost manpower - Germany couldn't. So it doesn't matter that the Germans won victory after victory if they couldn't deliver the killer blow. The only chance to do this was to a) inflict enough losses in the field on the Red Army and b) topple the political apparatus by taking Moscow and/or deposing Stalin. By failing to take Moscow and losing any hope of a quick resolution to the war, Germany was doomed to ultimate defeat.

Moreover, they were not prepared for a war lasting more than 6 months against the USSR. In October, they had already switched a lot of their industrial focus to beefing up the Luftwaffe for a strategic war against the USA/UK. They had ramped down production of ammunition and had no hope of replacing the manpower losses suffered in 1941, even though they were operationally victorious. The cream of German manpower had been committed to Barbarossa and there was very little left in reserve. That the Germans continued to do very well (even to the end in pockets) is down to their superior tactical ability, mission based orders system, superior mobility and the fact that the Red Army was still operationally quite poor.

Are you sure the fall of Moscow had caused the collapse of the Soviet Union's civilian government.
 
I don't know that the fall of Moscow would have resulted in the collapse of the USSR. I've heard both viewpoints. Some say by cutting off the head it would demoralize the reds to such a degree they would have surrendered. Yet others say this wasn't sufficient for a German victory.

I think by taking the Caucus oilfields and blocking the Volga lifeline they would have stood a better chance of scoring an economic victory, hence military victory.

Germany was quite elastic and made quite an economic comeback despite their initial failure to but Germany on a total war economy. It wasn’t until spring – fall 43 that the Soviet war production actually equaled – surpassed that of Germany.

One point the new historians point out is the tremendous losses the Germans inflicted on the Soviet army POW's and the USSR’s Slavic peoples. Current figures for Russian civilian losses run as high as 19 million, with perhaps as many as 10 to 12 million killed - murdered deliberately. These crimes were exposed upon the fall of the iron curtain and showed the real reason the Soviets could ill afford to lose the war. They gave the people someone worse than Stalin to hate, so the people rallied to Stalin who greatly reduced his repressive policies during the war years. Allowing religious freedoms, reducing the effect of the political commissars etc.
 
Are you sure the fall of Moscow had caused the collapse of the Soviet Union's civilian government.

I think the answer to this comes down to Stalins reaction had Moscow been on the verge of falling, it is claimed he was planning to stay to the bitter end in Moscow.
If this is the case then I believe the fall of Moscow would have facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union as a replacement government would most likely have taken the opportunity to negotiate an end.

However being a politician I have major doubts he was planning to stick it out and think he would have been heading for the hills as soon as Moscow's defenses were breached in which case I believe the Soviet winter offensive would have gone ahead as planned and probably would have lead to the destruction of Army Group Center.
 
Are you sure the fall of Moscow had caused the collapse of the Soviet Union's civilian government.
If captured quickly enough sure. One of the major tenets of the operational doctrine in Barbarossa, at least for the panzer formations, was to paralyze the Soviet rearguard and give them no time to react in a meaningful way. This was why von Bock, Guderian, Hoth etc all wanted to drive straight for Moscow after Smolensk, instead of pausing so that the Kiev situation could be dealt with. I am convinced now that the Battle of Kiev, as great a tactical victory as it was for the Wehrmacht, cost the Germans a critical chance to seize Moscow. Speed really was of the essence.
 
The informations we have indicate that an attack of Moscow immediately after Smolensk would have failed .

Besides, Typhoon had as aim NOT to capture Moscow,but the destruction of (what the Germans thought to be )the last operational Soviet forces,who would (thought the Germans) try to defend Moscow on a line west of the city . But,what would happen if these forces would avoid to be encircled by withdrawing to the region east of Moscow,where the Germans could not pursuit them /could not catch them ?

Reality is that if the Red Army was not defeated west of Smolensk,it could not be defeated east of Smolensk .
 
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