About Has any one read: Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?
|July 20th, 2011||#1|
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Has any one read: Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? info
ISBN 9781574888102 / 1574888102
TITLE Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?
AUTHOR Russell A. Hart
Here is the publishers description:
Biographers and historians have lionized Heinz Guderian as the legendary father of the German armored force and brilliant practitioner of “blitzkrieg” maneuver warfare. As Russell A. Hart argues, Guderian created this legend with his own highly influential yet self-serving and distorted memoir, which remains one of the most widely read accounts of the Second World War. Unfortunately, too many of Guderian 's biographers have accepted his view of his accomplishments at face value, without sufficient critical scrutiny, resulting in an undeserved hagiography. While undoubtedly a great military figure of appreciable ego and ambition and with a volatile, impetuous, and difficult personality, Guderian was determined to achieve his vision of a war-winning armored force irrespective of the consequences. He proved to be a man who was politically naive enough to fall under the sway of Hitler and National Socialism and yet arrogant enough to believe he could save Germany from inevitable defeat late in the war, despite Hitler 's interference. At the same time, Guderian was unwilling either to participate in attempts to remove Hitler or to denounce as traitors the conspirators who did. In the end, he distorted the truth to establish his place in history. In the process, he denigrated the myriad important contributions of his fellow officers as he took personal credit for what were, in reality, collective accomplishments. Thus, he succeeded in creating a legend that has endured long after his death. This brief biography puts the record straight by placing Guderian 's career and accomplishments into sharper and more accurate relief. It exposes the real Heinz Guderian, not the man of legend.
We are more often treacherous through weakness than through calculation. ~Francois De La Rochefoucauld
|July 20th, 2011||#2|
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There also is the fact (and this can be consulted on the web)that on the request of Liddell-Hart (IMHO an imposter)Guderian was ,in the English edition of Panzer Leader,commending L-H as his mentor ,a blatant lie,because the role of L-H before the war was insignificant .
|July 20th, 2011||#3|
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You shall only find out by reading it.......if it is revionistic (ugly word) it would be a sort of counter-revisionistic - wouldn't it...? That is good, is it not..?
www.fredleander.com - River Wide, Ocean Deep - a book on Operation Sea Lion
|July 20th, 2011||#4|
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I am just trying to determine whether the book is worth buying for example I would not recommend "Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir Of General Raus, 1941-1945" as I found it somewhat of a self serving self righteous read basically it seems that he alone could have won the war as late as 1944 and never lost a battle everyone else did, I don't mind whether I agree with its findings or its overall aim as long as it is well researched and a worthwhile read.
I tend to think that much of the credit for modern armoured warfare seems to be attributed to Guderian, Liddel-Hart and Fuller when in reality it had many champions around the globe.
But you are correct I will only know what it is like by reading it.
Last edited by MontyB; July 20th, 2011 at 20:43..
|July 24th, 2011||#5|
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Almost anyone writing their own memoirs will be tempted to embellish the truth somewhat. Guderian was no different. The title of that book is obviously to generate interest and I suspect that the conclusion would determine somewhere in between, gravitating towards Guderian's status being intact.
Monty, why would you disagree with Guderian's recommendation to focus on production of the Panzer IV. That suggestion had many sound economic and military benefits for a 1944 Germany short on exotic raw materials and spare parts. The long barrelled Panzer IV was still competitive and it made good sense to rationalise German production. Although clearly better tanks the Panzer V and VI were more expensive and slower to make. Germany needed as many tanks as quickly as possible. If I had been Guderian I'd have made exactly the same recommendation.
As far Rommel's defence plans for France it's obvious that he had half an eye on the July bomb plot and his own political plans were it successful. How can a defence plan that has conflicting political intentions be the best one militarily? Also, I know you are alluding to the overwhelming threat of allied air power but the tanks were ineffective where Rommel wanted them anyway - why not take the risk and move them? Tanks are not pill boxes and they need to be used correctly. If there was one thing not in dispute by anyone it was that Guderian knew how to work with armour. More than Rommel, more than Rundstedt (who incidentally supported Guderian) and more than Hitler. Arguing with Guderian over the correct use of tanks is like giving Tiger Woods advice on how to play golf.
"An Emperor is subject to no-one but God and justice."
Frederick 1, Barbarossa
|July 24th, 2011||#6|
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As IG of the Pz,it was the task of Guderian to determine what tanks Germany was needing,NOT to meddle in operational things .This was reserved to the local commanders,i.c. Rundstedt,Rommel,Geyr von Schweppenburg ;the point is that Germany only had a few operational PzD:between the Loire and the Seine 3 :PL,HJ,21,even if these had been able to launch a mass counterattack,IMHO,this would fail .Rommels POV was :better ONE Pzbatallion on the place and moment of the debarquement,than a counterattack a few days later :the days of mobile warfare were over:it all would depend on the first 24 crucial hours .As the Atlantikwall in Normandy was not strong enough to prevent a debarqurment,the Pz units had to be used as immobile artillery .
|July 25th, 2011||#7|
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In my opinion the only future for the Pz IV chassis was as Jagdpanzer IV with Germany's future armoured development being the Panther chassis.
If Rommel understood nothing else he understood the effect that allied air superiority was going to play in the war far better than Guderian did given that Guderian had never tried or been in a position to operate armour without air superiority.
|July 25th, 2011||#8|
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With the book in hand, most people could make up their minds to buy or not to buy, with not much effort and time, by examining not too many pages. Should a purchase be made and a mistake realised, one can sell the book to a second-hand book dealer. I doubt the book is several hundred NZ dollars and so any loss minimal and the gamble reasonable. Then again, other's advice and opinions are less important than using the topic to advance your own in search of an audience.
|July 25th, 2011||#9|
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Rommel can claim with hindsight (had he lived) that Allied air superiority proved decisive. Other than that, he was wrong. Basing the panzers inland was the only chance the Germans had, although I don't believe it would have worked given Allied air power.
|July 25th, 2011||#10|
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With the new generation of Russian tanks as well as the development of British and American armour the Pz-IV was simply past its prime and the chassis had reached its developmental end in all but a tank killer role, even as early as late 1945 it would have been a death trap for tank crews.
Also Rommel did not need hindsight as he saw what the RAF did to the DAK during the withdrawal from Al Alamein.
Last edited by MontyB; July 26th, 2011 at 07:43.. Reason: spelling fixes