About Questions about the Yom Kippur War-1973
|August 18th, 2012||#1|
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Questions about the Yom Kippur War-1973 info
I'm going to talk about the situation after the two failed attacks against Suez and Ismailia by Israel. According to some Egyptian general - my apologies, I don't remember the name - he said,
"It was essential that the Israeli command protect its forces in a limited sector west of the canal by dispersing them over a wider area. Consequently more troops were sent west of the canal. The outcome was untenable strategically for several reasons. One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force-and consequently the country-mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this in total conflict with its military theories."
Then comes the Israeli general Dayan he said something similar about that same situation,
"The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between October 24, 1973 and January 18, 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack our units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut-off our canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of our forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support."
Was Israel west of the canal really in such a position at the end of the war? Remarking that both generals admitted that the cease-fire wasn't the end.
Also some Israelis have admitted some interesting things about the war....
General Ishio Javitch
"For Israel, the war ultimately ended without our being able to break up the Arab armies, neither Egypt's nor Syria's. We scored no victories. Nor did we succeed in restoring the deterrent power of the Israeli army. If we assess achievements against targets, we will find that the Arabs' victory was the more decisive." -- Symposium on the October War, Jerusalem, 16 September 1974
"As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them they resisted and advanced to occupy in fact a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we defeated or conquered them."
I find this quote by Elazar to be kinda...awkward since Shazly who's an Egyptian general admitted that the situation of that Third Army was a "catastrophe" and I believe him in that because during the negotiations Israel could basically achieve what they wanted from Egypt such as the Israeli POWs and some Israeli spy I can't recall his name. And all of this, in return of non-military supplies delivered to the Egyptian Third Army.
My questions are....
1) If supposedly that situation the Israeli army west of the canal was in is true. Why does Israel claim victory??
2)Israel could basically hold Egypt from the neck and the Egyptian command had to do everything the Israelis wanted from them because of the Third Army's situation then, why does Egypt claim victory??
Probably, I would agree with Trevor N Dupuy when he said "Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory."
Last edited by ScarabVenom; August 18th, 2012 at 16:26.. Reason: Grammar
|August 20th, 2012||#2|
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The Arabs attacked Israel with the intention to destroy it. At the end of the war they didn't achieve its goal. In fact they didn't gain anything. So they lost the war, none of their goals was achieved and had a lot more casualties and destroyed material.
Israel was propably not able to destroy Egypt but if there wouldn't have been a cease fire the Egyptian third Army would have been eliminated. You can't hold out long in the dessert without fuel, food and water.
After the cease fire they were resupplied again and were back as a threat to Israeli forces.
|August 21st, 2012||#3|
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2) Make Israel suffer severe casualties.
3) Liberate the land GRADUALLY depending on the capabilities of the Egyptian military.
Nothing here involves Israel in a way besides the Sinai occupied by Israel.
I agree with u when it comes to the Egyptian Third Field Army but, the entire Israeli army west of the canal was in a very miserable situation. Please read the article in full. I have a bunch of quotes from 3 different sides that talk about this specific issue; The Egyptian Third Army and the Israeli army west of the canal. I mean, one of the things I want to know....if Israel was in such a strong position why did they pull back to the east of the canal?
Assuming Moshe Dayan's quote saying that they expected to lose too much casualties and a quote from Henry Kissinger's book saying....."Just as in November, Sadat had accomplished the spectacular by winnowing the essential from the tactical. The key points were Sadat's agreement that the Israelis could retain the strategic passes for now and his ingenious idea for a U.S. proposal on arms limitations. He and Golda both understood that the significant event would be the first major voluntary Israeli withdrawal in nearly 20 years. The details were essentially secondary." So, their pull back was VOLUNTARY. Egypt did keep it's forces on the east but they just limited their forces, I believe.
P.S I'm not sparking an argument I'm basically asking a question, I'm not a military expert.
|August 21st, 2012||#4|
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at best you could call it a draw, but certainly not an egyptian victory. golda meir was at fault for not calling up reserves and preparing. the intelligence was there. so the egyptians were able to swarm the east bank of the suez, there were hardly any defenders there. the egyptians also had the latest sams which initially prevented the iaf from operating in the area. the egyptians were provided with many saggers and rpgs, and were able to use these effectively. but when the egyptian army left the cover of the sam shield and attacked the dug in israelis they got trounced. from then on the idf had the intiative. and the iaf and idf eventually destroyed the sams, giving the israelis air superiority. so objective wise the egyptians ultimately got what they wanted through negotiations. but military wise it's far from a victory, and it speaks to how much the idf has truly dominated the arab armies, as they see this as their greatest achievement to date
|August 22nd, 2012||#5|
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"Just as in November, Sadat had accomplished the spectacular by winnowing the essential from the tactical. The key points were Sadat's agreement that the Israelis could retain the strategic passes for now and his ingenious idea for a U.S. proposal on arms limitations. He and Golda both understood that the significant event would be the first major voluntary Israeli withdrawal in nearly 20 years. The details were essentially secondary." So, I tend to believe that the IDF withdrew from the west of the canal due to military pressure. While, I tend to see the Egyptian still on the east shore of the canal. Although they got their tanks limited, they ended up adding more and more of long-range artillery. I do agree that the Egyptian situation got a little sub-optimal after 14th of October, but I do also agree that they started using their brains again later.
|August 22nd, 2012||#6|
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I won't believe that the only goal was to take back lost territory. I will believe that it was the first goal.
Giving back the Sinai to Egypt in later peace agreements was not a loss for Israel, because the only thing that Israel wants are safe and peacefull borders and that was achieved for the borders with Jordan and Egypt after several peace accords.
|August 22nd, 2012||#7|
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1) The Israeli army was going to be so far away from Tel Aviv and it's military situation which was stated above would be even worse because their only supply-line road was the gap in the Deversoir region and that supply-line road was so vulnerable against Egyptian ground forces so, the further they go to the west, the longer the supply-line becomes. 2) The Egyptian 4th armored brigade was between the Israeli army and Cairo and behind them another Algerian brigade and by the gates of Cairo there was a brigade of Presidential guards to protect Cairo and in case the Israeli army succeeded in destroying all those troops and could reach Cairo, they would be very very wary of the fighting especially, because they would have to cross the Eastern Desert and after all of that, it's time to begin taking down Cairo....I dread to guess what was going to happen. You said Egyptian armor and Air Force were almost totally destroyed, I honestly don't know where u got that from. As I re-call by the end of the war the EAF was still working and according to Moshe Dayan "They had 500 operational aircraft" and they had around 1,700 tanks plus others. I believe u're talking about the 1967 war not the 1973 war.
Israel leaving the Sinai did leave an impact on them. 1)When Israel was leaving the Sinai they had to evacuate various Israeli settlements by force (Example: The settlements of Yamit (Yamet?)). 2) Israel lost the chance to become energy independent due to the oil-fields in the Sinai (Abu-Rudeis, Et-Tur and Alma). 3) Israel left some territory so, their country after it tripled in size; it got less again.
Edit: To reply about ur very first sentence; About eliminating Israel by force. Well, Heikal didn't specifically say Egypt, he said the Arabs. I do believe on a wide level that Arabs from the Middle East do want the elimination of Israel right now before the next minute. But, I don't know why this has to involve Egypt. Egypt never sought the elimination of Israel with the exception of Nasser who was brainwashed completely by Arab nationalism. He sacrificed a lot of Egyptian blood and equipment for the Arabs and for what??? Nasser was a dreamer who thought his dream is reality. In 1964, he sold every drop of Egypt's gold reserves. For who? For Yemen. He sent 1/3 of the entire Egyptian army to war. Whose war? Yemen's war. If we go all the way back, to the very first appearance of Israel on the map; back in 1948. I know Egypt fought against Israel in their war of independence but, it wasn't to eliminate Israel neither was it to help Palestine. It's a whole other story unfortunately.
Last edited by ScarabVenom; August 22nd, 2012 at 17:08..
|August 23rd, 2012||#8|
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The strenght of the Egyptian forces were the SAM's and anti-tank missiles. Their planes and armour were worthless in direct confrontation with their Israeli counterparts.
The third army escaped collapse. No way they could have hold much longer. They were completely cut of and with no supplies you wont get far. Chief of Staff Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as “desperate” and classified its encirclement as a “catastrophe that was too big to hide.
Egypt lost more than half their tank and plane inventory and almost 2/3rds of their frontline SAM batteries which were very important for a defensive umbrella against the IAF.
Why were Egyptian forces on their way to Tel Aviv if they were not there to help the Palestinians/Arabs or to defeat the Israelis in 1948?
|August 23rd, 2012||#9|
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|August 23rd, 2012||#10|
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General Shazly's plan was very good for defense but had weak points for offence. As we know now, if you don't have air superiority an offensive action will be very difficult.
Israel's position at the end of the war was not optimal but I think a little better than Egypt's one.
No matter how we think of it one thing is for sure. Thanks to that war peace came upon that area up untill today. But we must not forget to thank the Russians and the US for enforcing it.
About your story of the 1948 war, I read the same thing (on the internet) but about the Yom Kippur war. I couldn't believe it but then again, why not? Sadat overuled his Generals several times (for the worse) if I'm not mistaken.
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