My picks would be as follows:

Best Strategic Commander - Erich von Manstein for 'Sichelschnitt', aka the Manstein Plan, the masterstroke that humbled France. It has to be remembered that this would not have been possible without the influence of the man below. Manstein also achieved a great victory in 1943 with the recapture of Kharkov. Hitler should have listened to this man instead of the likes of Halder but sadly for Germany he didn't. Manstein was a defensive master but it's a pity he wasn't more forceful with Hitler. For example, he accepted Operation Citadel (Kursk) all too easily when his own plan was far more daring and in keeping with strengths of the German Army.

Best Army Commander - Heinz Wilhelm Guderian for the decisive role his XIX Corps played in the Battle of France and for the pivotal roles his 2nd Panzergruppe (later 2nd Panzer Army) played in Russia. Both Hoth and Hausser are fine alternative picks but it has to be remembered that both these commanders took much of their ideas and inspiration from Guderian. Hauser at least served under Guderian in the opening months of Barbarossa. Rommel too could not have achieved his tactical successes in Africa without what Guderian was able to do, that is, form a completely new arm of the German Army against significant opposition from his peers. All of Germany's great victories in WWII were as a direct result of the infuence and energy of this one man. Also an acomplished strategist as his futile attempts to save Germany from ruin when he was Chief of the German General Staff demonstrated.

I can't disagree with you but I do believe commanders like Heinrici, Hoth and Hauser have been largely forgotten due to the likes of Rommel who managed to get a lot of media coverage without the same level of achievement. Lets face it ask anyone today who Erwin Rommel was and they will give you his life story ask the same of Gotthard Heinrici and most of them will tell you he wrote the theme to the pink panther movie.

I personally would rate Heinrici as one of the best (if not the best) defensive generals of the war his actions around Moscow, the retreat from Smolensk and the Seelow heights at the end of the war were masterfully conducted against almost impossible odds.

You're absolutely right Monty. Rommel, and to a lesser extent Rundstedt, Kesselring and Model etc have all taken all the headlines, primarly as they fought against the Western Allies from 1943 onwards. Guderian and Manstein are known to people who have looked into things a little more but there are plenty of commanders who deserve to be mentioned yet are almost unknown to most people. Aside from the excellent generals you already mentioned you could add the likes of Hoepner, Balck, Schweppenburg, Eberbach, Dietrich, Bock, Leeb. I could go on and on. I think the German system of Auftragstaktik, where commanders were given mission-style orders by their superiors and given a great deal of autonomy in achieving those orders, developed commanders who were quick to use initiative and think for themselves. This system created and nurtured some excellent commanders. It is notable that as soon as Hitler started micro-managing the Wehrmacht much of its ability and dash disappeared. Even so, NCOs and upwards were still encouraged to think for themselves and is one reason why even the 1944-45 Wehrmacht was still a very effective combat force, albeit on the defensive.

Didn't Rundstedt once say of Rommel "He's nothing more than a good divisional commander...", one other man I would add to this list is Felix Steiner

Monty B and Doppleganger you guys are both right i am not disagreeing with you guys, but we can't belittle Rommel, because he was a wiz especially when it came to mechanized warfare and the art of deciption he was as cunning as they come on the field and they only thing that saved Montgomery is the entry of the Americans into North Africa and the fact that Hitler didn't give Rommel the Men and Materials he requested because Hitler put the priority on the Russian front, and wanted to quickly and decisively crush the Russians. Had Hitler gave Rommel the men and materials he requested especially more tanks and air cover, I truely believe Rommel would have captured North Africa and Egypt.

While I agree with you guys, their is a reason why they called Rommel the "Desert Fox."

Originally Posted by Somalia

Monty B and Doppleganger you guys are both right i am not disagreeing with you guys, but we can't belittle Rommel, because he was a wiz especially when it came to mechanized warfare and the art of deciption he was as cunning as they come on the field and they only thing that saved Montgomery is the entry of the Americans into North Africa and the fact that Hitler didn't give Rommel the Men and Materials he requested because Hitler put the priority on the Russian front, and wanted to quickly and decisively crush the Russians. Had Hitler gave Rommel the men and materials he requested especially more tanks and air cover, I truely believe Rommel would have captured North Africa and Egypt.

While I agree with you guys, their is a reason why they called Rommel the "Desert Fox."

I think the Allied Torch landings "finished" Rommel but I don't agree that operation Torch saved Montgomery as by that stage in the campaign the 8th army had attained superiority on the ground, air and most importantly at sea. The thing that pretty much ended the DAK was the inability to resupply caused by allied control of the air and sea in the theater.

I certainly agree that had Hitler given more emphasis to the Afrika Korp early on it may have made a huge difference but then had the Italians actually had a desire to fight Rommel wouldn't have been needed there anyway and had he followed his orders in not to proceed further than the Libyan border until he was at full strength he may not have over stretched his supply lines and been able to maintain local air superiority thus maintaining his supply lines.

On the whole I wont argue that Rommel was a good commander and had a lot of good traits however he also had bad traits and I believe those are being overlooked for a somewhat "romanticised" view of the man and his abilities.

I tend to agree with Monty Somalia. Rommel was a good commander but you're buying into the idealist and romantic image of the man rather than his actual abilities and war achievements. He never commanded anything larger than a corps-sized formation (a smallish one at that) and seemed to regard logistics as an afterthought rather than an integral part of warfare. He did well in Africa but the likes of Guderian, Hoth, Hoppner, Schweppenburg, Balck, Hausser would have done equally well and perhaps even better.

I believe that Rundstedt did indeed say that about Rommel, as they were in disagreement over where to place German armoured forces in the West in anticipation of the D-Day landings. Rundstedt agreed with Guderian that the German panzer reserves should be placed inland near Paris so that they could counter-attack and envelop Allied armoured thrusts. Rommel disagreed and wanted them placed near the coast which negated their mobility and thus their main strengths. As Rommel was officially in charge of these forces Hitler took Rommel's advice. Interestingly though, some say part of Rommel's real reasoning was to have some army divisions in positions that suited him because he was involved in the July bomb plot. Certainly the 21st panzer division seemed to fall into this category.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

I believe that Rundstedt did indeed say that about Rommel, as they were in disagreement over where to place German armoured forces in the West in anticipation of the D-Day landings. Rundstedt agreed with Guderian that the German panzer reserves should be placed inland near Paris so that they could counter-attack and envelop Allied armoured thrusts. Rommel disagreed and wanted them placed near the coast which negated their mobility and thus their main strengths. As Rommel was officially in charge of these forces Hitler took Rommel's advice. Interestingly though, some say part of Rommel's real reasoning was to have some army divisions in positions that suited him because he was involved in the July bomb plot. Certainly the 21st panzer division seemed to fall into this category.

This is one area I think Rommel may well have been right though, under normal operating conditions keeping the panzer units back so that they can move to counter where required makes sense but these were far from ideal conditions for the movement of armour as the Luftwaffe was toast leaving the allies with total air superiority and making effective movement all but impossible.

I also tend to believe that the only option available to the Germans on D-Day was to defeat the allies on the beaches as once they became established the war was effectively over.

Originally Posted by MontyB

This is one area I think Rommel may well have been right though, under normal operating conditions keeping the panzer units back so that they can move to counter where required makes sense but these were far from ideal conditions for the movement of armour as the Luftwaffe was toast leaving the allies with total air superiority and making effective movement all but impossible.

I also tend to believe that the only option available to the Germans on D-Day was to defeat the allies on the beaches as once they became established the war was effectively over.

Guderian's argument was that the panzer forces could have been moved at night. When Guderian suggested this to Rommel he replied that Guderian was a man from the Russian Front and couldn't properly realise the effectiveness of Allied air power, which had made a big impression on Rommel. It would have been tough but to not at least try and use those forces as they were intended was a massive waste. It is interesting to note that Guderian, Rundstedt and Schweppenburg all disagreed with Rommel. As I said before i think Rommel had some ulterior motives regarding the placement of those panzer formations.

As you know the weather occassionally meant that Allied air forces couldn't fly in support of the ground troops. Under those conditions a talented commander like Geyr von Schweppenburg with 2 large panzer pincers situated on either side of Paris could have done a much greater deal of damage than historically. Whether they would have made any difference is another matter.

There is no doubt to that had the German ground forces been able to go toe to toe with the allied ground forces they would have defeated the allies on D-Day but the problem for German counter attacks on and around D-Day was quite comprehensive:
1) Road, Rail and Bridges were in chaos which would make large scale armoured movement very slow.
2) Allied air drops were also causing large scale confusion in the German rear.
3) Any air activity on that day was going to be allied and that wouldn't be good for German armour formations.
4) Even had the allied air force stayed away any German counter offensive within 10 miles of the beach was going to be met with naval gun fire.

This is why I tend to back Rommel on this, basically the tanks needed to be on the beach as the allies landed as this would have negated both allied air superiority and naval support.