http://www.historynet.com/magazines/...2/3035106.html

It is a very long and good read. It clears up a lot of myths about the battle.

What on the referenced webpage refers to "Germany's Lost Victory?"

I don't get it. Please provide a title link to whatever you are referring to.

I fixed the link.

A very interesting article...thanks.

It's an interesting article and it does clear up some myths for the layman but some of the author's points do need further clarification. One of the foundations of his argument is that Army Group South's panzer reserve could have been used to exploit a breakthrough on the southern wing of the German attack. It is not clear whether Manstein would have been able to commit this reserve and it's also true that Soviet reserves were much greater, hence the ability of the Red Army to conduct succesful offensive operations quite soon after Zitadalle had come to a close. This suggests that the Soviets simply would have committed their own reserves to counter Manstein's attempted breakthrough and through sheer force of numbers would have worn them down.

IMO it would have been a big gamble, but perhaps gambles are all Germany had left at that point on the Ostfront.

Hi Easy-8

I suppose these losses have to be judged in context with overall tank production. For example, between 1940 and 1944 nearly 36,000 T-34 tanks were produced. Another 23,000 T-34-85s were built in 1944 and 1945.

Perhaps the critical factor were not the numbers of tanks but the experienced crews who got killed or maimed in both sides, since these are more difficult to replace. This is certainly the case with aircraft pilots.

A battlefield also presents an opportunity for both sides to use captured weapons, so the side which advances, gains abandoned weapons whilst the side which retreats, loses the immobile heavy weapons which can be easily repaired.

Another myth was the superiority of the Panzers in the attack on the West in 1940. In fact the French tanks and their crews proved superior in the initial contacts but because they retreated from the battlefield most the French tanks which were damaged were lost and all the German ones were repaired.

Originally Posted by perseus

Hi Easy-8

Heyas

I suppose these losses have to be judged in context with overall tank production. For example, between 1940 and 1944 nearly 36,000 T-34 tanks were produced. Another 23,000 T-34-85s were built in 1944 and 1945.

True. The production output of the USSR was impressive. However many destroyed tanks along with dead crews can't be good. However the Soviets proved their ability to recover from massive losses and the Red Army became better and better as time went on much like that of the Union during the US Civil War. However building new weapons and replacing losses takes time and is a real . However, it is kinda like punching your enemy in the stomach really hard and knocking the wind outta him. He will recover but you will be free to attack full force as he tries to regain his strength.

Perhaps the critical factor were not the numbers of tanks but the experienced crews who got killed or maimed in both sides, since these are more difficult to replace. This is certainly the case with aircraft pilots.

Indeed. The loss of personal is much worse than the loss of equipment. You can replace equipment but you cannot replace people. Training a soldier is much like building a weapon - it takes time, energy and money and the more of the the above you put into both the better they will be.

A battlefield also presents an opportunity for both sides to use captured weapons, so the side which advances, gains abandoned weapons whilst the side which retreats, loses the immobile heavy weapons which can be easily repaired.

You are 100% correct.

Another myth was the superiority of the Panzers in the attack on the West in 1940. In fact the French tanks and their crews proved superior in the initial contacts but because they retreated from the battlefield most the French tanks which were damaged were lost and all the German ones were repaired.

The tactics and strategy as well as doctrine enployed by the Wehrmacht in France was the key to the swift victory that was produced. The French tank was better than its German Panzer counterpart however weakness in leadership led to their speedy down fall.

Here is a read you might also find interesting...

http://www.uni.edu/~licari/citadel.htm

Hi Easy-8.

The second article you linked to is a partial rebutal of the first article you linked to, particularly with regard to the use of the German panzer reserves to continue Zitadelle. Myth #8 deals with this claim and I generally agree with the author's conclusions.

The fact of the matter is that Kursk exhausted the bulk of the German Panzer formations. Nevermind that the Wehrmacht inflicted heavy casualties on the Red Army for relatively light casualties of their own, at the end of the battle the Germans had little option but to withdraw and regroup. Despite their heavy losses, the Red Army still had sizeable operational reserves which they then used to push the Germans back. This was the crucial difference between each army - one had almost no operational reserves whereas the other had significant operational reserves.

So it's inaccurate IMO to ever term Kursk as Germany's lost victory. It never was or never could be. What it did achieve was to blunt the Soviet counter-offensive and gave time for the Germans to withdraw. The only possible victory in the East at that time would have been to follow Manstein's 'Backhand Blow'. Otherwise, the Wehrmacht would have been best served to follow Guderian's advice and not attack in the East in 1943 at all.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Hi Easy-8.

Heyas

The second article you linked to is a partial rebutal of the first article you linked to, particularly with regard to the use of the German panzer reserves to continue Zitadelle. Myth #8 deals with this claim and I generally agree with the author's conclusions.

There are many myths about Kursk. And with a little resreach one can hammer threw the bs created years later by the Soviet propaganda machine. The scene of nimble T-34s darting between burning Panzer wrecks just isn't so.

The fact of the matter is that Kursk exhausted the bulk of the German Panzer formations. Nevermind that the Wehrmacht inflicted heavy casualties on the Red Army for relatively light casualties of their own, at the end of the battle the Germans had little option but to withdraw and regroup. Despite their heavy losses, the Red Army still had sizeable operational reserves which they then used to push the Germans back. This was the crucial difference between each army - one had almost no operational reserves whereas the other had significant operational reserves.

This is basic. Everyone who knows anything about the Eastern Front knows that the Soviets took much bigger losses than the Germans, however the USSR had the resources and manpower to make up for these massive losses and the Germans did not. The rate the Soviets replaced stuff is remarkable. They took HUGE losses in the early days of Barbarossa and it is to their credit they found a way to recover from all that. It is like Stalin said "I have more men than you do bullets".

So it's inaccurate IMO to ever term Kursk as Germany's lost victory. It never was or never could be. What it did achieve was to blunt the Soviet counter-offensive and gave time for the Germans to withdraw. The only possible victory in the East at that time would have been to follow Manstein's 'Backhand Blow'. Otherwise, the Wehrmacht would have been best served to follow Guderian's advice and not attack in the East in 1943 at all.

That is the thing we can ponder 'what ifs' all day and get nowhere. This is because history happened as it did. However I have this to say: Kursk was not completely a lost cause. It had a slim chance of success but a chance none the less. The advance in the North did not get far at all but the trust from the south go very far and almost got the desired break threw. I do agree with you on the Manstein's 'backhand blow' I am still debating if or if not Guderian was right when he said the Wehrmacht should mount no offensive operations whatsoever...

what ifs are always interesting because they have so much of the 'unknown' around them.

Originally Posted by Easy-8

This is basic. Everyone who knows anything about the Eastern Front knows that the Soviets took much bigger losses than the Germans, however the USSR had the resources and manpower to make up for these massive losses and the Germans did not. The rate the Soviets replaced stuff is remarkable. They took HUGE losses in the early days of Barbarossa and it is to their credit they found a way to recover from all that. It is like Stalin said "I have more men than you do bullets".

Basic yes but it's amazing just how many people fail to grasp this simple fact. Many educated people still believe that Soviet victory was due to a combination of mounting German losses, greater Soviet AFV/Plane production and the emergence of a 'new' Red Army that had learned from its mistakes and was now dealing a 'Blitzkreig' of its own. Whilst these points are relevant to some degree the fact is that the Red Army actually won because they had more men. They were also able to get those men where they were needed, thanks partly due to Lend-Lease, which kept the Soviet railroad system operational. Glancing at the figures provided by Soviet Colonel-General G.F Krivosheev in his book "Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century" tells its own story. These figures (and they don't even include the figures for the disaster that was Operation Mars) are frightening.

Originally Posted by Easy-8

what ifs are always interesting because they have so much of the 'unknown' around them.

Agreed. They can be very interesting as long as they stay within realistic boundaries. I still think that one can look at all the evidence available for Kursk and make a reasonable assumption that it was unlikely to suceed simply because it was a flawed plan to being with.