| Immunes
| Hi Doppleganger,
Just a few thoughts.
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
It's unhelpful to compare the logistical needs of the Mongols compared to those required by Blitzkrieg. It's much easier to have superb logistics when all you have to look after are men and horses who can feed themselves on route to any objective.
The Germans did not lose the war because of the failure of Blitzkrieg tactics nor solely because of faulty logistics. They also lost because of faulty planning, faulty intelligence and overconfidence.
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I agree, the only reason I mentioned it was to illustrate [ one ] of the reasons why Blitzkrieg failed in Russia, and that was a lack of logistical support.
And of course, as you point out, the failure of Blitzkrieg was not the sole reason for Germany losing the war, and i've never suggested that it was.
The Germans won initially, not only because they achieved penetration and moved rapidly, but also because early they could sustain attacks to the operational depth of their opponents.
When that failed, the Whermacht failed.
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
Not true. The main problem was that almost all of the German General Staff at the time were VERY resistant to the creation of all mechanised forces.
Guderian fiercely argued for all mechanised forces in the 1930's but because of the above resistance he only partially got what he asked for.
Which is why Guderian argued for all mechanised Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions to help offset that. As long as you have infantry type troops in sufficient number to hold objectives, it does not matter so much about slow moving infantry troops in your wake.
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I'd already mentioned that........
''Everyone'' was butting their heads against the brick walls of conservative army high
commands, until unfortunately [for Europe ] Hitler, the only leader willing to take the risk, gave the green light for combined tank operations soon after coming to power, Guderian lucked out..........
But what if most of your supplies, fuel, ammunition, spares, artillery etc, are also with the slow moving infantry troops in your wake?
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
Ashes. Take a look at the sheer size of the Soviet Union. Remember that Blitzkrieg was still a very new concept.
In fact, Blitzkrieg tactics were the only reason why Germany was initially so successful.
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Yes, a new concept of an age old way of warfare, manoeuvre, and had been well honed in Poland, the low countries, France, and the Balkans.
And the Whermacht must have been very aware of the problams with the size of Russia, they'd just completely defeated Russia 25 years before, [ without Panzers ] Ludendorff could have easily marched on Moscow and captured it, and this was with half of his army fighting on the huge western front.
And a much smaller Prussian army then what the Germans had in 1940, quickly defeated France in 1871, under Moltke, without tanks, thanks to superior manoeuvre, and superior commanders, like armies have won wars for centuries. And in the first world war, as I said above, Germany fought on two huge fronts, yet defeated Russia, and came close twice in the west.
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
Guderian and Manstein both believed that a new dawn of trench warfare would have set in.
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I'm doubtful, I think the reasons put forward suggest that trench warfare was probably a thing of the past, plus you have to take into account that what happened in WW1 was an aberration of how wars had been fought in the past, not the norm.
It's obvious you greatly admire Guderian and Manstein, and you quote from their books often, but I wonder how completely everything they say, or their memoirs, should be relied on?
Perhaps it's just a coincidence, but authors like Erickson, Clarke, and Glantz among others, are doubtful as to the reliability of German commanders reminices and memoirs, [ as well as Russian ] and The 'Cambridge History of Warfare' goes as far as to state, in a review of post war German Generals writings........
"The new wave of historical research has underlined what most historians have generally suspected, the complete unreliability and intellectual dishonesty, even by the standards of the genre, of post war memoirs by German generals."
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
True, there were a few theorists between the wars who were looking at using tanks in a more far-sighted way. Guderian was the man who was given the opportunity to develop them and he did so extremely well. We can argue that some of the others also would have achieved what Guderian did but none of them had the chance so the argument is moot.
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You're right that we'll never know what would have transpired if commanders like Fuller, Doumemc, De Gaulle and Tukhachevsky were given the the advantages that the German commanders had, but as a hypothetical, [the same that is constantly done with why Germany lost the war] it would be interesting.
Perhaps an idea might be the handling of mechanised forces by Patton, the best of the Allied tank commanders, after breaking out into good tank country in '44 rolling up the Germans in France, just as quickly as the Germans did to the French in '40, and his turning the 3rd army around 90 degrees in 48 hours, to hit the Germans in the flank in the Ardennes to relieve Bastogne, called a feat to equal anything in the war.
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
Ok Ashes. Please tell me what the fatal flaws of Blitzkrieg are.
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Already stated in my previous posts.
It's not that the concept is flawed, [the faster the manoeuvre the better,] it's just that the German overall handling of it was ultimately flawed.
Blitzkrieg was very effective early [and very spectacular, with great commanders willing to take risks] but only if particular prerequisite conditions were first met. Good weather, fairly level and unobstructed terrain, and ample fuel and supplies were all essential for sustained mobility and advancement, and there is a danger of the attacking force overextending its supply line. [as the Germans did in Barbarossa]
And the strategy as a whole can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm. In addition, the defending army can maintain strong points which the attacking army must either eliminate, thereby disrupting its momentum, or bypass, which creates the possibility that the defender will use them to encircle the attacker. Once the attack loses momentum, the war becomes one of attrition,
in which the mobility and surprise involved with blitzkrieg are no longer useful.
The Red Army was able to regroup far to the rear, and eventually defeat the overextended German forces for the first time in the Battle of Moscow.
In the following summer of 1942, when Germany launched another Blitzkrieg offensive in southern Russia against Stalingrad, the Soviets again lost territory, just to counter-attack again when they stopped in front of the city.
Most people focus on the Whermacht's attack capabilities, and, unfortunately, pay undue attention to the tank, and miss the broader picture, of which the tank was but one part.
Doppleganger wrote __________________________________________________ _______________________
Pease also tell me what type of tactics modern armies are using in the field because they look pretty similar to modified Blitzkrieg tactics to me.
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But isn't warfare evolving all the time?
Now the military doctrine of Rapid Dominance, or shock and awe, is considered the modern successor to blitzkrieg. Unlike blitzkrieg, rapid dominance relies heavily on air power, precision weapons and cruise missiles, large amounts of central coordination, and focuses on destroying the enemies command and control structures rather than its supply lines. |
