About So why do people hate Israel? Page 5
|December 2nd, 2011||#41|
| || |
|December 2nd, 2011||#42|
| || |
Perhaps if the USA gave the Palestinians the same economic and military aid that they give to the Israeli's they wouldn't need to strike at whatever they can reach. I'm sure that they would far rather just lob a few white phosphorus shells into an Israeli town than strap on an explosive vest just to kill a few Israelis.
Respect has to be earned. To offer respect to those who are clearly not worthy of it, merely destroys your own credibility and the respect of others for yourself.
"I am totally responsible for what I write,... however I cannot be held responsible for your complete inability to understand"
Last edited by senojekips; December 2nd, 2011 at 08:26..
|December 2nd, 2011||#43|
| || |
Forgive me that I use so much space - but I can´t make it much shorter.
|December 2nd, 2011||#44|
| || |
In English literature and debate in connection with the Palestine question often the word "transfer" comes up. Some historians simply call it a euphemism for expulsion.
That the establishment of a Jewish state would lead to the displacement of a native population was clear to the Zionist fathers. They saw a removal or relocation of a non-Jewish population, as a precondition for project implementation. So when the Zionist movement at the end of the 1800s decided to colonize Palestine, it was with the knowledge that the area's Arab population at one time or another had to move. How this de-Arabization could take place was up to Israel's formation in 1948, a recurring theme in the Zionist debate. Various proposals and plans were developed in this context with the clear target of de-Arabization of Palestine.
We meet the transfer idea with Theodor Herzl, who in his diary on 12 June 1895 wrote: "We must try to send the poor population across the frontier ... Both the process of expropriating the land and move the poor must be carried out discreetly and cautiously.” Later on it developed into a proper transfer policy.
In Nahman Syrkin's pamphlet from 1898, entitled "Die jüdische Frage und der sozialistische Juden Staat".. He wrote that Palestine is "sparsely populated, Jews today represent 10% and the land must be cleared for the Jews."
Similarly, from early 1900-century, numerous examples that the transfer was one of contemporary significant issues. Arthur Ruppin, another prominent Zionist Socialist, made in a memorandum to the Zionist Organization Executive, May 1911, a concrete proposal which consisted in "a limited population transfer" of Arab peasants to the Syrian districts of Aleppo and Homs.
One of the strongest proponents of "The Transfer Solution" was, however, the British Jewish writer Israel Zangwill. During a meeting with British Zionists in 1905 he said that "either we must be prepared by the sword to drive out the Arab tribes, who owns the land, just as our ancestors did it or contend with the problem of a large alien population, mostly Muslims through centuries been accustomed to despise us. "
In 1920 he published the book: The Voice of Jerusalem, in which he wrote: "We can not allow the Arabs to block such a valuable piece of historical reconstruction (restoring Israel) ... Therefore, we most kindly persuade them to emigrate. After all, they have all Arabia with its millions of square miles ... There are no particular reason for the Arabs to cling to these few kilometers. Let them "pack their tents together" and "move" as they have for habit: let them exemplify it now. "
Another contemporary player in the transfer debate was Leon Motzkin - who in 1897 helped to establish the Basel Program. He said in 1912 at the annual German Zionist conference: "The facts are that around Palestine there are large areas. It would be easy for the Arabs to settle there for the money they will receive from the Jews."
And in a pamphlet from 1918 entitled: "The Core of Zionism And The Way to Build Up Palestine", he argued once again the view that the solution to the Arab "demographic problem" had to be sought in a larger Arab context.
The transfer idea was not met with any particular form of skepticism in Europe. They were deeply influenced by the notion that nations outside the European cultural sphere almost natural, had to give way in favor of European civilization. The Zionist thought they had the right to colonize Palestine because - as Menahem Ussishkin puts it in 1930: “we had greater and nobler goal than protection of several hundred thousand Arab Fellah." It was an evolutionary mindset that pure science was underpinned by the notion of the white race's superiority, and which operated with concepts like "inferior cultures" and the existence of the "wild".
It was thus entirely in keeping with the zeitgeist, when Theodor Herzl in his book Der Judenstaat from 1896 called Zionism the "vanguard of culture against barbarism." Contemporary views on the Palestine Arabs as someone who lived at an earlier and lower stage of human evolutionary history did clearly emerge from the writer Moshe Smilansky, who immigrated to Palestine in 1890: "Let us not be too familiar with the Arab Fellah, so that our children will inherit their manners and learn from their vile business. Let all who are faithful to the Torah avoid the horrors and keep distance from Fellah and their miserable performance. "
After years of diplomatic activity in 1917, the Zionists got their final breakthrough. This was done by England - who a few years later was awarded the Palestine as a so-called mandate territory – who issued the Balfour Declaration, which read: (England) "look favorably on the establishment of a national home in Palestine for the Jewish people ..." It paved the way for a more realistic and pragmatic discussion of what in Zionist terminology was termed "the Arab question." Previously, the issue of transfer had a visionary nature, but was now in force of the new facts put on the real political agenda.
More then stood up and advocated openly for the transfer. Not least Zangwill, who in late 1918 and early 1919 wrote several articles in which he pointed out the necessity that the Palestinian Arabs left Palestine either voluntarily or were gradually displaced to other Arab countries.
The debate in the wake of the Balfour Declaration was so intense that the Zionist leadership asked for a greater degree of discretion in consideration of the item's controversial nature. During negotiations in Versailles in 1919, mentioning the transfer was avoided. But behind the scenes the Zionist intentions was not hidden.
William Bullitt, who was a member of the U.S. delegation, later described how he repeatedly with colleagues from the Zionist delegation, including Chaim Weizmann, off of the agenda discussed various transfer plans: "While Palestine remain a Jewish state, the great Iraqi valley ... cultivated by means of a regular irrigation ... and the Arabs of Palestine will be offered the country ... as many as possible must be persuaded to move. "The proposal was submitted by Aaron Aaronsohn - member of the Zionist Executive and Director of Palestine's land development company. The only thing from the negotiations that officially was said was Weizmann's later so famous words: "Palestine shall be as Jewish as England is English."
A prerequisite to implement the transfer was that it was done in accordance with Britain. The Zionists had therefore repeatedly let the Brits understand that the only solution to the growing unrest in Palestine was a separation of Jewish and non-Jewish populations.
During spring 1930, Weizmann worked on a plan that would later become known as "The Weizmann Rutenburg plan". The idea was - acc. Weizmann's own notes - that the Zionists would lend money to a resettlement of Palestinian Arabs in Tran Jordan. The plan - which today is still classified material - was one of the first concrete transfer plans, that was presented to England. They rejected, however, considering that it was associated with excessive spending, and also was unworkable, not least because of the violent resistance, which was increasingly expressed among Palestinian Arabs.
|December 2nd, 2011||#45|
| || |
Despite British reluctance the Zionists worked during the 30s on to find a sustainable solution to the "Arab question". Not least, the negotiations with the Arab world played an important role. Negotiations between the Zionists and various Arab leaders and politicians can be traced back to 1919, when they actually managed to conclude an agreement with Prince Faisal. He was willing to support Jewish immigration to Palestine if the Zionists in return would give his future state financial and technical assistance. In 1937, there were similar talks with Emir Abdullah of Trans Jordan and in 1939 with the Saudi King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. Also got the Zionists during the 30s went to Iraq and did some lobbying work among Iraqi politicians. The reason for rapprochement with the Arab world was - as already pointed out by Motzkin in 1912 - that a solution must necessarily be sought in a larger Arab context.
It is also here that you partly find an answer to why the Zionist leadership did not want too much publicity about the transfer issue. It was, of course - not least in the Arab world - a very sensitive and controversial topic and should, not to create a bad climate for negotiations, bee handled with great care. The party Ahdut Ha'avodah that was forerunner of the Zionist labor party Mapai therefore instructed in the mid-1920s the party members to avoid all mention of the Arab question in party manifestos and policy statements.
Since neither the negotiations with the Arabs or the British lived up to Zionist demands, they began during the 1930 to increasingly focusing on a purely military solution. Chaim Arlosoroff, who was director of the Jewish Agency Political Department, sent on 30 June 1932 a letter to Ben-Gurion, in which he gave an assessment of the current demographic and political factors. He wrote in particular: "The Arabs are no longer strong enough to destroy our position, but still consider themselves strong enough to create an Arab state. We must ensure that the real power structure prevents any possibility of establishing an Arab state in Palestine ... Arabs will then be unable to prevent the Jewish community to grow and there will prevail an equilibrium between the two people, based on real power, and an agreement that resolves the problem will be possible ... in the current circumstances Zionism would not be realized without a transition period during which the Jewish minority would exercise organized revolutionary government ... where the state apparatus, the administration and the military establishment is located in minority hands. "
The introduction of minority rule, however, did not arouse enthusiasm among the Zionist leaders and as also Arlosoroff writes in his letter: “this looks like a certain political mindset that we have always refused." They wanted, in other words not a South African model, but were working strictly within the Zionist doctrine: "Jewish land" and "Jewish work".
In 1936 "The Great Arab Revolt," broke out and it helped to fortify the Zionist leadership's view that the Arab question could only be solved by military power.
Ben-Gurion asked rhetorically during a meeting of Mapai's Central Committee: "What could compel the Arabs to a mutual understanding with us?" and answered himself: "Facts ... only after we have been able to establish a strong Jewish fact in this country ... only then will the conditions to discuss with the Arabs be present."
The Zionists had already in 1920 created the underground army “Haganah” and in 1936 created yet another military force. Haganah was never formally accepted by the British, but the new force, “Notrim” got both arms and training and quickly became a part of the British military, which fought against the Arab revolt.
In the mid-30s the leftist Zionists were thus consistent with the revisionist Jabotinsky, who in 1925 wrote his essay, "The iron law": "If you wish to colonize a country where human beings already are living, you must make an occupation of the country or find an alternate that on your behalf will make the occupation ... Zionism is a colonialist adventure and therefore stands or falls with the question of the armed forces. "
The right-radical Zionists - who in 1925 gathered in the revisionist party - had for years been obvious supporters of the idea that you simply drove the Arabs not only from Palestine but also from Tran Jordan, which was believed to be covered by the Balfour Declaration, a view which in principle was shared by the left Zionists. Therefore it was thought that there was a crucial difference whether you just wanted to move the Arabs to Tran Jordan or any of the other Arab countries. To which Ben-Gurion asked in October 1936, during a meeting of the Jewish Agency's executive committee: "If it was permissible to move an Arab from the Galilee to Judea, why is it then impossible to move an Arab from Hebron to Tran Jordan, which is much closer? "
What really placed the question of transfer at the top of the Zionist agenda were the British division proposals in 1937. The proposal, which contained a “population exchange”, was the result of the Peel-commission study on the causes of the Palestinian uprising (1936-39).
The conclusion of the report, published on 8 July 1937 was that the mandate did not work, and therefore it was desired to divide the state into two separate states. One an Arab state, consisting of Tran Jordan and the Arab part of Palestine and the other a Jewish state. The "Population changeover" consisted of the approximately 225,000 Arabs who lived in the proposed Jewish state that was to be "exchanged" with around 1,250 Jews who lived in the proposed Arab state. The Peel commission stressed that "the swap" should preferably take place peacefully, but if necessary could be done by coercion. The Zionists in Ben-Gurion's words, "got an opportunity, that we are not in our wildest imagination dared dream of."
Although the proposal looked like a godsend to the Zionists, this was far from true. The proposal, however, was the result of a powerful Zionist lobbying commission, which arrived in Palestine on 11th November 1936. The lobbying consisted in a series of informal conversations between its members and the Zionist leadership, which emerged with several concrete "solutions". For example, the Jewish Agency brought forward in March 1937 a secret plan that suggested that the existing Arab towns and populations were grouped together in order to vacate their fields in favor of Jewish colonization. And in case that the Arabs refused and offered resistance, it was "the government’s” (England) responsibility to force them to exchange land and move from one place to another.
The proposal, however, that made the biggest impression on the commission, was put forward in May 1937 in a memorandum from the Jewish Agency and included a separate item on the Palestinians moving to Tran Jordan. That this proposal had a big influence on the commission members, one can read in the President of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, Moshe Shertok's diary. On 12 June 1937 he mentions a conversation with the American consul general in Jerusalem, George Wadsworth: "We talked about the issue of sharing Tran Jordan. Wadsworth said he knew that the government (the English) were very impressed by the proposals that were contained in the memorandum, which we had presented to The Royal Commission, and which dealt with the transfer of Arabs from the western Eretz Yisrael (ie Palestine) to Tran Jordan to vacate the area for new Jewish settlers. They really looked at this proposal as a constructive plan. "
Almost simultaneously at the time the Peel Commission's report was published, In Zurich in Switzerland two major Zionist congresses was conducted. The sharing proposal was at the top of the agenda on both. These discussions provide a unique insight into the thinking, the Zionists had in connection with the proposed division and, not least, how they behaved on the question of transfer.
|December 2nd, 2011||#46|
| || |
At the Zionist Workers World Congress that opened on 29th July, Berl Katznelson, who ironically has often been called the Zionists conscience said: "My conscience is absolutely pure in this case. A distant neighbor is better than a close enemy. They (the Palestinians) will not lose anything by being moved, and we will certainly not lose anything by it. All in all, this is a political and settlement reform that serves both parties. I have long been of the opinion that this is the best of all solutions, and in the days of unrest (riots 1936-39), I was confident in my belief that this had to happen one day. But it never occurred to me that the transfer "to outside the land of Israel" only meant the vicinity of Nablus. I have always believed and still do, that they were intended to be moved to Syria or Iraq ".
Even among the more left-wing Zionists, such as Aharon Zisling, who in 1948 became chairman of Mapam, there was no doubt that the transfer was both necessary and morally justifiable. Zisling said from the pulpit: "I do not contest our moral right to defend an exchange of populations. There is nothing morally wrong with a proposal whose goal is to allow a development of national life ... But the individual Arab will hold on to this country with his fingernails .. . the use of force would be the only option that remains: a clearing with "automatic rifles" ... This will certainly mean war. It was therefore acc. Zisling, better to wait with a transfer in the future, where hopefully it would be easier to implement.
Golda Meir, president of the Jewish Histadrut trade union, said: "I also want the Arabs out of the country, and my conscience would be absolutely clean. But is this a possibility without Arab consent and without British assistance?"
On the 20th World Zionist Congress, which began on 3 August 1937, they agreed on the necessary and morally justifiable in the transfer - and strongly dissatisfied with the fact that Palestine should be shared. Again, the debate focused on some purely practical problems associated with transfer.
One of the Mapai leaders, Yosef Baratz in this connection said: "I myself do not believe that we are able to migrate each of the 300,000 Arabs ... But I suppose that some will be moved."
The discussion ended with a principled rejection of the division proposal. Instead a resolution was adopted which authorized the Jewish Agency's Executive Committee - based on the Peel Commission's proposal - to negotiate with England for the establishment of a Jewish state. With 299 votes for and 160 against the resolution was adopted and it was thus the Zionist Workers pragmatic line that came to influence congressional final outcome.
The Revisionist Zionists had always categorically rejected the proposal. Their leader, Jabotinsky, said bluntly: "A corner of Palestine, a" canton ". How can we promise to be satisfied with that? We can not. Never. If we express satisfaction it would be a lie ... We do not believe in a compromise in this way ... There are only one compromise ... that Palestine is transformed into a Jewish state”.
But behind the Zionist controversy was a common understanding of the Zionist project's overall goal: a Jewish state in all the territory formerly included in British Palestine mandate. Weizmann had already on 14 March 1937 declared to the British High Commissioner A. Wauchope: "We will expand throughout the country during some time ... this partition plan is only an event for the next 25-30 years." And Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: "The acceptance of partition does not commit us to renounce Tran Jordan. No one can ask of anyone that they should abandon their vision."
Based on the Resolution and in anticipation of future negotiations with England the Jewish Agency in November 1937 created the "Population Transfer Committee" which would serve as an expert committee. The Committee consisted of a large number of prominent people, among them Yosef Weitz, who later came to play a prominent role in the development of the Zionist transfer policy. Already at their second meeting, on 21 November, concrete transfer plans were made. Weitz began the meeting by saying: "Transfer of the Arab population from the Jewish State does not just serve one purpose - to reduce the Arab population. It also serves another no less important purpose, which is to vacate the land, currently owned and cultivated by the Arabs, to release it for Jewish inhabitants”
Weitz therefore wished primarily to move the Arab peasants, "although their transfer would be more difficult than the urban population”. His goal was to reduce the Arab population by one third in 2-3 years.
In the discussion on what strategy you would use to remove the Arabs as smoothly as possible, an extensive demographic research material was included. Among other things, Eric Mills' two-volume work from 1931, "Census of Palestine," at that time one of the most accurate identifications of the Palestinian society. And in early 1938 they got British permission to copy mandate authorities archival material including information about land ownership, and registration of 400,000 plots in 400 villages in attempts to acquire an accurate picture of Palestinian society in order to develop the optimal transfer plan. The project involved cartographers, economists, surveyors, agricultural experts, land buyers, etc.
Judging by the number of experts who took part in this committee and the extent of the calculations and analysis included in the various proposals, the transfer preparations assumed almost scientific character.
In January 1938 the British government decided that the Peel commission proposals required further study and therefore in April the so-called Woodhead-commission was sent to Palestine. On its arrival, it became clear that the British government did not intend to make a forced relocation. And the result of the Woodhead commission was indeed, as expected, a rejection of the division proposal. The plan was simply unworkable.
The new circumstances then forced the Zionists to work within the framework of a so-called "voluntary" transfer, which - like Ben-Gurion said during a meeting on 7 June 1938 - meant that "the Jewish state have to discuss with the neighboring Arab states the issue of voluntary relocation of Arab peasants, workers and Fellah from the Jewish state to neighboring states."
Volunteerism meant in the words of Ben-Gurion that the move primarily would take place in accordance with the Arab states but not that you necessarily would not hesitate to use force against Palestinian Arabs. He also said: "The Peel commission’s sharing proposal is only a step in the realization of Zionism and to lay the groundwork for our expansion beyond the whole country through Jewish-Arab agreement ... The state must, however, enforce order and security and will not do this by moralize but ... with machine guns, which we need. "
The Zionists did not changed position on the possible use of force, for as Menahem Ussishkin said during a meeting of the Jewish Agency's Executive on 12th June 1938: "We will not be able to begin our political lives in a state where Arabs constitute 45%"
And at the end of the meeting Ben-Gurion concluded: "I support the forced removals. I see nothing immoral in that process. However, forced relocation can only be done by England. ... Had its implementation been dependent merely on our proposal, I would have suggested it, but this would be too dangerous, as the British government has distanced itself from forced displacement ... But this question must not be removed from the agenda because it is a central issue. There are two points here: 1) sovereignty and 2) removal of a certain number of Arabs - and we must insist on both. "
The creation of a Jewish state and a forced displacement was - as Ben-Gurion also stated – depended upon the support of a superpower. So when England in the spring of 1939 with its White Paper broke with the Balfour Declaration (they declared itself to be implemented, ed.) then instead the Zionist turned their interest to the upcoming superpower USA.
|December 2nd, 2011||#47|
| || |
Despite the fact that the transfer - after the White Paper and the outbreak of the 2nd World War, had lost its immediate topicality, some circles within the Zionist movement worked on the issue. Not least Yosef Weitz, who on 20 December 1940, wrote in his diary: "... it must be clear that in this country there is not room for both peoples ... If the Arabs leave it, it'll be big and spacious for us ... The only solution after the war is a land of Israel, at least a western land of Israel [ie Palestine], without Arabs. there is no room for compromises ... the only way is to move the Arabs from here to neighboring countries, everybody, except maybe the Arabs from Bethlehem , Nazareth and Old Jerusalem. But not one village must be left, not one Bedouin tribe. The transfer must go towards Iraq, Syria and even Tran Jordan. For that purpose funding will be found ... and only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers and the Jewish problem will cease to exist. There is no other solution. "
Weitz's involvement with the issue of transfer during the 40s assumed almost the character of a neurotic obsession. He was President of the Jewish National Fund's department for purchase of land and responsible for the colonization of Palestine and was aware that the Zionist land acquisition policy had failed. In the mid-1940s, the Fund had only managed to buy about 3.5% of land in Palestine, which was a failure, given that the organization has already started buying in 1901. He was therefore more than anyone else aware that the Zionist project stood and fell with the issue of transfer. His frustration was not diminished by the fact that he almost daily - by virtue of his job was confronted with a stubborn and grudging Arab population. But Weitz was first and foremost a practitioner who could not be paralyzed by frustration and despair, and he continued with other prominent Zionists confident of attaining the deforestation of the country.
Weitz in the early 40s took the initiative to form a new "Population Transfer Committee", with Menahem Ussishkin and Moshe Shertok on a more informal level and they discussed the prospects for transfer. Their activities led to Weitz in September 1941 traveled to northern Syria to inspect some of the areas that they would use for a resettlement. Before the trip he wrote in his diary: "From now on, we must develop a plan that is based on the removal of the Arabs ... which must be incorporated into American political circles".
Towards the end of the war, it became clear that England could not keep its Palestine mandate, and the Zionists prepared for the conflict that inevitably comes. The armed groups who attached to the revisionist right wing started already in 1944, their guerrilla war against the mandate, and was a few years later followed by the main organization Haganah. Their strategy with was specified by Haganah officer Yigael Yadin - who in 1944 started the plan, which later became known as Plan Dalet, which was put in force in March 1948 – that they in the wake of the British withdrawal would take over the British posts, and in case of the expected Arab resistance they would strike hard. This strategy the senior Haganah officers called "aggressive defense" .
The military instructions were described in the Haganah's military plan "Plan Gimmel", which was ready in May 1946. It was operating with various forms of collective punishment, sabotage of the Arab infrastructure, imprisonment or kidnapping, and last but not least, the demolition of Arab villages and the displacement of Arab inhabitants.
The final signal to the implementation of Plan Gimmel and later Plan Dalet came when the United Nations on 29th November 1947 decided to divide Palestine. The division led as we know to war and with Weizmann's words resulted in a "miraculous simplification of the problem"; approx. 750,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out.
The manufacture of the Palestinian refugee problem as merely a byproduct of the first Israeli-Arab war in 1948 - not least in light of recent research in Zionist transfer policy - reflects a striking distortion of historical facts. De-Arabization of Palestine was not a byproduct, but rather the logical consequence of the Zionist ideology. State creation and the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs was the same thing. To which Ben-Gurion immediately after the adoption of the UN partition plan said: "There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%"
Israel's creation was, in other words, under the condition that the Palestinians were removed, which of course was also put into practice since the Zionists during military operations carried out ethnic cleansing in the areas they came to control.
Finally, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the transfer idea is not a Zionist idea. Throughout European history, there have been many forced removals. For example, millions of people in Stalin's Soviet Union were forced to move, and after WW1 there was an extensive exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece, just like Pakistan's separation from India in 1947 led to an extremely bloody moving of people.
The specificity of the Zionist transfer policy is not the phenomenon itself, but rather the degree of preparation and planning that lay behind. It is the Zionists' persistent insistence and the pursuit of transfer and the degree of rationality and systematic, thereby developing the transfer policy, which means that the Zionist transfer policy must be viewed in a special way.
|December 2nd, 2011||#48|
| || |
Here you go Calixbentley, another typical example of Israeli "Settlers" provoking Palestinians whilst the IDF stand by to ensure their safety.
Now are you starting to see a common thread showing why the Israelis are so hated?
Last edited by senojekips; December 2nd, 2011 at 13:23..
|December 2nd, 2011||#50|
| || |
For these civillians to die (purposely being targeted) is unacceptable. If they died indirectly, it would be very unfortunate, but is more understandable (note: I didn't say acceptable).
Of course I remember, but I still disagree with it. Killing civillians purposely with the aim to kill them only is unacceptable to me. I don't even like the fact we nuked Japan (though I believed it necessary in that case).
If USA did that, people would try to say we are igniting a conflict. Arming both sides and letting the duke it out? You know how many ignorant Europeans like to say that about USA during WW2 in which USA, sold weapons to the warring countries?