| | Conner's axiom — never fight unless you have to — looms over policy discussions today on rogue nations like Iran that support terrorism, that is a destabilizing force throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia and, in my judgment, is hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need and, in fact, I believe it would be disastrous on a number of levels. But the military option must be kept on the table given the destabilizing policies of the regime and the risks inherent in a future Iranian nuclear threat — either directly or through proliferation.
And then there is the threat posed by violent jihadist networks. The doctrine of pre-emption has been criticized in some quarters. But it is an answer to legitimate questions: With the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials, and the willingness of terrorists to use them without warning, can we wait to respond until after a catastrophic attack is either imminent or has already occurred? Given the importance of public opinion and public support, how does one justify military action to prevent something that might happen tomorrow or several years down the road? While "never fight unless you have to" does not preclude pre-emption, after our experience with flawed information regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, how high must the threshold of confidence in our intelligence have to be to justify — at home and abroad — a pre-emptive or preventive war?
Conner's second axiom was, "Never fight alone."
He recognized from the onset that the way World War I ended — in particular, the terms of the Versailles Treaty-made another major conflict with Germany almost inevitable. Victory would require a strong partnership of the Anglo-American democracies, and the most successful Army officers would have to adapt to working with allies and partners. Eisenhower and Marshall executed this concept brilliantly in World War II — despite the fact that, as one historian wrote about allied generals, Eisenhower had to deal with "as fractious and dysfunctional a group of egomaniacs as any war had even seen."
Nonetheless, as Perry writes, "Eisenhower was a commander who believed that building and maintaining an international coalition of democracies was not a political nicety... but a matter of national survival." And he brought this conviction to the founding of NATO.
But what do you do when, as is the case today with NATO in Afghanistan, some of your allies don't want to fight? Or they impose caveats on where, when, and how their forces may be used? Or their defense budgets are too small as a share of national wealth to provide a substantial contribution? Not counting the United States, NATO has more than two million men and women in uniform, yet we struggle to sustain the deployment of less than 30,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and are forced to scrounge, hat in hand, to replace a few helicopters.
In August 1998, after the terrorist bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, I wrote an op-ed about terrorism and national priorities for the New York Times. I noted that taking a more aggressive approach to terrorism would, in virtually all cases, require America to "act violently and alone." Even after September 11th, and a string of attacks in Europe and elsewhere, the publics of many of our democratic allies view the terror threat in a fundamentally different way than we do — and this continues to be a real obstacle with regard to Afghanistan and other issues.
But as Churchill said, the only thing worse than having allies is not having them at all. They provide balance, credibility, and legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. In the case of Afghanistan, one should never discount the power of the world's wealthiest and most powerful democracies coming together-as they did in Bucharest three weeks ago — to reaffirm publicly their commitment to this mission. Nor, above all, should we forget the superb performance in combat and sacrifices of allies like the British, Canadians, Australians, Danes, Dutch, and others.
Indeed, just about every threat to our security in the years ahead will require working with or through other nations. Success in the war on terror will depend Less on the fighting we do ourselves, and more on how well we support our allies and partners in the moderate Muslim world and elsewhere. In fact, from the standpoint of America's national security, the most important assignment in your military career may not necessarily be commanding U.S. soldiers, but advising or mentoring the troops of other nations as they battle forces of terror and instability within their own borders.
Finally, Fox Conner said, "Never fight for long."
According to Perry, General Conner believed that "American lives were precious, and no democracy, no matter how pressed, could afford to try the patience of its people." Early on, Conner instilled the idea in both Eisenhower and Marshall of finding the enemy, fighting the enemy, and defeating the enemy, all within a short timeframe.
In World War II, the American people had already begun to lose patience by the fall of 1944, when the lightning dash across the plains of France following D-Day gave way to a soggy, bloody stalemate along Germany's western border. And that was only two-and-a-half years after Pearl Harbor.
Eisenhower no doubt had this in mind when he became president during the 3rd year of the Korean War. He believed that the United States — and the American people — could not tolerate being bogged down in a bloody, interminable stalemate in northeast Asia while the Soviets menaced elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Eisenhower was even willing to threaten the nuclear option to bring that conflict to a close.
It's now been six-and-a-half years since the attacks of September 11th, and we just marked the fifth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war. For America, this has been the second longest war since the Revolutionary War, and the first since then to be fought throughout with an all-volunteer force. In Iraq and Afghanistan, initial quick military successes have led to protracted stability and reconstruction campaigns against brutal and adaptive insurgencies and terrorists. This has tested the mettle of our military and the patience of our people in ways we haven't seen in more than a generation.
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