Quote:
|
Originally Posted by LeEnfield Now could you tell me why it took TWO atoms bombs to make Japan surrender, surely if they were thinking of surrendering then one should have done the trick. |
How do we know they were seeking a negotiated end to the war (which is different to saying they intended to surrender) because the Allies had intercepted messages saying as much...
July 1945 - Japan's peace messages Still, the messages from Togo to Sato, read by the U.S. at the time, clearly indicated that Japan was seeking to end the war: - July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".
- July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".
- July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
- July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
- July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
- July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
- July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
I don't know how else you can possibly read anything else into these messages.
As I indicated in my first post you have to look at it from two scenarios.
1) Japan wanted a way out of the war as early as August 1944 and a concerted effort probably could have achieved an end to the Pacific war by early 1945 which would make the bombing unnecessary and impossible as they simply would not have been ready in time.
or
2) Japan had to be invaded to be defeated in which case the bombing was the right thing to do and saved countless Allied lives and as a (most likely unintended) consequence saved countless Japanese lives as well.
I actually love discussing this particular set of questions because it is one of the few areas where my attitude has completely changed with age and understanding I recall heated arguments with my father as a kid claiming that the A-bombs were nothing short of a war crime and now I argue that they were the right option and ended up saving a lot more lives than they took.