Originally Posted by Supostat

In fact only first two weeks went in more or less accordance with `Barbarossa` plans and timeline. After engaging the Second strategic echelon of Red Army in July 9 significantly slowed Germans down.

The point is, that between June and December the Red Army could not stop the Wehrmacht from advancing and lost more casualties than any other army in history during that timeframe.

Originally Posted by Supostat

1. Actually winter did not affect panzers in winters 1942/1943, 1943/1944 and 1944/1945, as well as muddy roads. Only fall 1941 and winter 1941/1942. has been always mentioned as reason for failing German plans. And only because of bad planing, since during following winters both panzers and soldaten were prepared of low temperatures. And responsibility to prepare vehicles and men for winter combat is responsibility of generals, not of Hitler.

Well not just responsibility of the generals but of the entire German infrastructure. After 1941 the original plan of Barbarossa was over anyway and newer plans were in place.

Originally Posted by Supostat

2. Miller-Gillebrandt writes, in winter 1941/1942 from frostbitten soldiers 85% returned to duty, 10% returned to duty in non-combat units (continued their service in the rear), 3,5% were commissioned as unable to continue any duty, 1,5% died. In numbers it is less than 3000 dead and ~75 000 non-letal, unable to continue duty in combat units. It is not much, if compared to combat-caused casualties of German army.

Firstly, please provide a link if you are quoting from a source. Secondly, you are not stating how long it took for frostbitten soldiers to return to their units which is a significant piece of information. Thirdly, had the Germans a) went for Moscow after Smolensk or b) dug-in after Kiev until spring 1942 the effects of the weather on the Germans would have been minimal, successful or not.

Originally Posted by Supostat

3. If Germans stopped Dnieper river line and gave Russians a rest, they will have even less success and could be defeated earlier. Only hope for Germans was to defeat Soviets asap. Any delay will decrease their chances, since USSR had more resources than Germany. And if Germany loses initiative, it loses war too.

This is really just an opinion that has no basis in fact. There is nothing to suggest that the Soviets would have recovered from their 1941 losses by Spring 1942. In fact, they would likely have been in a worse position than historically as Stalin would have demanded attack after attack on dug-in German forces that would resulted in horrible losses for the Red Army. Like the 'Rzhey meat grinder' but on an even bigger scale.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

The point is, that between June and December the Red Army could not stop the Wehrmacht from advancing and lost more casualties than any other army in history during that timeframe.

But it slowed down and forced Germans to change their plans. It is still better for Red Army than if the `Barbarossa` would be fulfilled in accordance to timeline.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Well not just responsibility of the generals but of the entire German infrastructure. After 1941 the original plan of Barbarossa was over anyway and newer plans were in place.

Again, in winters 1942/1943., 1943/1944 and 1944/1945. German infrastructure had no such problems as in winter of 1941/1942. It means there was no decision or - decision came too late.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Firstly, please provide a link if you are quoting from a source. Secondly, you are not stating how long it took for frostbitten soldiers to return to their units which is a significant piece of information. Thirdly, had the Germans a) went for Moscow after Smolensk or b) dug-in after Kiev until spring 1942 the effects of the weather on the Germans would have been minimal, successful or not.

I'm afraid You do not read Russian...
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/bezdarnoct-1.shtml

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

This is really just an opinion that has no basis in fact. There is nothing to suggest that the Soviets would have recovered from their 1941 losses by Spring 1942.

They did it in reality... despite to fact that Germans did not stop but continue their offensive.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

In fact, they would likely have been in a worse position than historically as Stalin would have demanded attack after attack on dug-in German forces that would resulted in horrible losses for the Red Army. Like the 'Rzhey meat grinder' but on an even bigger scale.

Stalin demanded it also after Moscow, in beginning of December 1941 and it was quite successful, even with lack of tanks and other vehicles, carried out generally by infantry and cavalry, with some tank brigades, armed mainly with cheap, simple and light T-60 tanks...

Yep. The Red Army needed to slow the Germans down. That's what they wanted and that's what they got. It didn't matter how much men they lost. Russia could afford that loss.
Russia knows how to use its winter to the fullest effect. That is why it is such an effective deathtrap.
And don't tell people that "that's an opinion" because your "facts" are the most blatant examples of opinions based on "what if" scenarios to which anything could have happened.

Originally Posted by Supostat

But it slowed down and forced Germans to change their plans. It is still better for Red Army than if the `Barbarossa` would be fulfilled in accordance to timeline.

True but we both agree that the original timetable for Barbarossa was hopelessly unrealistic. And no matter whether the Soviets slowed down the Germans or not, they still could not stop the Germans advancing almost at will.

Originally Posted by Supostat

Again, in winters 1942/1943., 1943/1944 and 1944/1945. German infrastructure had no such problems as in winter of 1941/1942. It means there was no decision or - decision came too late.

Well there was a decision and it was in time too. The problem was that the German logistical chain could not adequately supply basics such as ammunition, food and fuel, never mind items like winter uniforms and snow tracks for the panzers. The winter uniforms for example had been ordered by Hitler, but they were sitting in a train yard in Poland in a massive traffic jam.

Originally Posted by Supostat

I'm afraid You do not read Russian...
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/bezdarnoct-1.shtml

I don't but I appreciate the link anyway.

Originally Posted by Supostat

Stalin demanded it also after Moscow, in beginning of December 1941 and it was quite successful, even with lack of tanks and other vehicles, carried out generally by infantry and cavalry, with some tank brigades, armed mainly with cheap, simple and light T-60 tanks...

It was successful in December 1941 because the Germans were overstretched and out of supply. The Germans however in my scenario would be dug-in and well supplied with winter gear. As I said, picture the Rzhev battles but on a larger scale. You seem to be a sensible guy with good knowledge so I don't see how you could think that a winter Soviet counteroffensive in 1941 would be as successful against a well prepared German Army on the defensive. It wouldn't and this has nothing to do with any bias. It is plain common sense.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

And no matter whether the Soviets slowed down the Germans or not, they still could not stop the Germans advancing almost at will.

Well, they eventually did it...

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Well there was a decision and it was in time too.

In time - it was when? In planning of `Barbarossa` winter equipment was foreseen, for about 20% of German army, directed to East (info from the same link), since General Stuff assumed that number will be enough as occupation forces after Red Army will be defeated. If there was another decision already after beginning `Barbarossa` or even in fall 1941 - it was too late. Since traffic jams You mentioned were not foreseen and no logistics was properly planned to make this decision real.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

It was successful in December 1941 because the Germans were overstretched and out of supply. The Germans however in my scenario would be dug-in and well supplied with winter gear. As I said, picture the Rzhev battles but on a larger scale. You seem to be a sensible guy with good knowledge so I don't see how you could think that a winter Soviet counteroffensive in 1941 would be as successful against a well prepared German Army on the defensive. It wouldn't and this has nothing to do with any bias. It is plain common sense.

Well, Germans could not make nor Dnieper, nor Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava and nor Oder rivers as natural obstacles for dug-in, unbreakable defense lines later, during operation `Bagration`, so why You think defense could be successful in 1941?

One attack at Rhzev was planned and carried out to sidetrack German attention from counter-offensive as Stalingrad, also most of the troops and efforts to break up German defense were concentrated there... Thus Rzhev could not be considered as classic scenario of Red Army offensive on German defense lines.

And as I said earlier - time and any delays helped Red Army, no Germans. In interests of Germans was to finish war asap, the German economics weren't ready for long war on attrition.

Originally Posted by the_13th_redneck

It didn't matter how much men they lost. Russia could afford that loss.

This one also is overestimated. Russia, even USSR, was and is no China with more then billion population.

At first, USSR before the war outnumbered the Germany in population as 2,4:1. That it is not very much.

At second, in side of Germans also fought Finnish, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Austrian people. Even Polish and Czech people have been reported in Soviet archives captured as POWs from regular Wermacht units.

At third, USSR lost significant part of territory which was relatively dense populated as well in the first weeks of war. Population remaining on these territories found itself in the territory occupied by Germans and could not be used by USSR government as mobilization base any more.

Thus, USSR hadn't a large superiority in human resources over Germany. Difference was in the `total mobilization` - USSR exploited ALL its human resources - men were fighting, women worked in factories and farms 16 hours per day. While everyday life continued without significant changes in Germany for a while.

Originally Posted by Supostat

Well, they eventually did it...

They did but this was in no small part due to failures in German strategic and operational planning.

Originally Posted by Supostat

In time - it was when? In planning of `Barbarossa` winter equipment was foreseen, for about 20% of German army, directed to East (info from the same link), since General Stuff assumed that number will be enough as occupation forces after Red Army will be defeated. If there was another decision already after beginning `Barbarossa` or even in fall 1941 - it was too late. Since traffic jams You mentioned were not foreseen and no logistics was properly planned to make this decision real.

I think Hitler started ordering winter uniforms after the Kiev operation. Remember, it's the belief of some historians that Hitler intended to do no more major fighting until 1942, with the exception of a winter siege on Leningrad. Of course, once he decided to gamble on Moscow there was no hope of those uniforms reaching the front line.

Originally Posted by Supostat

Well, Germans could not make nor Dnieper, nor Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava and nor Oder rivers as natural obstacles for dug-in, unbreakable defense lines later, during operation `Bagration`, so why You think defense could be successful in 1941?

One of the main differences though was in force relations between the 2 sides in 1942, compared to 1944. In 1944 the Red Army had a 2:1 superiority in troops, nearly 3:1 in artillery pieces and nearly 8:1 in tanks and aircraft. In 1942 the odds would be much more in the German's favour. That would be the big difference, along with the fact that in 1942, the Red Army had not yet recovered in spirit, training and confidence from the mauling it had received in 1941. In short, it had not yet learned from the Wehrmacht and was nothing like the enormously powerful army it was 2 years later.

Originally Posted by Supostat

One attack at Rhzev was planned and carried out to sidetrack German attention from counter-offensive as Stalingrad, also most of the troops and efforts to break up German defense were concentrated there... Thus Rzhev could not be considered as classic scenario of Red Army offensive on German defense lines.

David Glantz believes that the 'Mars' offensive was designed to be even bigger than the 'Uranus' offensive further south at Stalingrad. It is his belief that Operation Mars was no sideshow and indeed was designed to push back AGC from the Rzhev salient. Stalin was still uneasy about such a large concentration of German forces fairly near Moscow. This operation is detailed in David Glantz's book, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies)" and in the link below. David Glantz is no pro German historian as you might be aware. In fact, he's been accused by some of being too pro Soviet.

http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Bat...rationmars.htm

Originally Posted by Supostat

And as I said earlier - time and any delays helped Red Army, no Germans. In interests of Germans was to finish war asap, the German economics weren't ready for long war on attrition.

True but I think a delay of a few months to avoid fighting in the Russian winter was not only utterly sensible, it was necessary. The Germans knew that Stalin was ordering wave after wave of futile, uncoordinated attacks. The sensible option would be to let these attacks come when it suited the Germans, not when it suited the Soviets. It is one of the basic tenets of war after all that you make your enemy fight on your times.

Barbarossa was on an unrealistic timetable because that's the only thing that would "work."

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

David Glantz believes that the 'Mars' offensive was designed to be even bigger than the 'Uranus' offensive further south at Stalingrad. It is his belief that Operation Mars was no sideshow and indeed was designed to push back AGC from the Rzhev salient. Stalin was still uneasy about such a large concentration of German forces fairly near Moscow. This operation is detailed in David Glantz's book, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies)" and in the link below. David Glantz is no pro German historian as you might be aware. In fact, he's been accused by some of being too pro Soviet.

http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Bat...rationmars.htm

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/battles/mars42.htm

Originally Posted by Supostat

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/battles/mars42.htm

Ok, so you've posted a link that is basically a rebuttal to David Glantz's book. Fair enough, although without the ability to read the sources (which I presume are in Russian), it's hard for me to check their validity. Glantz at least, is widely known and respected. I'm not saying that there is no worth in the article but I have no real cause to disbelieve Glantz over an unknown author who only references two alternative secondary sources and appears to have no primary sources of his own.

I would like for you to answer my other points though, if you don't mind.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Ok, so you've posted a link that is basically a rebuttal to David Glantz's book. Fair enough, although without the ability to read the sources (which I presume are in Russian), it's hard for me to check their validity. Glantz at least, is widely known and respected. I'm not saying that there is no worth in the article but I have no real cause to disbelieve Glantz over an unknown author who only references two alternative secondary sources and appears to have no primary sources of his own.

There's another one (seems to be quite similar with previous), with author known:
http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/b...rs42_Orlov.htm

And here is original in Russian:
http://www.tellur.ru/~historia/archive/04-00/orlov.htm

I do not consider myself as expert in operation `Mars`, however I do not agree with thesis `Red Army's generals were fools and unable to conduct battles of first half of WW2 properly` ©.

I would like for you to answer my other points though, if you don't mind.

I already mentioned my arguments and I do not want to repeat them... basically they are:
1. Giving up initiative (even for while) increases a risk to loose entire war.
2. Time and any delays worked in the benefit of Red Army, not of Wermacht.
3. Thesis about unbreakable German defense lines in winter 1941/1942, located near the Dnieper river, does not hold critics because of points 1 and 2.