Intelligence Service

I3BrigPvSk

The Viking
Did the intelligence services play any major role during the war or did their contribution never play a major role for the outcome of the war?

We know about instances when the commanders and/or leaders ignored warnings and signs of military actions. One commonly known is how Stalin ignored or preferred to ignore the warnings about a German attack prior June 22nd 1941, another event is during the Operation Market Garden, the commanders preferred to ignore the presence of German armor units around Arnhem.

Another aspect of the intelligence is how to use information. When the Allied was able to intercept the German communication, not making it obvious for the Germans that they have a compromised communications. One success must be when the code breakers warned the Russians about the planned offensive at Kursk, the Russians had another source as well, the spy ring in Germany, I don't remember the name of it, but Lucy comes to my mind.

So did it all have a significant role during the war?
 
Certainly the intelligence services played an important role. I only have to think of the British at Benchley Park and their work with the enigma machine in deciphering German code for an example of successful intelligence. The Germans remained Clueless and for the most part considered their code unbreakable, little did they know that the positions of their U-boats was often known ahead of time. I believe it also supplied Britain with valuable data on the Luftwaffe.
Also the Allied intelligence networks worked hand and hand with many of the partisan - resistance fighters in occupied Europe. One of the greatest success stories was the destruction of the heavy water plant in Norway setting back the Nazi atomic bomb effects. A team of British SOE-trained Norwegian commandos succeeded in destroying the heavy water facility in what may have been the most significant act of sabotage of the war.
 
I would say intelligence played a vital role. Breaking the japanese naval codes played a critical role in the Midway and subsequent battles.
The Enigma materials were important in the Battle of the Atlantic, one of the most critical struggles of the war.
The allies ( british?) had cracked the Lorenz crypto machine a much more complex machine than Enigma. Only a handful of Lorenz machines were ever made and used only for the highest level German communications. I only recently learned about the Lorenz breakthrough and it now makes me doubt the existence of the so-called Lucy network. I am beginning to think that Lucy was an invention to disguise the source of the Lorenz materials.
 
It was said that the code breakers of Bletchley Park received German Commanders orders before the intended recipient. A standing joke was that German Commanders should phone Bletchley Park for their orders.

History shows that Enigma was absolutely vital for the War in the Atlantic, routing convoys away from German U Boat Wolf Packs.
 
Most Enigma information was obsolete when it was received by the local allied commanders .

If convoys were routed away from German U Boats (the Wolf Packs were only constituated when it was decided to attack a convoy and after the attack,the Wolf Pack was disbanded) does not mean that they would be attacked: only 10% of the big Atlantic convoys were attacked,and their losses were 10 %,which means that the total losses were 1 % .The main reason was that convoys were discovered accidentally and that the escorts were mostly strong enough to prevent attacks or to minimize the losses .
 
Last edited:
Did the intelligence services play any major role during the war or did their contribution never play a major role for the outcome of the war?

We know about instances when the commanders and/or leaders ignored warnings and signs of military actions. One commonly known is how Stalin ignored or preferred to ignore the warnings about a German attack prior June 22nd 1941, another event is during the Operation Market Garden, the commanders preferred to ignore the presence of German armor units around Arnhem.

Another aspect of the intelligence is how to use information. When the Allied was able to intercept the German communication, not making it obvious for the Germans that they have a compromised communications. One success must be when the code breakers warned the Russians about the planned offensive at Kursk, the Russians had another source as well, the spy ring in Germany, I don't remember the name of it, but Lucy comes to my mind.

So did it all have a significant role during the war?

1) Stalin was right to ignore warnings about Barbarossa,because these warnings were not reliable and it would not make any difference

2)It was the same for MG :the informations were not reliable,it would not make any difference,and,the story was mostly a myth

3)The importance of Lucy for Citadel is an invention .
 
Throughout the second world war, the Nazis believed that their Enigma coding machine was unbreakable, but the British had uncovered it's secrets. This ultimately shortened the war by an estimated 3 years and by the 8th May 1945, when the Allied leaders were celebrating victory in Europe, the jubilant public were completely unaware of the vital role the code breakers of Bletchley Park had played in the downfall of Hitler and Nazi Germany.

By 1945, it would have been easier for Himmler and Goerring to ring Bletchley Park for Hitler's orders rather than wait for them to be decyphered by their own headquarters.

During the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, Bletchley park broke into 2 keys used by the Luftwaffe and ULTRA gave a clear picture of the German Air Force's order of battle and the overall strategy of it's commander Hermann Goerring.

This allowed R.A.F Fighter Command to preserve the narrow margin which gave it ultimate victory. In an earlier example in June 1940, Bletchley ptovided the Admiralty with a warning about the vulnerability of German warchips to the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Glorious which was then withdrawing from Norway.

Glorious was under threat, but the codebreaking at Bletchley park had still been in it's infancy and the Navy ignored the warning. On the 8th june 1940, Glorious was intercepted and sunk by the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

The loss of Glorious brought home to the Navy just how important ULTRA information could be. ULTRA came into prominence again in 1942 during the campaign against Rommel's Afrika Korps in the western desert.

The distance of the North African desert theatre from Germany threw up mass volumes of Enigma traffic and breaks into the Luftwaffe cyphers and the more stubborn German Army cyphers gave British commanders a clear picture of rommel's order of battle, capabilities and shortages which plagued the Afrika Korps.

However, the knowledge did not prevent the loss of Tobruk and 8th Army's retreat to El Alamein, but in July of 1942 it played a vital role in halting the Afrika Korps' advance.

The then commander of the 8th army General Auchinleck later stated that " But for ULTRA, Rommel would have got through to Cairo". ULTRA information also enabled British aircraft to wage a devastating war on the Mediterranean convoys supplying Rommel.

In October 1942, just before the second battle of El Alamein, they sank nearly 50% of German cargo, however, the influence of ULTRA on the battle itself in which Auchinleck's successor Montgomery enjoyed a 5 to 1 adavntage in tanks and aircraft, was less important.

Some military historians have argued that so comprehensive was the ULTRA information that was available to Montgomery as Rommel withdrew, that it was a surprise that the Afrika Korps were not finished off before it's retreat ended in Tunisia.

On at least one occasion the delay enabled Montgomery to read a message from Hitler to Rommel before it had even been delivered to the commander of the Afrika Korps.
 
Last edited:
Ultra 2

Nowhere was ULTRA more important however than in the battle against the German U-boats in the battle for control of the Atlantic and nowhere was it more vital to conceal the source of the information.

Bletchley Park broke the U-boats Enigma in June 1941, the Atlantic convoys were stretched to their limits and the use of decrypts to lure convoys away from the waiting U-boats dramatically reduced their losses.

Between June and November 1941, the total tonnage lost, fell from 282,000 tonnes to 62,000 tonnes, the difference between Britain's survival and starvation. To achieve this first critical break into the U-boats code, the British were helped by a remarkable incident.

In May 1941, U-110 was put out of action on the surface and she was boarded. On board was located it's Enigma machine and it's daily setting sheets, the boat's captain drowned in a last-ditch attempt to prevent the capture of this vital material. U-110 was sunk and German Naval Intelligence never suspected that she had yeilded up her vital secret.

But in the Autumn of 1942, Bletchley Park was back to square one as the U-boats changed to a new Enigma key known as Shark. This wasn't broken until Dcember and the see-saw battle between the U-boats and the convoy's protectors reached crisis point by March 1943.

By then the forces escorting the convoys at sea and in the air, were finally strong enough to turn the tide conclusively. By the late summer of 1943, the U-boat command had been crippled.

https://youtu.be/2458QZmNxRY
 
1) Stalin was right to ignore warnings about Barbarossa,because these warnings were not reliable and it would not make any difference

2)It was the same for MG :the informations were not reliable,it would not make any difference,and,the story was mostly a myth

3)The importance of Lucy for Citadel is an invention .

So Stalin was correct when he ignored the warnings about the German attack, because the warnings were unreliable. That doesn't make any sense. The Germans attacked so the warnings were reliable. If Stalin had believed the warnings about it, he might have reacted differently and acted on it. The performance of the Soviets in the early stage can be explained by other factors.

So the presence of armor and mechanized forces around Arnhem had no significance for the 1st Airborne Division? What happen when light infantry units like an airborne unit face a mechanized unit?


Yes, Midway, there is a difference when the Americans knew about the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and the Japs were unaware of the presence of the American carriers.

Bletchley Park did an important contribution to the war effort and in the long run it saved lives.

If the American had been aware of the Japanese fleet sailing toward Hawaii in December 1941, the outcome might have been different or way more costly for the Japanese. Information is everything, imagine if the Germans had known about operation Overlord prior the D-Day.

A footnote,

The Swedish intelligence service (the C-Bureau) during the Second World War, was able to brake the German communication and was aware of Barbarossa before the attack.
 
1) Stalin was right to ignore warnings about Barbarossa,because these warnings were not reliable and it would not make any difference

2)It was the same for MG :the informations were not reliable,it would not make any difference,and,the story was mostly a myth

3)The importance of Lucy for Citadel is an invention .

1) Stalin willfully ignored British warning of the massive German buildup in preparation on the border. This cost him dearly. The Nazi juggernaut advanced so quickly into the USSR that they were constantly in danger of outrunning both their supplies lines and infantry support. Thousands of Soviet planes were destroyed the 1st few days of the invasion due to Stalin poor judgment Untold 100's of thousands of Soviet POW's were captured as a result of Stalin's failure to react. Rather than consolidate his forces Stalin had them spread out with some in the frontier regions which were sitting ducks and some in more stable positions in the hinterland which were to far to lend any immediate help to the beleaguer frontier forces.

2) a Myth tell that to the 1000's of dead from the British 1st Airborne division. Who died as a result of the ignoring of these reports.
 
There was a German agent active in the UK prior the Normandy operation. Or rather I would say the Germans believed he worked for them, he convinced the Germans the landings in Normandy was a diversion. The real invasion was planned to occur at Calais

I think his code name was Garbo, but I might be wrong.
 
So Stalin was correct when he ignored the warnings about the German attack, because the warnings were unreliable. That doesn't make any sense. The Germans attacked so the warnings were reliable. If Stalin had believed the warnings about it, he might have reacted differently and acted on it. The performance of the Soviets in the early stage can be explained by other factors.

I suspect that he meant that the source was unreliable, when receiving information a large proportion of its validity comes from the source for example few women will tell you their real age or weight and there are no guilty people in prison if you ask the inmates.

In the case of Barbarossa the information was correct but the Stalin clearly did not believe the person passing on the information further to that the information itself has to make sense to the recipient and fit in with their line of thinking, take Crete for example where the battle plans were captured prior to the invasion yet Freyberg still believed that it was going to be a seaborne invasion.


So the presence of armor and mechanized forces around Arnhem had no significance for the 1st Airborne Division? What happen when light infantry units like an airborne unit face a mechanized unit?

This is a pretty standard assessment of Market Garden (Arhnem in particular) but I think it overlooks several points namely that Intelligence had done its job and shown what was in the area however because of British distrust of the Dutch resistance and a general belief that the German soldier was a defeated one that would not put up a fight it was largely ignored.

What the argument also fails to take into account is that the it was a bad plan right from the start to rely on a single road lined by trees and surrounded by swamps and Dutch Generals and resistance told them so, if anyone failed it was 30 Corps inability to reach the bridge and that was caused by bad planning as the airborne troops held it for more time than it was expected that they would have to.
 
What the argument also fails to take into account is that the it was a bad plan right from the start to rely on a single road lined by trees and surrounded by swamps and Dutch Generals and resistance told them so, if anyone failed it was 30 Corps inability to reach the bridge and that was caused by bad planning as the airborne troops held it for more time than it was expected that they would have to.

Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance. Unfortunately the information was dismissed. This doomed the British 1st Airborne division to failure with ~ 2000 dead and ~ 6000 POW's. The British 1st Airborne division made quite a good showing for themselves considering they were out numbered and taking on the 10th SS Panzer division. Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war.
 
Last edited:
I disagree, 1st Airborne basically achieved its goal the failure was in the plan to relieve the airborne troops.

In fact I would argue that at no stage in the planning of Market Garden was there an intelligence failure, the failure of the operation was purely one of leadership.

Intelligence was spot on in almost every aspect of the operation it was senior command namely Montgomery that screwed up.
 
Last edited:
I disagree, 1st Airborne basically achieved its goal the failure was in the plan to relieve the airborne troops.

In fact I would argue that at no stage in the planning of Market Garden was there an intelligence failure, the failure of the operation was purely one of leadership.

Intelligence was spot on in almost every aspect of the operation it was senior command namely Montgomery that screwed up.

Disagree with what?

I proved the specific intelligence data that was provided to allied command. To repeat: Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance.

I never stated that the British 101st airborne didn't initially and initially only achieve their goal. Which couldn’t be maintained for long due to the strong German forces pitted against them. An airborne division can only hold out for so long against an armored division as well as other German forces. The plan to relieve them was flawed as well, however that wasn't the main reason for the surrender. The British 101st airborne was still being supplied by air in an ever shrinking pocket. They were outgunned and outnumbered.

My final statement was as follows: Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war. In hindsight it was foolhardy for Monty to have sent a Airborne division into an area containing strong enemy forces at the end of shoestring.
 
Last edited:
Weird somehow I completely missed most of your post, seems we pretty much agree although I think it "could" have worked however I think had Montgomery looked at the data he had objectively he may have planned the relief operation differently.

Still hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would point out that they did hang on to the end of the bridge for five days which is two more than they were meant to have which is why I believe it was the relief plan that failed.
 
I suspect that he meant that the source was unreliable, when receiving information a large proportion of its validity comes from the source for example few women will tell you their real age or weight and there are no guilty people in prison if you ask the inmates.

In the case of Barbarossa the information was correct but the Stalin clearly did not believe the person passing on the information further to that the information itself has to make sense to the recipient and fit in with their line of thinking, take Crete for example where the battle plans were captured prior to the invasion yet Freyberg still believed that it was going to be a seaborne invasion.




This is a pretty standard assessment of Market Garden (Arhnem in particular) but I think it overlooks several points namely that Intelligence had done its job and shown what was in the area however because of British distrust of the Dutch resistance and a general belief that the German soldier was a defeated one that would not put up a fight it was largely ignored.

What the argument also fails to take into account is that the it was a bad plan right from the start to rely on a single road lined by trees and surrounded by swamps and Dutch Generals and resistance told them so, if anyone failed it was 30 Corps inability to reach the bridge and that was caused by bad planning as the airborne troops held it for more time than it was expected that they would have to.

Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance. Unfortunately the information was dismissed. This doomed the British 1st Airborne division to failure with ~ 2000 dead and ~ 6000 POW's. The British 1st Airborne division made quite a good showing for themselves considering they were out numbered and taking on the 10th SS Panzer division. Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war.

Weird somehow I completely missed most of your post, seems we pretty much agree although I think it "could" have worked however I think had Montgomery looked at the data he had objectively he may have planned the relief operation differently.

Still hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would point out that they did hang on to the end of the bridge for five days which is two more than they were meant to have which is why I believe it was the relief plan that failed.

Disagree with what?

I proved the specific intelligence data that was provided to allied command. To repeat: Major Brian Urguhart obtained information in Belgium from the Dutch resistance that German armor was present around Arnhem. This was backed up by aerial reconnaissance.

I never stated that the British 101st airborne didn't initially and initially only achieve their goal. Which couldn’t be maintained for long due to the strong German forces pitted against them. An airborne division can only hold out for so long against an armored division as well as other German forces. The plan to relieve them was flawed as well, however that wasn't the main reason for the surrender. The British 101st airborne was still being supplied by air in an ever shrinking pocket. They were outgunned and outnumbered.

My final statement was as follows: Monty ultimately has to take responsibility for the disaster at Arnhem, as it was he who convinced Allied command that this plan could shorten the war. In hindsight it was foolhardy for Monty to have sent a Airborne division into an area containing strong enemy forces at the end of shoestring.

I disagree, 1st Airborne basically achieved its goal the failure was in the plan to relieve the airborne troops.

In fact I would argue that at no stage in the planning of Market Garden was there an intelligence failure, the failure of the operation was purely one of leadership.

Intelligence was spot on in almost every aspect of the operation it was senior command namely Montgomery that screwed up.
Actually from what was in the book "A bridge too far" is the Dutch weren't asked how to invade their own Country. A Dutch General after it was over told them the Final Exam at their War College(what ever it's called) is to invade from the same direction as The Allies did, anyone trying to do it like Market Garden fails the exam.
 
MG was a gamble,and a justified one : if it succeeded,there was a big chance that the war could be over before Christmas,if it failed,nothing was lost .But if there was no MG,one thing was certain : the war would not be over before Christmas .
 
About Barbarossa: Stalin was justified to not believe the informations he received,especially those from Sorge :Sorge lived in Tokyo : HOW could a Soviet spy living in Japan have reliable informations about something that would happen in Eastern Europe ? Hitler had expressily forbidden to inform Japan about Barbarossa .

And the informations coming from European sorces were not better : ONLY if suddenly the German Pz and Mot Divisions appeared at the border with the SU,could there be a reason for anxiety :at the start of june 1941,there were only 5 PzD and 2 Mot D at the border with the SU ,thus no reason for anxiety .
The other (12 PzD and 12 Mot D) were going to the east only between 3 and 23 june (and remained 60/80 km from the border) and when they were detected,it was to late for counter-measures .
 
Weird somehow I completely missed most of your post, seems we pretty much agree although I think it "could" have worked however I think had Montgomery looked at the data he had objectively he may have planned the relief operation differently.

Still hindsight is a wonderful thing.

I would point out that they did hang on to the end of the bridge for five days which is two more than they were meant to have which is why I believe it was the relief plan that failed.

I must disagree : the only chance for MG to succeed was if at the day of the landing,the Germans would yell:Kamerad and raise their arms .

In the period immediately before MG,the Hun was on the run,and the assumption was that one more push and he would fall definitively .But there was not much time :the longer the allies would wait,the less chance MG would have to succeed .Thus,improvisation and pray that everything would work .
 
Back
Top