| |
Topic: Foreign Spy Activity Surges To Fill Technology Gap |
![]() |
|
![]() |
| |
| | Post 1 |
| Milforum's Postmaster | Post; Foreign Spy Activity Surges To Fill Technology GapWashington Times January 3, 2007 Pg. 3 Pentagon report details tactics; China leads illegal collection By Bill Gertz, Washington Times Foreign spies are stepping up efforts to obtain secret U.S. technology through methods ranging from sexual entrapment to Internet hacking, with China and other Asian countries leading the targeting of U.S. defense contractors. "The apparent across-the-board surge in activity from East Asia and Pacific countries will continue in the short term as gaps in technological capability become apparent in their weapons-development processes," the latest annual report by the Defense Security Service counterintelligence office stated. "The globalization of defense business will increase the threat from strategic competitors who will use legitimate business activities as a venue to illegally transfer U.S. technology," the report said, noting that the use of third countries to disguise collection will continue as a common tactic. The report provides details of the methods used by foreign technology spies, from simple verbal requests for information to purchases of controlled technology and -- in at least one case -- the use of a woman who seduced a contractor into providing his computer password. Other methods included offering marketing services to contractors, spying during visits to U.S. companies and the use of "cultural commonality" to obtain technology. The report did not identify the 106 countries that are engaged in the collection activity, but other defense officials said the most active technology spies are working for China, Russia and Iran. Other collectors of U.S. technology were identified as agents working secretly for Israel, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Egypt and United Arab Emirates, the officials said. The unclassified 2006 report, "Technology Collection Trends in the U.S. Defense Industry," was approved for release in June, but only recently made available to defense contractors and government agencies. A copy was obtained by The Washington Times. It is based on counterintelligence reports from contractors and other data through early 2006. Space systems, lasers and missile- and radar-evading stealth technology are among the most sought-after U.S. technologies, the report said. Other key targets include information systems, modeling and simulation technology, optics, aeronautics, sensors, explosives, electronics and marine systems. The report said the largest percent of the 971 spying incidents detected during the latest reporting period came from East Asia and the Pacific with 31 percent of all incidents, while the Near East accounted for about 23 percent. About 19 percent of the incidents emanated from Eurasia and 13 percent from South Asia. The report provides several cases showing how foreign spies have tried to obtain technology, through simple verbal requests, covert computer hacking and clandestine intelligence activities. One case revealed in the report involved an East Asian company that sought to obtain classified technology related to U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a cutting-edge U.S. military technology. The Asian representatives showed up at a classified facility at the U.S. defense company uninvited and tried to "observe the repair" of previously purchased unclassified systems. The report said the "aggressive effort" to visit the company appeared to be a "veiled attempt to collect information on other high-interest UAV programs at the facility." It was the fourth time since 2003 that the company sought UAV goods. Several U.S. defense contractors have reported that between October 2005 and January 2006 they found radio-frequency transmitters hidden in Canadian coins that were planted on them after they traveled through Canada, according to the report. |
| |
| | Post 2 |
| Nuclear Duck Hunter ![]() | Raytheon is tightening up this year. I forgot my badge this morning and the guard transferred the data on the badge I left at home to a temporary badge. The old badge won't work until I give him the temp back and he reprograms my old one. I also found an extra twelve hours added to my yearly training schedule. All had to do with internal security, especially ITAR related material. Also, there was a Predator on the site for a show and tell since we build the pod for it. They built a tent and took boxes inside the tent and assembled the thing inside the tent.
__________________ “War is an ugly thing but not the ugliest of things; the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feelings which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse.” —John Stuart Mill Last edited by Missileer; January 3rd, 2007 at 23:34. |
| |
| | Post 3 |
| Canuckus Maximus | man, those defense contractors aren't kidding when it comes to security. after reading the article, i'm not surprised that foreign countries, even our allies, want to get what we have.
__________________ "I find your lack of faith disturbing." |
| |
| | Post 4 |
| Milforum's Postmaster | you ever been to the Puzzle Palace? Almost every office is like working in a bank vault. Almost no open doors what-so-ever. |
| |
| | Post 5 |
| Nuclear Duck Hunter ![]() | Some of the military installations are, and have been, Top Secret clearance and Customer clearance minimum to get by the outer gate. My Son worked for E Systems who sent him to an Air Force base in Colorado for a year, I believe it was in Denver, and they had two razor wire fences before you got to the guard gate. All around the outer fence were signs with a little stick figure man getting shot in the back. I seem to remember that it had "No Warning Zone" or something to that effect. We started missing the Grandsons so my Wife and I flew out for a visit. He had a house leased in Aurora with a secure phone line. Sometimes, he would get a call at odd hours and speak with someone about a circuit problem or just get dressed and leave for the base. He told me that once inside, security police were in every hall and by every door. If you missed your door and badged through the wrong one, you went straight to security headquarters accompanied by two guards and two M16s. I couldn't work like that. |
| |
| | Post 6 | |
| Centurion | Quote:
| |
| |
| | Post 7 |
| Nuclear Duck Hunter ![]() | I also tried to get into Northrup Grumman to check on some retirement fund money. I've never worked for them but they bought Litton Laser and my account went to them. I finally got on their site but access is limited to the benefits area only. I get a "you aren't authorized" when I try to go to any other place in their employee web site even though I am an active member. |
| |
| | Post 8 |
| Canuckus Maximus | wow, that's what i call strict security there, missileer. |
| |
| | Post 9 | |
| Nuclear Duck Hunter ![]() | Quote:
| |
| |
| | Post 10 |
| Immunes | One thing they tell us ever year, "There is no such thing as a 'friendly' intelligence service, only foreign intelligence services." Christopher Boyce’s biography "The Falcon and the Snowman" highlighted that for me. The copy I read was annotated by a judge that sat on his trial. |
| |