I suggest that some weapons could have been acquired from the German crates if the landing zones were already overrun or under contest. This is what happened to many of the British supplies along the path to Arnhem. Heavy weapons should have been to the defenders advantage, initially at least. I still think the defenders could have caused carnage even with light and antiquated weapons, in fact they did in some areas but didn't take full advantage of the situation.

I submit that even a company from the 19:th Bde Inf (Rathymnon sector) placed on/around Maleme field in wellmade positions could have faltered the entire german operation.

At times during the fight the Scene commander said that even an extra platoon would have made an inpact on the fighting.

The single greatest error were the strength of reasources earmarked to repell an amphibious assault, an assault that was really a resupply convoy to the troops already on the Island with a Btn of mountainrangers.

I believe that Freyberg should not have been put in charge of the defence as his actions and decisions showed again and again his indecicivness and unability to think outside of the box when engaging the fallshirmjaegers.

But it is sure easy to be an armchair general some 60-70 years after the fact.

Originally Posted by KJ

I submit that even a company from the 19:th Bde Inf (Rathymnon sector) placed on/around Maleme field in wellmade positions could have faltered the entire german operation.

At times during the fight the Scene commander said that even an extra platoon would have made an inpact on the fighting.

The single greatest error were the strength of reasources earmarked to repell an amphibious assault, an assault that was really a resupply convoy to the troops already on the Island with a Btn of mountainrangers.

I believe that Freyberg should not have been put in charge of the defence as his actions and decisions showed again and again his indecicivness and unability to think outside of the box when engaging the fallshirmjaegers.

But it is sure easy to be an armchair general some 60-70 years after the fact.

As much as I feel I should be arguing against this as a New Zealander I can't and I wont, I believe that the campaign and the troops defending the Maleme were let down by Freyberg and his command.

Again- you are letting the experience of subsequent events colour your perceptions- Freyberg demonstrated throughout his career an ability to think outside the box. it was his decision to swim ashore at Bulair at Gallipoli in 1915 and create a single handed distraction which enabled the troops assigned there to be available sooner in the main operation.
this remains the only operation conceived and executed as an all airborne operation. Freyberg had no reason to believe in his initial planning that the seaborne component of the operation was other than the invasion itself with the paras in support.
for my mind- given the commanders immediately available for the defence- it would be hard to pick anybody who would have done better.

I disagre with those statements.

Freyberg had Ultra intelligence telling his the seaborne opertaions were mearly a resupply and still did not act by displacing his troops accordingly.
Simple fact is he froze when faced with something new (to him) as the airborne assault were.

No offence but he did a pisspoor job.
Not only before the invasion, but he made several critical errors all through the campaign.
This makes one believe he got the post because he once proved he could swim.
I bet several others on the Island of crete could too...

The only thing that worked semigood on the allied side where the spirit and will to fight in it´s troops.
(And some command decisions in the (Rathymnon) sector.

That´s it, otherwise the entire operation from an allied standpoint was a total and utter fiasco.

Originally Posted by KJ

I disagre with those statements.

Freyberg had Ultra intelligence telling his the seaborne opertaions were mearly a resupply and still did not act by displacing his troops accordingly.
Simple fact is he froze when faced with something new (to him) as the airborne assault were.

No offence but he did a pisspoor job.
Not only before the invasion, but he made several critical errors all through the campaign.
This makes one believe he got the post because he once proved he could swim.
I bet several others on the Island of crete could too...

The only thing that worked semigood on the allied side where the spirit and will to fight in it´s troops.
(And some command decisions in the (Rathymnon) sector.

That´s it, otherwise the entire operation from an allied standpoint was a total and utter fiasco.

I agree and it pains me to say so but throughout WW2 Australian commanders proved themselves to be better for this kind of job than their New Zealand counterparts (although I did like Kippenberger), I tend to think that pretty much any one of them on the island would have done a better and more aggressive job than Freyberg and his staff.

The only mitigating factors for Freyberg that I can see was that he took over command of the island very late in the process and very little had been done to fortify the island prior to his taking over but I am not sure how that really helps his case when you consider that he knew the attack would be airborne and he had a full set of operational orders for the 3rd Parachute Regiment and a summary of the whole operation before it began.

As I have said previously given knowledge of the enemies operations, the numbers involved and the landing points I can not for the life of me see how you can fail especially since he had at least twice the number of troops available to him than the attacking force.

Originally Posted by MontyB

The only mitigating factors for Freyberg that I can see was that he took over command of the island very late in the process and very little had been done to fortify the island prior to his taking over but I am not sure how that really helps his case when you consider that he knew the attack would be airborne and he had a full set of operational orders for the 3rd Parachute Regiment and a summary of the whole operation before it began.

The other major mitigating factor was that he could not make it look too obvious or else he would have compromised Ultra. Is is possible he received instructions from high not to make his dispositions obvious to oppose a paratroop landing? Perhaps if so this should have appeared in his memoirs.

Originally Posted by perseus

The other major mitigating factor was that he could not make it look too obvious or else he would have compromised Ultra. Is is possible he received instructions from high not to make his dispositions obvious to oppose a paratroop landing? Perhaps if so this should have appeared in his memoirs.

There was no point as Freyberg was told that the information came from well placed sources in Athens, even he didn't know it was Ultra.

Even if he didn't trust the sources to the point that he ignored them he still failed to react once the invasion began, surely if information you had been given began to look accurate you use it to plan a response.

There were four Australians in the theatre of operations who were in a position to take command- Blamey, Makay, Lavarak and Morsehead. Blamey was unpopular with the home government for failing to inform them of his reservataions about the entire campaign; Lavarak and Morsehead were both new appointments to their positions and not on the island. Makay had already proven himself unable to 'control' a battle- whilst it might be heartening to have the division commander in the midst of the rear guard in Greece, one does feel compelled to ask who was actually running the division at its moment of crisis? his actions in Greece and Crete (including sitting in the open during air raids) suggest a suicidal tendency- a classic response of a general who can not cope with the situation around him.
which of these do you honestly think could have done better?
i am not trying to suggest that Freyberg was a genius- then or later- but i do think that the defence of Crete, like the entire Greek campaign, was doomed before it began. Freyberg may have made mistakes- but it is a bit fallacious to suggest that he had access to every thought of the enemy via Ultra. and in the final analysis- could you say to your men; "Here's a pigstick; go attack those Hun paratroopers wil you; there's a good chap."

Originally Posted by bren122

There were four Australians in the theatre of operations who were in a position to take command- Blamey, Makay, Lavarak and Morsehead. Blamey was unpopular with the home government for failing to inform them of his reservataions about the entire campaign; Lavarak and Morsehead were both new appointments to their positions and not on the island. Makay had already proven himself unable to 'control' a battle- whilst it might be heartening to have the division commander in the midst of the rear guard in Greece, one does feel compelled to ask who was actually running the division at its moment of crisis? his actions in Greece and Crete (including sitting in the open during air raids) suggest a suicidal tendency- a classic response of a general who can not cope with the situation around him.
which of these do you honestly think could have done better?

I would have picked Morshead without hesitation.

He had proved himself as an able and aggressive commander during WW1 and later went on to prove his quality throughout WW2, Freyberg on the other hand managed to lose Crete and blew up a Monastery which ended up killing more allies than helped..