Originally Posted by Supostat

I already mentioned my arguments and I do not want to repeat them... basically they are:
1. Giving up initiative (even for while) increases a risk to loose entire war.
2. Time and any delays worked in the benefit of Red Army, not of Wermacht.
3. Thesis about unbreakable German defense lines in winter 1941/1942, located near the Dnieper river, does not hold critics because of points 1 and 2.

I agree with these points although I am sure the counter will be that Germany quickly regained the initiative in spring/summer of 1942, I am not sure however that the 1942 offensives would have had the same success had they have started from further west.

Originally Posted by Supostat

There's another one (seems to be quite similar with previous), with author known:
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/b...rs42_Orlov.htm

And here is original in Russian:
http://www.tellur.ru/~historia/archive/04-00/orlov.htm

I do not consider myself as expert in operation `Mars`, however I do not agree with thesis `Red Army's generals were fools and unable to conduct battles of first half of WW2 properly` ©.

I am no expert either so we'll have to agree to disagree on the reasons for Operation Mars. However, what can't be disputed is that the Red Army failed to dislodge AGC from the Rzhev salient and suffered heavy casualties in the process. They did however, force the Germans to use their depleted reserves to blunt the Soviet attack.

Originally Posted by Supostat

I already mentioned my arguments and I do not want to repeat them... basically they are:
1. Giving up initiative (even for while) increases a risk to loose entire war.
2. Time and any delays worked in the benefit of Red Army, not of Wermacht.
3. Thesis about unbreakable German defense lines in winter 1941/1942, located near the Dnieper river, does not hold critics because of points 1 and 2.

So what I can gather from this is that:

1. You see no difference between the Red Army of 1941/42 and the same army in 1944
2. The force relations between the 2 sides is of no importance when determining the outcome of a battle
3. It is better to over-extend yourself, fight on knowing that you have barely enough ammunition, food and fuel, moreover to do this in winter when you know you are not adequately equipped to fight in winter, than to dig-in, reequip and resupply and wait for weather that suits your strengths

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

So what I can gather from this is that:

1. You see no difference between the Red Army of 1941/42 and the same army in 1944

If Antony Beevor is to be believed perhaps there wasn't that great a difference between the two periods, certainly the Red Army was better equipped by 1944 but I am not certain it was anymore professional.

This leads me to believe that a large part Germany's problems late in the war came from a degradation of its ability to fight rather than an improvement in the Russians ability.

Originally Posted by MontyB

[/list]If Antony Beevor is to be believed perhaps there wasn't that great a difference between the two periods, certainly the Red Army was better equipped by 1944 but I am not certain it was anymore professional.

This leads me to believe that a large part Germany's problems late in the war came from a degradation of its ability to fight rather than an improvement in the Russians ability.

Wouldn't the Likes of Zhukov and other professional commanders have taken over making military decisions from Stalin and inept generals of the immediate post purge period? On the German side the reverse was happening with Hitler taking over.

Originally Posted by MontyB

I agree with these points although I am sure the counter will be that Germany quickly regained the initiative in spring/summer of 1942

Well, it depends on how would be developed situation in the front in the winter 1941/1942.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

However, what can't be disputed is that the Red Army failed to dislodge AGC from the Rzhev salient and suffered heavy casualties in the process. They did however, force the Germans to use their depleted reserves to blunt the Soviet attack.

Yes, generally I do agree.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

You see no difference between the Red Army of 1941/42 and the same army in 1944

You forget one significant factor. Due to German offensive to East, Soviets were forced to evacuate their industry for to East. Generally, to Ural mountains. If Germans stopped at Dnieper with no signs to move further, it certainly made less difficult evacuation of industry or no request it at all. This means Red Army received more weapons and sooner than actually in 1941/1942. This factor could make hypothetical Red Army of 1941/1942 more alike Red Army of 1943/1944...

In reality Red Army of 1941/1942 and first part of 1942 were forced to fight with lack of heavy weapons, all due to industry evacuations, which caused delays in production and Army did not receive weapons to compensate their loss in defeats of 1941 summer.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

The force relations between the 2 sides is of no importance when determining the outcome of a battle

Sorry, didn't got that.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

It is better to over-extend yourself, fight on knowing that you have barely enough ammunition, food and fuel, moreover to do this in winter when you know you are not adequately equipped to fight in winter, than to dig-in, reequip and resupply and wait for weather that suits your strengths

In the way `Barbarossa` was planned - yes, Red Army had to be defeat asap, if Germans had a wish to won the war...

The problem is that Red Army could re-equip and re-supply FASTER than dug-in Wermacht. Due to factors such as:

1. Total mobilization;
2. Non-stretched or nearer communications;
3. Less part of Soviet industry would be evacuated than if Germans countinued their offensive.

Originally Posted by MontyB

If Antony Beevor is to be believed perhaps there wasn't that great a difference between the two periods, certainly the Red Army was better equipped by 1944 but I am not certain it was anymore professional.

Well, even Red Army of summer 1941 was professional enough, although less professional than Germans, since Germans had greater experience of modern warfare. Then occured a fall of army professionalism because of defeat of professional army and mobilization of reserve armies. Reserve armies of course were less professional, but at the end of 1942, at Stalingrad, level of professionalism of Red Army was restored.

Originally Posted by MontyB

This leads me to believe that a large part Germany's problems late in the war came from a degradation of its ability to fight rather than an improvement in the Russians ability.

Germans lost war because of economics. Have You ever compared amounts of tanks produced during the war?

Originally Posted by Supostat

You forget one significant factor. Due to German offensive to East, Soviets were forced to evacuate their industry for to East. Generally, to Ural mountains. If Germans stopped at Dnieper with no signs to move further, it certainly made less difficult evacuation of industry or no request it at all. This means Red Army received more weapons and sooner than actually in 1941/1942. This factor could make hypothetical Red Army of 1941/1942 more alike Red Army of 1943/1944...

It is questionable that the evacuation of Soviet heavy industry would have been heavily affected whether the Germans halted at the Dnieper or not. I don't think it would have made much difference but I do know there's no way that the Red Army of 1941/42 would have resembled the Red Army of 1943/44. Basically because a) the Red Army of 1941/42 had not only been severely mauled but its replacements were in the main under trained and poorly equipped and b) it's too early for the Red Army to apply the lessons it learned in combat in 1941.

Originally Posted by Supostat

Sorry, didn't got that.

Sorry what didn't you get? The meaning of force relations?

Originally Posted by Supostat

In the way `Barbarossa` was planned - yes, Red Army had to be defeat asap, if Germans had a wish to won the war...

The problem is that Red Army could re-equip and re-supply FASTER than dug-in Wermacht. Due to factors such as:

1. Total mobilization;
2. Non-stretched or nearer communications;
3. Less part of Soviet industry would be evacuated than if Germans countinued their offensive.

IMO a dash to Moscow was the best plan, but once the emphasis was diverted to take Kiev and the Ukraine it was no longer possible to capture Moscow in 1941. Therefore, the next best option was to dig-in around October and wait until Spring 1942. This wasn't only Hitler's initial intent, some influential generals like Gerd von Rundstedt also favoured this plan. It doesn't matter whether the Red Army can reequip and resupply faster because the Germans really have no choice by this time. It is military suicide to:

• attack in winter when you also know that you're under supplied
• attack in winter when you also know that your formations need to rest and refit
• attack in winter when you know that you're not equipped for winter warfare

Mate, it really is a no brainer and I don't know why you're having such a hard time grasping this.

You're also forgetting that it's almost certain that the Red Army will mount a major winter offensive in 1941 which will break against the dug-in Wehrmacht. Come Spring 1942, the Red Army will be in no shape to mount a major summer offensive. It took another year before the Red Army was able to win in a summer engagement and that was at Kursk where the Germans allowed themselves to be sucked into a massive pitched battle reminiscent of WW1. It's not going to happen in Spring 1942, especially when historically the Red Army was beaten all the way back to Stalingrad and in this 'what if' scenario the Wehrmacht would be in measurably better shape in 1942.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

It is questionable that the evacuation of Soviet heavy industry would have been heavily affected whether the Germans halted at the Dnieper or not.

For example, Kharkov was the motherland of factory which constructed and produced T-34 tanks... Kharkov is on the East from the Dnieper river. If no need to evacuate it, imagine counterattack of winter 1941/1942 not with some T-60 tanks, but with full tank divisions of T-34. That makes a difference.

Stopping of Germans at Dnieper, without any doubts, is decision which benefits Red Army too, not only Wehrmacht.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

I don't think it would have made much difference but I do know there's no way that the Red Army of 1941/42 would have resembled the Red Army of 1943/44. Basically because a) the Red Army of 1941/42 had not only been severely mauled but its replacements were in the main under trained and poorly equipped and b) it's too early for the Red Army to apply the lessons it learned in combat in 1941.

a) Well, nobody is saying that Red Army would counterattack just after Germans stopped. There still we delays because of need to train conscripts, to find out and understand plans of enemy and so on. So, if Germans stopped in September, the main counterattack would follow only in November or even in January.
b) But it is still worth chance to take initiative from the Germans. In better conditions than real counterattack of 1941/1942, in terms of better equipment due to less evacuated and thus more productive industry.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Sorry what didn't you get? The meaning of force relations?

The meaning of entire sentence The force relations between the 2 sides is of no importance when determining the outcome of a battle. Force relations of proportion of forces makes a count, nobody has canceled the minimum needed superiority for successful attack.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Therefore, the next best option was to dig-in around October and wait until Spring 1942. This wasn't only Hitler's initial intent, some influential generals like Gerd von Rundstedt also favoured this plan. It doesn't matter whether the Red Army can reequip and resupply faster because the Germans really have no choice by this time. It is military suicide to:

• attack in winter when you also know that you're under supplied
• attack in winter when you also know that your formations need to rest and refit
• attack in winter when you know that you're not equipped for winter warfare

Mate, it really is a no brainer and I don't know why you're having such a hard time grasping this.

You're also forgetting that it's almost certain that the Red Army will mount a major winter offensive in 1941 which will break against the dug-in Wehrmacht.

Of course they will mount a major winter offensive. Without any doubts. Only I think they certainly will brake up German defense lines. I am not sure could Red Army fulfill its objectives of this offensive for 100% (it depends also from what would be those objectives) because it will still lack a truck transport and at the certain moment their supplies woudn't be able to catch the first line units, in such way stopping entire offensive. But this counterattack will surely give a hard time to Germans. There won't be just sitting in fox-holes and shooting at approaching Russkies just as at shooting range.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Come Spring 1942, the Red Army will be in no shape to mount a major summer offensive. It took another year before the Red Army was able to win in a summer engagement and that was at Kursk where the Germans allowed themselves to be sucked into a massive pitched battle reminiscent of WW1. It's not going to happen in Spring 1942, especially when historically the Red Army was beaten all the way back to Stalingrad and in this 'what if' scenario the Wehrmacht would be in measurably better shape in 1942.

Well, it depends from result of our hypothetic campaign of winter 1941/1942. at Dnieper. If Germans more or less succeed their defense than yes, You could be right and Germans would rule in the following campaign of summer 1942. If no and Red Army success to push Germans back significantly, forcing them to suffer casualties both in living force and technic, then Germans would another hard time at first to launch ad offensive and a second, to force Dnieper line (which now will de defended from other side) themselves.