Originally Posted by MontyB

I think we have gone off track here a bit, while I have no doubt that few if any people believe Germany could ever have won WW2 the question was "How as the leader of Germany or the Luftwaffe" you would have gone about winning the Battle of Britain.

Germany could not win the Battle of Britain...nothing could have been changed in 1940 to alter the outcome.

1. The Galland Approach: "We needed more fighters", Galland wrote after the war. This approach was wrong. What would fighters have accomplished? Nothing. Britain first of all had many fighters in reserve. Only the southern Group (Group 11) was under any real pressure. In any case, British production made up for the losses. Any German devotion to fighter production would only have made Britain's strategic bomber campaign much more difficult.

2. How about more bombers? Germany had to hit British fighter production to win the Battle of Britain. This was the major lesson of the Allied bombing campaign. That is, an attacker must bring the fighters to battle and destroy them, AND hit the productive facilities while simultaneously increasing indigenous production. All of this amounts to a long drawn out battle of attrition. And Britain had the US pumping in resources, men and production.

3. How about a landing to directly impact production? Any German attempt at landing on British soil was sheer fantasy...suicide is a better word.

4. How about knocking out the radar installations? So what. Radar was NOT the reason why Britain defended the skies over southern England. It was only a small bonus...and incidentally a bonus enjoyed by Germany as well. The British strategic bombing campaign had to overcome the same obstacles. They did so using numbers or mass. Germany could not mobilize this mass without severely restricting the economy and making Germany ripe for a Soviet ground offensive...which was coming whether the members of this forum like it or not.


Germany could only have "won" the Battle of Britain using unconventional weapons. That is, by dumping thousands of tons of Tabun, Soman and Sarin on s. England prior to and during the "Blitz". Germany had the stuff. These actions would have led to British retaliation, but the Brits did not have nerve gas and the strategic bombing capacities were too low in 1940-1941. These German actions would have led to the following results:

1. A reduction of the British population by over 50%. (guess based on nerve gas lethality)
2. A reduction of the German population by around 10%. (guess based on WWI gas lethality)

Ollie
It’s interesting to speculate why Hitler decided not to use biological and chemical weapons for warfare. I always assumed it was because Hitler thought that the British possessed even more destructive weapons than he did. It is tempting to believe it was because of the horrors of gas warfare during WW1 which he experienced directly. Of course this did not stop the organised gassing of ethnic groups later on. Could it be because gas was not practical against troops and civilians with gas masks, or at least hinders the attacker more than the defence? Sarin was not very effective (as a mass killer) on the Japanese underground so I doubt it would have been elsewhere. Nerve gases and high potency poisions have theoretically high killing potential but are devishly difficult to deploy without causing decomposition and dispersal.


A few additional points:

Regarding aircraft numbers, I think the limitation here was the availability of experienced pilots on both sides, this would have worked against Germany due to them having to parachute over hostile territory when the aircraft was damaged.

Radar was just one part of a highly effective air defence system which was set up by Dowding in preparation for the air battle. This included observers and a highly organised information gathering and filtering system, a forerunner of the web in fact. I am sure the system as a whole was important.


A wargame of Sealion was conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974. The initial results are here: http://homepage.mac.com/a.biermann/S...Personal7.html

and here is a summary, from Wikepedia

In wargames conducted at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1974, which assumed the Luftwaffe had not yet won air supremacy, the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in England by using a minefield screen in the English Channel to protect the initial assault. However, the German ground forces were delayed at the "Stop Lines" (e.g. the GHQ Line), a layered series of defensive positions that had been built, each a combination of British Home Guard troops and physical barriers. At the same time, the regular troops of the British Army were forming up. After only a few days, the Royal Navy was able to reach the Channel from Scapa Flow, cutting off supplies and blocking further reinforcement. Isolated and facing regular troops with armour and artillery, the invasion force was forced to surrender.

if anyone knows were the full version is I would be interested

Originally Posted by perseus

It’s interesting to speculate why Hitler decided not to use biological and chemical weapons for warfare. I always assumed it was because Hitler thought that the British possessed even more destructive weapons than he did. It is tempting to believe it was because of the horrors of gas warfare during WW1 which he experienced directly. Of course this did not stop the organised gassing of ethnic groups later on. Could it be because gas was not practical against troops and civilians with gas masks, or at least hinders the attacker more than the defence? Sarin was not very effective (as a mass killer) on the Japanese underground so I doubt it would have been elsewhere. Nerve gases and high potency poisions have theoretically high killing potential but are devishly difficult to deploy without causing decomposition and dispersal.

Supposedly, Speer countermanded Hitler's order to use nerve gas during 1945. I know too little about this order. In any case, it is hard to figure out why nerve gas was not used. Comparing Zyklon B to Tabun is furthermore sort of misleading because Zyklon B was really a pesticide for delousing. I think that it is better to bring up Britain's use of "real" gas during the 1920s and that of Italy during the 1930s. In fact, Churchill pushed hard for the use of chemical weapons against Germany during 1944.

Some Nerve Agent Facts:

1. Sarin is deadly. "A dose as small as 100mg · min/m3 will cause death in 50 percent of individuals exposed. If Sarin is absorbed through the skin, death results within ten minutes. Skin exposure of 1.7g on the skin of a man weighing 70 kilograms (roughly 150 pounds) is fatal to 50 percent of exposed individuals. Sarin is five times as heavy as air and represents no fire or explosion hazard. This makes Sarin an ideal agent for delivery by artillery, rockets or aerial spray. Because Sarin is very volatile and non-persistent, it is often thickened with oils or other petroleum products when filled in munitions to leave low-level residues". These residues can contaminate an area for about a day.

2. The Germans had lots of the stuff. "They had the capability of producing over 12,000 tons of poison gas every month. They were believed to have had over 70,000 tons of Tabun and two types of mustard gas stockpiled".


Why then did Hitler not order its use? "The reason he failed to do so probably had much to do with a conversation at the Wolf's Lair, his headquarters in East Prussia, back in May 1943. After the collapse at Stalingrad, both Speer and his chemical warfare expert, Otto Ambros, were sum- moned to a special conference by Hitler to discuss using gas to stem the Russian advance. Ambros began by saying that the Allies could out-produce Germany in chemical weapons. Hitler interrupted to say that he understood that might be true of conventional gases-'but Germany has a special gas, tabun. In this we have a monopoly in Germany.' Ambros shook his head. 'I have justified reasons to assume that tabun, too, is known abroad.' According to Ambros, the essential nature of tabun and sarin had been disclosed in technical journals as long ago as 1902, and like many other German scientists he could not believe that the chemical warfare experts of Porton Down or Edgewood Arsenal had failed to develop them. Whether Ambros genuinely believed that the Allies had their own nerve gases, or whether he was merely trying to put off Hitler, the result was the same: Hitler turned on his heel and abruptly left the meeting. From that moment on, no matter how tempted he felt to use his secret gases, Hitler had always to balance in his mind the conviction of his scientists that the Allies had them too".

http://dtirp.dtra.mil/CBW/references...tsCW_nerve.asp

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/li...t/1984/ARW.htm

Originally Posted by LeEnfield

Now you quote the number of fighter planes that Britain was building per month, yes fine the problem was training that number of pilots per month to fly them. Also you mentioned about the German output of aircraft but what you failed to mention was the thousands of them that they already had in service and the trained people to fly them. When the BoB stated we only had a few hundred planes to cover the whole of the British Isle yet the Germans could muster them in their thousands to send in from any direction they wanted to. Had Germany concentrated it's efforts on the Airfields and radar in the south east of England from the time they had taken France and then launched an invasion there was strong chance it could have succeeded. Instead they took a few months off while they enjoy the fruits of their victory which gave Britain a chance to organise it's ground defences along with it's air defences, but any one that thinks it was push over was not around at the time.

Yeah, I tried to find the information but can't find how many did Britain make the men to be a pilot, nor German.

Originally Posted by MontyB

Russia was never going to be a successful campaign until Britain was out of the war as Hitler was always going to station large numbers of his assets on the western front to prevent british intervention.

When it comes down to it the germans best chance was to have crossed the channel on the heals of the Dunkirk evacuation (if not during the evacuation) and perhaps sacrificed their navy to do so.

I believe given that Britain was still in the war and he still had to deal with the balkans and Greece the germans perhaps should have completed these campaigns and then waited until the following year to attack Russia (although this in itself would have been a problem) that way they could have replaced BoB and balkan losses and not lost the time invested, perhaps then they could have reached beyond Moscow before the first winter and if Stalin was as good as his word he would been lost in the battle of Moscow and I believe the Russians would have sort peace.

As I have said before I believe the failed Italian campaigns cost germany the war.

Hi Monty.

I have to disagree with you here. The Russian campaign as success or failure was entirely unrelated to what happened in the Battle of Britain. There was little danger of any British-only invasion of Europe and thus little need for Hitler to station anything other than garrison and 2nd line troops in the occupied territories. Although the 'miracle' at Dunkirk did save 330,000 Allied troops, it was more of a political, morale-boosting victory than a military one. The BEF left almost all of its heavy equipment behind for example. The main legacy of Dunkirk was that it ensured that Churchill, and thus Britain, remained in the war. Otherwise there was the possibility that Lord Halifax could have ousted Churchill and then settled for a seperate peace with Hitler.

The biggest fallout for the losing the Battle of Britain was the loss of fighter planes and trained pilots. The Luftwaffe could certainly have used the extra fighter planes for 'Operation Typhoon', the codename for the German assault on Moscow. Other than that, aside from any morale loss, the Battle of Britain had little impact on why Germany lost in Russia. The Germans lost for other reasons.

Originally Posted by Doppleganger

Hi Monty.

I have to disagree with you here. The Russian campaign as success or failure was entirely unrelated to what happened in the Battle of Britain.

As I have said previously I dont for an instant believe that Germany could have won WW2 as they simply did not have the capacity to take on the USA or more importantly they didnt have an ability to take on its untouched production capability.
However I find it incredibly difficult to believe that having access to the 50+ divisions tied up in the west would not have made a huge difference to either the early days of the Russian campaign or a much strengthed Afrika Korps.

With Britain in the war even with extremely limited offensive capability pretty much meant that those units would have to stay in the west and maintain an almost full strength combat capability.

As far as an invasion of Britain went I dont tend to agree that it was an impossibility as long as they had air superiority over the north sea and channel which that would have made RN activity in those areas incredibly costly when you take into account that it would have given the kriegsmarine (especially the uboat force) a very secure (ie downed crew recovery, and air support for naval action thus making RN operations risky at best) lake of operations. However any German assault on Britain would have to have occured and finished before mid-1941 at the latest.

Originally Posted by MontyB

As I have said previously I dont for an instant believe that Germany could have won WW2 as they simply did not have the capacity to take on the USA or more importantly they didnt have an ability to take on its untouched production capability.
However I find it incredibly difficult to believe that having access to the 50+ divisions tied up in the west would not have made a huge difference to either the early days of the Russian campaign or a much strengthed Afrika Korps.

With Britain in the war even with extremely limited offensive capability pretty much meant that those units would have to stay in the west and maintain an almost full strength combat capability.

As far as an invasion of Britain went I dont tend to agree that it was an impossibility as long as they had air superiority over the north sea and channel which that would have made RN activity in those areas incredibly costly when you take into account that it would have given the kriegsmarine (especially the uboat force) a very secure (ie downed crew recovery, and air support for naval action thus making RN operations risky at best) lake of operations. However any German assault on Britain would have to have occured and finished before mid-1941 at the latest.

You have to bear in mind though that the German divisions stationed in occupied territories were not front-line formations nor were they (for the most part) near their establishment strength. Many of the formations were garrison divisions with little or no transport attached to them. For example, out of the 38 divisions stationed in occupied France in June 1941, 32 of them were so short of men and material as to be unfit for any active duty other than garrison duties. The 2 Panzer Divisions outside the 4 Panzer Groups marching into Russia had less than 300 tanks between them and many of those machines were older Panzer IIs and IIIs. There wasn't much more that the Germans could have taken into Russia and certainly the availability of the aforementioned divisions would have made very little difference to the eventual outcome.

Coming back to Operation Sealion IMO it wouldn't have worked, even had things gone perfectly for the Germans and even if air superiority had been established. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, chief of the German Kriegsmarine, stated time and time again that the plan was deeply flawed and that his navy was not up to the task. The following article sets out some good points as to why, although in places it's a little biased and over the top and sadly unreferenced. Nonetheless, its conclusions are valid.

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm

I dont disagree with any of what you say but I believe it was a failing of German planning prior to the start of the war not to have the western war end in an invasion of Britain.
I really have trouble with the theory that after conquroring europe they just thought Britain was going to go away.

Whomever though up this thread, Good Idea for a subject!

Ok here we go.

1. The main problem with the Luftwaffe Fighters was its short range. The Me-109E3 had a combat duration of 10-15 minutes over Britan which meant as German bombers flew deeper inland they did so without fighter coverage. So first and foremost the Luftwaffe needed a medium to long range fighter.

2. The inconsistant bombing strategy, changing targets from shipping to rader sites to airfields to aircraft production, to infrustucture to cities. A mess! Concentrate the He-111 and Ju-88 on airfields and aircraft production sites. Use the Ju-87 and Ju-200s to attack the RN, shipping, and rader installation. Continuously Repeat attacks to prevent the British from rebuilding. Force 12 Group (Southern England) to retreat behind London.

3. After the victory in France, do not stop attack British Costal Defenses immediatly...

Originally Posted by MontyB

As I have said previously I dont for an instant believe that Germany could have won WW2 as they simply did not have the capacity to take on the USA or more importantly they didnt have an ability to take on its untouched production capability.
However I find it incredibly difficult to believe that having access to the 50+ divisions tied up in the west would not have made a huge difference to either the early days of the Russian campaign or a much strengthed Afrika Korps.

With Britain in the war even with extremely limited offensive capability pretty much meant that those units would have to stay in the west and maintain an almost full strength combat capability.

As far as an invasion of Britain went I dont tend to agree that it was an impossibility as long as they had air superiority over the north sea and channel which that would have made RN activity in those areas incredibly costly when you take into account that it would have given the kriegsmarine (especially the uboat force) a very secure (ie downed crew recovery, and air support for naval action thus making RN operations risky at best) lake of operations. However any German assault on Britain would have to have occured and finished before mid-1941 at the latest.

1. Germany had an industrial capacity (measured in machine-tools) as high as that of the United States. Germany was the world leader in tool production. Germany was also the world's most technologically advanced state. Germany did not have the required resources or the large labour pool.

2. As Doppleganger points out, Britain could never have taken on Germany alone. In fact, you could make a strong case that only the UK-US-USSR alliance was strong enough to defeat Germany. But this does not mean that a German invasion of s. England was possible. Nor does it mean that Germany was an armed camp. I refer you to point one.

3. Britain was not a military weakling in 1939. Britain invested heavily in sea and air power during the interwar. In these two areas, Britain was either far ahead or marginally ahead of Germany. The massive German rearmament drive (while the world watched and did nothing) is a myth. It is still used for propaganda purposes, but the crudest research demonstrates that it is a total lie...real research turns it into a joke. Just google interwar Soviet military production. Here is a quote from the "United States Strategic Bombing Survey":

"Study of German war production data as well as interrogation of those who were in charge of rearmament at the time, leaves no doubt that until the defeat at Moscow German industry was incompletely mobilized and that in fact Germany did not foresee the need for full economic mobilization. German arms production during 1940 and 1941 was generally below that of Britain".

4. A chart of comparative fighter production/losses: [borrowed from the Axis History Forum and taken from Air Commodore Peter Dye, "Logistics in the Battle of Britain"]. The numbers tell it all.





http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar//AAF...y.html#tdotgaf"

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...03/muller.html