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| Immunes | Quote:
Bibliography 1997. Barros, James and Gregor, Richard. Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler and the Invasion of Russia. Northern Illinois University Press: DeKalb, 1995. Broekmeyer, Marius. Stalin, the Russians, and Their War 1941-1945. The University of Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin, 2004. Damaskin, Igor A. Stalin I Razvedka. Moscow, 2004. Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany. Yale University Press: London, 1999. Gorbunov, Evgenii. Skhvatka s Chyernim Drakonom. Tajnaya Vojna na Dalnyem Vostoke. Veche, 2002. Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1999. Leonard, Raymond W. Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918-1933. Greenwood Press: London, 1999. Mawdsley, Evan. Thunder in the East. Hodder Arnold: Great Britain, 2005. Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. Yale University Press: New Haven, 2005. Overy, Richard. Russia’s War: A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945. Penguin Books: New York, 1997. Petrov, Vladimir. Soviet Historians and the German Invasion “June 22 1941” University of South Carolina Press: Columbia S.C., 1968. Pikhalov, Igor. Velikaya Obolgannaya Voyna. Eksmo: Yauza, 2005. Prange, Gordon W. Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring. McGraw-Hill Book Company: New York, 1984. Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin’s Folly. Houghton Mifflin Company: New York, 2005. Prudnikova, Ye. et al. Legendi GRU. Moscow, 2005. Salisbury, Harrison E. The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad. Da Capo Press: New York, 1985. Stepashin, S. V. ed., Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti SSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voine. Moscow, 1995. Book 2. Sudoplatov, Pavel and Anatoli. Special Tasks. Back Bay Books: New York, 1994. Whymant, Robert. Stalin’s Spy. St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1996. Yakovlev, Alexander N. ed., 1941 god. Moscow, 1998. 2 Volumes. Ziemke, Earl F. Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East. Center of Military History: Washington, D. C., 1987. Websites http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2000-10-27/5_ramzay.html http://www.newlibrary.ru/read/korolkov_yurii/chelovek_dlja_kotorogo_ne_bylo_tain.html http://www.lib.ru/MEMUARY/ZHZL/zorge.txt Read Whymant's book "Stalin's Spy" if you want the messages he sent translated. Read Murphy to see the contradictory information coming into the GRU and NKVD from abroad. Use your common sense, and if that fails logic, to understand Stalin's and Golikov's situation, amongst others, when viewing the reports coming in.
__________________ "Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori." “It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets.” Voltaire Last edited by Kunikov : October 20th, 2007 at 04:01 AM. | |
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| | Post 33 | |
| Tribuni Angusticlavii | Quote:
If I accept that Sorge was not as accurate as earlier publications suggested, that still leaves Stalin's own military intelligence and, more importantly, the Lucy Spy Ring. Even if Stalin distrusted the information, which he reportedly did from the latter source (at least in 1941), he still should have made some adjustments to a defensive posture along his western border. I see no excuse for Stalin to be caught so off guard as he was when the Germans invaded.
__________________ "An Emperor is subject to no-one but God and justice." Frederick 1, Barbarossa | |
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| | Post 34 | |
| Centurion | Quote:
The whole problem with this issue is that surprise as a principle of war is unimportant. I know that I will get flak on this issue, but I do not care. But, think about it...an operation starts, people react, it happens along a timeline whereby a military will respond at a certain point. The problem for the Soviets was not the clock. The problem has to do with the OODA loop. The Germans reacted to Soviet action at an early juncture, and continued this process throughout the war. It makes no difference what Comrade Stalin thought or did. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_Loop | |
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| Tribuni Angusticlavii | Quote:
As far as the early stages of Barbarossa go, German tactics successfully (in the main) disrupted Soviet ability to adequately respond at a higher level for several months after the start of the operation. Therefore, the Soviet OADC loop process was severely short-circuited, if it even existed at all. When an opponent has gained the initiative so quickly, local success aside, would the Soviets even be able to respond pro-actively? It seems to me that their responses would be purely reactionary at least until they were able to stabilize their lines and have time to think. | |
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May I suggest you lose the hostile tone and the superior attitude prevalent in your posts. Whether you are right or wrong, coming over as 'up your own arse' isn't doing you any favours. I hardly think you'd act like this if we were discussing things face to face. It doesn't hurt to be polite. | ||||
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| | Post 39 | |
| Centurion | Quote:
Let me introduce a conjectural point...after all this crap, that is the least that one could allow me. What about a war between Germany and the Soviets without the air war and the two fronts in Italy and France? Come on, who are you trying to convince? I live in the real world. How about you guys? Germany would have won. And, anyway, look at Russia today, what have they won? 60 years after WWII, I have to say that Germany won, anyway. | |
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