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Originally Posted by Supostat You forget one significant factor. Due to German offensive to East, Soviets were forced to evacuate their industry for to East. Generally, to Ural mountains. If Germans stopped at Dnieper with no signs to move further, it certainly made less difficult evacuation of industry or no request it at all. This means Red Army received more weapons and sooner than actually in 1941/1942. This factor could make hypothetical Red Army of 1941/1942 more alike Red Army of 1943/1944... |
It is questionable that the evacuation of Soviet heavy industry would have been heavily affected whether the Germans halted at the Dnieper or not. I don't think it would have made much difference but I do know there's no way that the Red Army of 1941/42 would have resembled the Red Army of 1943/44. Basically because a) the Red Army of 1941/42 had not only been severely mauled but its replacements were in the main under trained and poorly equipped and b) it's too early for the Red Army to apply the lessons it learned in combat in 1941.
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Originally Posted by Supostat Sorry, didn't got that. |
Sorry what didn't you get? The meaning of force relations?
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Originally Posted by Supostat In the way `Barbarossa` was planned - yes, Red Army had to be defeat asap, if Germans had a wish to won the war...
The problem is that Red Army could re-equip and re-supply FASTER than dug-in Wermacht. Due to factors such as: - Total mobilization;
- Non-stretched or nearer communications;
- Less part of Soviet industry would be evacuated than if Germans countinued their offensive.
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IMO a dash to Moscow was the best plan, but once the emphasis was diverted to take Kiev and the Ukraine it was no longer possible to capture Moscow in 1941. Therefore, the next best option was to dig-in around October and wait until Spring 1942. This wasn't only Hitler's initial intent, some influential generals like Gerd von Rundstedt also favoured this plan. It doesn't matter whether the Red Army can reequip and resupply faster because the Germans really have no choice by this time. It is military suicide to:
- attack in winter when you also know that you're under supplied
- attack in winter when you also know that your formations need to rest and refit
- attack in winter when you know that you're not equipped for winter warfare
Mate, it really is a no brainer and I don't know why you're having such a hard time grasping this.
You're also forgetting that it's almost certain that the Red Army will mount a major winter offensive in 1941 which will break against the dug-in Wehrmacht. Come Spring 1942, the Red Army will be in no shape to mount a major summer offensive. It took another year before the Red Army was able to win in a summer engagement and that was at Kursk where the Germans allowed themselves to be sucked into a massive pitched battle reminiscent of WW1. It's not going to happen in Spring 1942, especially when historically the Red Army was beaten all the way back to Stalingrad and in this 'what if' scenario the Wehrmacht would be in measurably better shape in 1942.