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Originally Posted by Supostat Well, they eventually did it... |
They did but this was in no small part due to failures in German strategic and operational planning.
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Originally Posted by Supostat In time - it was when? In planning of `Barbarossa` winter equipment was foreseen, for about 20% of German army, directed to East (info from the same link), since General Stuff assumed that number will be enough as occupation forces after Red Army will be defeated. If there was another decision already after beginning `Barbarossa` or even in fall 1941 - it was too late. Since traffic jams You mentioned were not foreseen and no logistics was properly planned to make this decision real. |
I think Hitler started ordering winter uniforms after the Kiev operation. Remember, it's the belief of some historians that Hitler intended to do no more major fighting until 1942, with the exception of a winter siege on Leningrad. Of course, once he decided to gamble on Moscow there was no hope of those uniforms reaching the front line.
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Originally Posted by Supostat Well, Germans could not make nor Dnieper, nor Zapadnaya Dvina/Daugava and nor Oder rivers as natural obstacles for dug-in, unbreakable defense lines later, during operation `Bagration`, so why You think defense could be successful in 1941? |
One of the main differences though was in force relations between the 2 sides in 1942, compared to 1944. In 1944 the Red Army had a 2:1 superiority in troops, nearly 3:1 in artillery pieces and nearly 8:1 in tanks and aircraft. In 1942 the odds would be
much more in the German's favour. That would be the big difference, along with the fact that in 1942, the Red Army had not yet recovered in spirit, training and confidence from the mauling it had received in 1941. In short, it had not yet learned from the Wehrmacht and was nothing like the enormously powerful army it was 2 years later.
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Originally Posted by Supostat One attack at Rhzev was planned and carried out to sidetrack German attention from counter-offensive as Stalingrad, also most of the troops and efforts to break up German defense were concentrated there... Thus Rzhev could not be considered as classic scenario of Red Army offensive on German defense lines. |
David Glantz believes that the 'Mars' offensive was designed to be even bigger than the 'Uranus' offensive further south at Stalingrad. It is his belief that Operation Mars was no sideshow and indeed was designed to push back AGC from the Rzhev salient. Stalin was still uneasy about such a large concentration of German forces fairly near Moscow. This operation is detailed in David Glantz's book
, "Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies)" and in the link below. David Glantz is no pro German historian as you might be aware. In fact, he's been accused by some of being too pro Soviet. http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Bat...rationmars.htm Quote:
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Originally Posted by Supostat And as I said earlier - time and any delays helped Red Army, no Germans. In interests of Germans was to finish war asap, the German economics weren't ready for long war on attrition. |
True but I think a delay of a few months to avoid fighting in the Russian winter was not only utterly sensible, it was necessary. The Germans knew that Stalin was ordering wave after wave of futile, uncoordinated attacks. The sensible option would be to let these attacks come when it suited the Germans, not when it suited the Soviets. It is one of the basic tenets of war after all that you make your enemy fight on
your times.