Not trying to be confrontational here but didn't you state that in the "most decisive battle of WW2" thread that "The failure to capture Leningrad was a setback but it did not in itself determine the outcome of the war in the East. Therefore, it cannot be considered decisive."

Well surely the of the capture the Arctic ports would have fallen into AGN's sphere of operations, having them tied up around Leningrad unable to proceed with easterly operations then must be considered more decisive than previously thought.

I don't see how the capture of the arctic ports would make a possible capture of Leningrad a decisive event. It would certainly be highly desirable but the German failure to capture Leningrad was in itself not decisive; it did not determine the outcome of the war in the East.

I would argue that the failure of the Wehrmacht to capture Arkhangelsk and Murmansk was more decisive than the failure to capture Leningrad. Leningrad was a prestige target and was largely out of the way of the main railroad and communications hubs. As I've stated before, capture of prestige targets is generally a third priority after the destruction of enemy forces in the field and the capture of economic and industrial resources.

Certainly while Leningrad had limited strategic value as anything other than a major port without freeing up the forces besieging it the capture of the arctic ports was never likely to happen, essentially I am saying that Leningrad effectively tied up AGN's resources preventing further advance eastward (in the north).

However I should probably take this to the other thread so as not to get further off topic here.

Leningrad tied up some of AGN's resources so that's a fair point.

Coming back to Lend-Lease IMO it literally saved the Soviet Union from being wiped from the political map.

My problem with your argument is that by comparison the amount that went to the Soviet Union was only a fraction of what Britain got, I think in monetary terms Russia received 11 Billion dollars worth while Britain received around 35 Billion and as was pointed out earlier much of the fighting equipment was sub-par at best.

If it took 35 billion dollars to keep an army the size of Britain's in the field (and the program was a fraction of their requirements) then 11 billion would not have propped up the Russians for very long.

I suppose a great deal of Britain's aid would have been squandered in bombing raids and supporting the soft underbelly strategy. It must have also included a fair proportion of expensive high tech equipment and military hardware. Russia's aid consisted of a great deal of trucks, food and raw materials, the bread and butter of building a military machine.

This raises another question though does the aid consist of what was sent to Russia or what actually arrived. If it is what was sent then some of it never actually arrived and is sitting at the bottom of the Atlantic and North Sea.

Incidentally the numbers mentioned (35 and 11 billion) were just from memory and may not be correct so if anyone has anything more accurate please post them.

There are some figures on what % of Lend Lease aid to Russia was lost during delivery. For example, according to the US Dept of State "Report on War Aid" figures, some 14747 softskin vehicles were lost en route, which is a pretty low % of the total delivered, less than 5% actually. The vast majority of the aid appeared to have gotten through.

The other thing to realize is where the aid went and why it was so critical. It kept the Soviet logistical infrastructure in operation. Sure the Russians made their own planes and tanks in the thousands, but what's the point if the Red Army had no trucks or locomotives to deliver them and other vitals such as food, ammunition, spare parts to the front, never mind transporting the troops themselves. If the Red Army Rifle Divisions have far fewer trucks how are they supposed to get around? Walk? Remember that after the first year of war most of the horses are already dead.

Without Lend Lease there would have been around 430000 fewer trucks available to the Red Army and NO Soviet railroad system. Lend Lease was utterly decisive in the Red Army being victorious over the Wehrmacht.

Put it this way.

No Lend Lease, no Soviet victory.

Of course this assumes the Soviets had an inherent deficiency in some of these and that industry couldn't have been rearranged to build trucks and locomotives. The material and oil deficiencies prooved important in the eventual destruction of Germany. It seems that they focussed on what they were good at building T34s etc.

Well, I suppose it can be answered in that if the Soviets are making all their own railroad cars, railroad tracks, locomotives, trucks, jeeps. machine tools etc, it follows that there would be less capacity and resources to make tanks, guns and aircraft. Consider also that the Red Army lost a prodigious amount of material during the war; in 1944 alone over 13000 T34 tanks were lost in some way from the Soviet OoB. Could they really have afforded to divert even a small percentage of their industrial capacity to make trucks and locomotives?