| But there also are problems. The technology is being eyed as part of the target set for U.S. intelligence collecting. Moreover, the high-power microwaves can inflict long-term physical damage to the user.
“Network warfare has been done for some time,” says the intelligence official. “The difference now is that it’s being integrated as part of an overall combined operation. The Israelis’ raid on Syria wasn’t just about shutting down the radars and blowing up the building. There were a lot of integrated operations that had to happen to make the raid successful. Cyberwarfare information operations was one component of what went on there.”
The U.S. Marines, both aviation and radio battalions, have been quick to realize the value of being able to call up an electronic attack (EA) and create a “cone of silence” even at the squad level.
“The Marines are being very progressive,” says Walleston. “Now that they have all the experience fighting the asymmetric threat, they understand what they’re really up against. If you talk to the EW guys, they’re convinced that this is a commercial technology war because the [militants’] command and control could be any of a number of commercial technologies from cell and satellite phones and even cheap Motorola FRS [family radio service] hand-held two-way radios.”
Regarding the theme of going wireless for communications across the last mile of a battlefield, that jump opens up a vulnerability for anyone using a laptop or other wireless standards to connect with the Internet.
“Those are the threats the Marines are talking about,” says Walleston. “When they went into Falluja, they were up against a wide collection of commercial computer and telecommunications standards—a bunch of guys with PDAs [and] Blackberries that can communicate with multiple computer networks via some standard link such as WiMax.”
The wireless device transmits an RF signal, finds a connection and takes the user into the Internet. That’s called [crossing] an “air gap.” In the past, signals intelligence units were looking for tactical radios. Now they’re looking for commercial wireless devices that the enemy uses for command and control.
“The Marines figured out this local command-and-control approach very early,” says Walleston. “Now they’re trying to create electronic attack capabilities that can be used like digital munitions.” But they refuse to deal in typically classified capabilities and are employing an open architecture concept allowing full integration of air and ground forces. When we discuss capabilities we might have in the cyber-warfare domain, they say we only want to know about things we can use on the battlefield.”
One result is a joint concept technology demonstration called the Collaborative Online Reconnaissance Provider/Operationally Responsive Attack Link (Corporal). Northrop Grumman provides the network and BAE Systems handles the electronic attack piece. The system deals with a new domain called network-enabled electronic attack (AW&ST Sept. 3, 2007, p. 60; Apr. 9, 2007, p. 46).
“It connects nontraditional ISR systems with tactical-level EA capability and brings it to the point on the battlefield where it’s needed,” says Walleston. “Instead of having an electronic standoff weapon that only a few people understand and only sometimes gets used, they are giving the capability directly to the guy that kicks down the door. The platoon leader has a tactical PDA that gives him two-way comms and situation awareness from UAVs flying overhead.”
When the Marine with the PDA requests “digital fires,” he wants a cone of silence to be created over the immediate area that disables enemy communications, say U.S. Marine Corps officials. The network then would do asset synchronization to determine what ISR and EA assets are in the area. If there are none, it would redirect one, perhaps a UAV, to fly in and turn on the requested support. The capability to take on a wide range of telecommunication threats would be pre-loaded in the UAV. A number are already being used for experimentation, including the Shadow 200 and Predator.
The goal is to develop payloads for all the platforms that can perform all the required network ISR and electronic attack missions. As they come into the area of operations, they are logged on automatically to the network through a common antenna set that’s patched on the exterior of the airframe.
A network server keeps track of everybody, where they are and what capabilities they have. It might tell an F-15 to turn on its EA system as it flies by. It’s then replaced by an EA-6B, a helicopter or a UAV, each carrying the same small, multifunction payloads.
There will be a demonstration of network-enabled electronic attack for the Corporal JCTD within two years. An interim version, demonstrating PDA-controlled attack from a UAV, will be tested with the Marine Corps’ Wolfpack platoon in August.
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