ISAF SWE to german aid.

KJ

Active member
In a shootout in the baghlan district on April 29:th a swedish infantry company came to the aid of a german column under attack.
When the swedes arrived at scene one of the german vehicles were already on fire and several others severely hit.
One german officer were sadly killed in the clash.
My sympathies to our fellow german soldiers on here.

As the company arrived on scene the attack were still ongoing and the swedes took up an aggressive posture and pressed the attackers back as to be able to relieve the battered germans and take back control over the area.


The Swedish company commander (Name edit, PERSEC) said in his report:
"The attack were well planned and coordinated and the fire were intense with overlapping fields of fire, we deemed it necessary to take up an aggressive posture to push the attackers back."


Swedish combat operations in the area were concluded last Thursday.


//KJ.
 
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I blame soft touch/lack of firm to destroy attitude
^not great anyhow reminds me of 80's and muchajadin from being nearly wiped out, to end up victorious (only to loose to local Taliban again)
 
Fine work by the swedes...

Too bad they did not arrive earlier - RIP to the fallen...


What units do they have operating in the Stan and how many?
Don't really hear to much about the other Scandinavian countries engaged down there, here in Denmark.


-KV
 
ISAF is about 700 strong, mainly operating out of Camp Northern Lights up north.
There are also OEF and NIC forces.

C.O.M: Good observation I think it is one of two things..

Scenario 1. Taleban are reinforcing with foreign fighters from the northern republics.
They target the troops in the area they arrive.
Theese insurgents are seasoned fighters, true believers with experience in many cases from former jihad,s.

Scenario 2. The Taleban are trying to drive a wedge between the US and their allies in The Stan.
They are counting on the NATO and other allies to pull their troops if they encounter heavy losses. Happened before in Iraq where Spain pulled all their troops out after the Madrid bombings.

Worst case, a combination of the two.
Now there´s some dark thoughts on the subject..

KV: Same here.. The general public never hears about what denmark and norway does unless they take cassualties.
Some people in the service however travel alot between the bases and meet counterparts every now and again.

//KJ.
 
Coalition forces out in the stix being coordinated against an organized and smart enemy, those guys in the mountains, have been doing it for awhile, and those foreign fighters in Iraq, although militarily, as far as survivability of corruption and organization they are no slouches!

Hats, Patrol caps and Berets and Kevlars off to the men and women of ISAF and the US Armed Services.
 
To understand the Taliban and their current strategy, it helps to begin with the basics. The Taliban are insurgents, and their first order of business is simply survival. A domestic guerrilla group almost always has more staying power than an occupier, which is projecting force over a greater distance and has the added burden of a domestic population less directly committed to a war in a foreign — and often far-off — land. If the Taliban can only survive as a cohesive and coherent entity until the United States and its allies leave Afghanistan, they will have a far less militarily capable opponent (Kabul) with whom to compete for dominance.

Currently facing an opponent (the United States) that has already stipulated a timetable for withdrawal, the Taliban are in an enviable position. The United States has given itself an extremely aggressive and ambitious set of goals to be achieved in a very short period of time. If the Taliban can both survive and disrupt American efforts to lay the foundations for a U.S./NATO withdrawal, their prospects for ultimately achieving their aims increase dramatically.

And here the strategy to achieve their imperfectly defined objective begins to take shape. The Taliban have no intention of completely evaporating into the countryside, and they have every intention of continuing to harass International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, inflicting casualties and raising the cost of continued occupation. In so doing, the Taliban not only retain their relevance but may also be able to hasten the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Judging from the initial phase of Operation Moshtarak in Marjah and what can likely be expected in similar offensives in other areas, the Taliban strategy toward the surge is: 1) largely decline combat but leave behind a force significant enough to render the securing phase as difficult as is possible for U.S.-led coalition forces by using hit-and-run tactics and planting improvised explosive devices; 2) once the coalition force becomes overwhelming, fall back and allow the coalition to set up shop and wage guerrilla and suicide attacks (though Mullah Omar has issued guidance that these attacks should be initiated only after approval at the highest levels in order to minimize civilian casualties). In all likelihood, this phase of the Taliban campaign would include attempts at intimidation and subversion against Afghan security forces.

Being a diffuse guerrilla movement, the Taliban will likely attempt to replicate this strategy as broadly as possible, forcing ISAF forces to expend more energy than they would prefer on holding ground while impeding the building and reconstruction phase, which will become increasingly difficult as coalition forces target more and more areas. The idea is that the locals who are already wary about relying on Kabul and its Western allies will then become even more disenchanted with the ability of the coalition to weaken the Taliban. However, the ISAF attempting to take control of key bases of support on which the Taliban have long relied, and the impact of these efforts on the Taliban will warrant considerable scrutiny.

For now, the Taliban appear to have lost interest in larger-scale attacks involving several hundred fighters being committed to a single objective. Though such attacks certainly garnered headlines, they were extremely costly in terms of manpower and materiel with little practical gain. And with old strongholds like Helmand province feeling the squeeze, there are certainly some indications that ISAF offensives are taking an appreciable bite out of the operational capabilities of at least the local Taliban commanders.

Conserving forces and minimizing risk to their core operational capability are parallel and interrelated considerations for the Taliban in terms of survival. If the recent assault on Marjah is any indication, the Taliban are adhering to these principles. While some fighters did dig in and fight and while resistance has stiffened — especially within the last week — the Taliban declined to make it a bloody compound-to-compound fight despite the favorable defensive terrain.

Similarly, the U.S. surge intends to make it hard for the Taliban to sustain — much less replace — manpower and materiel. Taliban tactics must be tailored to maximize damage to the enemy while minimizing costs, which drives the Taliban directly to hit-and-run tactics and the widespread use of improvised explosive devices.

There is little doubt that the Taliban will continue to inflict casualties in the coming year. But there is also considerable resolve behind the surge, which will not even be up to full strength until the summer and will be maintained until at least July 2011. Indeed, it is not clear if the Taliban can inflict enough casualties to alter the American timetable in its favor any further.

There is also the underlying issue of sustaining the resistance. Manpower and logistics are inescapable parts of warfare. Though the United States and its allies bear the heavier burden, the Taliban cannot ignore that it is losing key population centers and opium-growing areas central to recruitment, financing and sanctuary. The parallel crackdowns by the ISAF on the Afghan side of the border and the Pakistani crackdowns on the opposite side, where the Taliban has long enjoyed sanctuary, represent a significant challenge to the Taliban if the efforts can be sustained. Signs of a potential increase in cooperation and coordination between Washington and Islamabad could also be significant.

In other words, despite all its flaws, there is a coherency to what the United States is attempting to achieve. Success is anything but certain, but the United States does seek to make very real inroads against the core strength of the Taliban. One of those methods is to reduce the Taliban’s operational capability to the point where it will no longer have the capability to overwhelm Afghan security forces after the United States begins to draw down. There is no shortage of issues surrounding the U.S. objectives to train up the Afghan National Army and National Police, and it is not at all clear that even if those objectives are met that indigenous forces will be able to manage the Taliban.
 
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But the Taliban must also deal with the logistical strain being imposed on it and strive to maintain its numbers and indigenous support. Central to this effort is the Taliban’s information operations (IO), conveying their message to the Afghan people. Thus far, the ISAF has been far behind the Taliban in such IO efforts, but as the coalition ratchets up the pressure, it remains to be seen whether the more abstract IO will be sufficient for sustaining hard logistical support, especially with pressure being applied on both sides of the border.

Similarly, there is the issue of internal coherency. Any insurgent movement must deal with not only the occupier but also other competing guerrillas and insurgents, whether their central focus is military power or ideological. The Taliban’s main competition is entrenched in the regime of President Hamid Karzai and among those in opposition to Karzai but part of the state; at issue are the Taliban’s sometimes loose affiliations with other Taliban elements and al Qaeda. The United States, the Karzai regime, Pakistan and al Qaeda are all seeking and applying leverage anywhere they can to hive off reconcilable elements of the Taliban.

The United States seeks to divide the pragmatic elements of the Taliban from the more ideological ones. The Karzai regime may be willing to deal with them in a more coherent fashion, but at the heart of all its considerations is the partially incompatible retention of its own power. Al Qaeda, with its own survival on the line, is seeking to draw the Taliban toward its transnational agenda. Meanwhile, Pakistan wants to bring the Taliban to heel, primarily so it can own the negotiating process and consolidate its position as the dominant power in Afghanistan, much as Iran seeks to do in Iraq. Each player has different motivations, objectives and timetables.

Amidst all these tensions, the Taliban must expend intelligence efforts and resources to maintain cohesion, despite being an inherently local and decentralized phenomenon. As Mullah Omar’s code of conduct released in July 2009 demonstrates, “command” of the Taliban as an insurgent group is not as firm as it is in more rigid organizational hierarchies. The reconciliation efforts will certainly test the Taliban’s coherency.

If history is any judge, in the long run the Taliban will retain the upper hand. In Afghanistan, the United States is attempting to do something that has never been tried before — much less achieved — i.e., constitute a viable central government from scratch in the midst of a guerrilla war. But the Taliban must be concerned about the possibility that some aspects of the U.S. strategy may succeed. Central to the American effort will be Pakistan — and Islamabad is showing significant signs of wanting to work closer with Washington.

Sorry! If this post is a little to long. Guess I got carried away….!
 
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To underestimate Taliban or other insurgent forces would be a big mistake, methinks. They might be third world, but are wrriors with different means, sound tactcis and even to some pont sound organization and training, definitely following a planned nd so far not successfully contested strtegy. Overall success in the end will tell who wins, so far I would not bet on any side.

Rattler
 
They have more than one advantage of fighting on home ground, and that is one the West does not share, they do not have to worry about rules of engagement, nor public opinion, or caskets coming home and bugles playing, also their sources of income are illegal anyway so fighting a bureaucratic battle for funding for another year in an ailing economy, is once again not a problem.

In my eyes, when it comes to survivability, they are pure geniuses. All the guns and the most advanced weapons and logistics in the world arrayed against ed them, but those using it are setting off their own political, and financial tripwires, which, as things are looking at times...may cause another international semi, or non success story...

Men in uniform, are good at fighting men in uniform, it's not a training thing, or a hardware thing it seems...But what your commander is allowed to order those under him, from his ultimate politician leaders, who can only do what the people they represent will support him or her to do.

The Taliban, don't have that problem. In a waiting game, that card alone is more of a threat than any suitcase bomb, ied or insurgent maniac.
 
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ISAF is about 700 strong, mainly operating out of Camp Northern Lights up north.
There are also OEF and NIC forces.

C.O.M: Good observation I think it is one of two things..

Scenario 1. Taleban are reinforcing with foreign fighters from the northern republics.
They target the troops in the area they arrive.
Theese insurgents are seasoned fighters, true believers with experience in many cases from former jihad,s.

Scenario 2. The Taleban are trying to drive a wedge between the US and their allies in The Stan.
They are counting on the NATO and other allies to pull their troops if they encounter heavy losses. Happened before in Iraq where Spain pulled all their troops out after the Madrid bombings.

Worst case, a combination of the two.
Now there´s some dark thoughts on the subject..

KV: Same here.. The general public never hears about what denmark and norway does unless they take cassualties.
Some people in the service however travel alot between the bases and meet counterparts every now and again.

//KJ.


Hopefully you are wrong about your scenarios - hopefully its just a coincident. But it is true, that it does seem like they target european troops at the moment.
Does also seem like they have stepped up the level of aggression quite a bit in the northern areas though.

Yeah could be fun to see something different than the desert and the green zone down in Helmand - but I don't think anyone down there have the oppertunity to travel to Northern Lights for example.

Cheers for the info on the SWE ISAF mate!


-KV.
 
To underestimate Taliban or other insurgent forces would be a big mistake, methinks. They might be third world, but are wrriors with different means, sound tactcis and even to some pont sound organization and training, definitely following a planned nd so far not successfully contested strtegy. Overall success in the end will tell who wins, so far I would not bet on any side.

Rattler

Exactly - Never underestimate the intelligence of your enemy!

The Taliban’s military organization demonstrates a good level of Professionalism in the regions where they dominate. In a country with a long history of determined, effective fighters, today’s Taliban are without question the strongest and most effective guerilla movement in Afghanistan’s history. The insurgency is able to mobilize thousands of fighters nationwide. Since 2006, the Taliban have been using field radios and cell phones to coordinate groups of fighters. They are able to coordinate complex attacks, are mobile, and are improving their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Their intelligence is good. Taliban sympathizers ensure that the moves of the coalition are known in advance if Afghan government forces are involved. Whether the coalition wants to admit it or not, the Taliban soldiers are also courageous. The insurgency accepts heavy losses, which contradicts the claim that a majority of the Taliban are motivated by money. The British soldiers in Helmand were surprised in 2006 to find an enemy able to stop them in direct confrontation.
 
Seems like if they had a capital and uniforms, allot of the ROEs would change and the coalition could really let loose with what they are good at, fighting a stand up fight against a uniformed enemy.
 
ISAF is about 700 strong, mainly operating out of Camp Northern Lights up north.
There are also OEF and NIC forces.

C.O.M: Good observation I think it is one of two things..

Scenario 1. Taleban are reinforcing with foreign fighters from the northern republics.
They target the troops in the area they arrive.
Theese insurgents are seasoned fighters, true believers with experience in many cases from former jihad,s.

Scenario 2. The Taleban are trying to drive a wedge between the US and their allies in The Stan.
They are counting on the NATO and other allies to pull their troops if they encounter heavy losses. Happened before in Iraq where Spain pulled all their troops out after the Madrid bombings.

Worst case, a combination of the two.
Now there´s some dark thoughts on the subject..

KV: Same here.. The general public never hears about what denmark and norway does unless they take cassualties.
Some people in the service however travel alot between the bases and meet counterparts every now and again.

//KJ.

I think you are right about that. It´s seems to be part of their current strategy.

Basically you can say that their strategy is very simple. They are waiting for the clock to run out of time, and the Taliban measures time in generations.
 
Seems like if they had a capital and uniforms, allot of the ROEs would change and the coalition could really let loose with what they are good at, fighting a stand up fight against a uniformed enemy.

Yes, the ROE would change.

In counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is public support. In order to defeat an insurgent force, you must be able to separate insurgents from the population.

At the same time, the forces must conduct themselves in a manner that enables them to maintain popular domestic support. Excessive or indiscriminant use of force is likely to alienate the local populace, thereby increasing support for insurgent forces. Insufficient use of force results in increased risks and perceived weaknesses that can jeopardize the mission by emboldening insurgents and undermining domestic popular support. Achieving the appropriate balance requires a thorough understanding of the nature and causes of the insurgency, the end state, and the military’s role in a counterinsurgency operation.
 
Lastly in terms of how much force you are using, using a force continuum can have harsh drawbacks, sending heavy forces can tell the populace that things are getting worse, not better and support all around can dwindle.
 
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