Crioche
New Member
I just finished reading an excellent book ...Task Force Black... on the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq following the invasion in 2003, when just about everyone started shooting at everyone else, especially if they were coalition forces.
TF Black was based on an SAS Squadron in Baghdad, but the book would have wider appeal than those simply interested in UK Special Forces. It takes a long hard look at everything happening at a multi-national level, especially the rocky relationship between the UK & US regarding the SAS becoming too close to Delta, and conflicts of interests.
I found the analysis of General Stanley McChrystal's modus operandi of 'industrial counter-terrorism' really interesting; to explain, he decided that find-fix-finish operations against Al Qaeda would naturally give rise to more volunteers to step into the place of those 'finished'. Yet if the operational tempo was such than the new volunteers were taken out at a faster rate than they could be replaced, the movement would collapse and fail. Coupled to that he invested a massive amount of technology and ingenuity into this effort, and I'm sure that's still in play now.
The author, Mark Urban, has written a few books about the covert world of the British Army and they make interesting reading. Whilst his earlier works have taken a look at the activities of the SAS in Northern Ireland (Big Boys Rules, etc), this one would offer trans-atlantic appeal as it examines how the SAS joined forces with Delta and JSOC to enact McChrystal's plan and make it work.
I found it especially interesting when he contrasts the success of the Baghdad & Sunni Triangle operations of the SAS, with the activities of the Armoured Division based around Basra. In Basra there seemed to be a lack of will at the highest level to succeed, whereas in Baghdad there was a desire at the lowest level to succeed and it pulled the political puppet-masters along with it, resulting in massive strategic success.
I reflect on the British military experience in Iraq with mixed feelings, from the success of the invasion and the counterinsurgency operations post-Gulf War 2 to the Sunni uprising that became uncontrollable, and the lack of political will (in the UK) to do something about it. I feel we left Southern Iraq with half the job done, but then maybe the thinking of the 'bosses' was that Afghanistan was more important and remains so to this day.
Unfortunately, I think we are making the same mistakes all over again in Helmand Province, where the troops are defeating the Taleban at each encounter, but there aren't enough of them to 'hold' the ground they take and the Politicians are reluctant to commit more.
Despite that, the book is a great read!
TF Black was based on an SAS Squadron in Baghdad, but the book would have wider appeal than those simply interested in UK Special Forces. It takes a long hard look at everything happening at a multi-national level, especially the rocky relationship between the UK & US regarding the SAS becoming too close to Delta, and conflicts of interests.
I found the analysis of General Stanley McChrystal's modus operandi of 'industrial counter-terrorism' really interesting; to explain, he decided that find-fix-finish operations against Al Qaeda would naturally give rise to more volunteers to step into the place of those 'finished'. Yet if the operational tempo was such than the new volunteers were taken out at a faster rate than they could be replaced, the movement would collapse and fail. Coupled to that he invested a massive amount of technology and ingenuity into this effort, and I'm sure that's still in play now.
The author, Mark Urban, has written a few books about the covert world of the British Army and they make interesting reading. Whilst his earlier works have taken a look at the activities of the SAS in Northern Ireland (Big Boys Rules, etc), this one would offer trans-atlantic appeal as it examines how the SAS joined forces with Delta and JSOC to enact McChrystal's plan and make it work.
I found it especially interesting when he contrasts the success of the Baghdad & Sunni Triangle operations of the SAS, with the activities of the Armoured Division based around Basra. In Basra there seemed to be a lack of will at the highest level to succeed, whereas in Baghdad there was a desire at the lowest level to succeed and it pulled the political puppet-masters along with it, resulting in massive strategic success.
I reflect on the British military experience in Iraq with mixed feelings, from the success of the invasion and the counterinsurgency operations post-Gulf War 2 to the Sunni uprising that became uncontrollable, and the lack of political will (in the UK) to do something about it. I feel we left Southern Iraq with half the job done, but then maybe the thinking of the 'bosses' was that Afghanistan was more important and remains so to this day.
Unfortunately, I think we are making the same mistakes all over again in Helmand Province, where the troops are defeating the Taleban at each encounter, but there aren't enough of them to 'hold' the ground they take and the Politicians are reluctant to commit more.
Despite that, the book is a great read!
