Quote:
|
Originally Posted by perseus Doppleganger: We have been discussing the bombing strategy of Germany on the other thread. I have often theorised that if the Western allies had an effective bombing strategy prior to D day they would be reluctant to use it prior to the ground invasion of West Europe since it would only help the Soviets. In fact once German defeat was almost inevitable after Stalingrad it may have been in the West's interests not to hurt Germany too much. If you look at the statistics, the German petroleum supplies for only began to dwindle from June 44 after the synthetic plants started to be hit. Do you think this is suspicious and justifies Stalin's suspicions, or was it merely the consequence of obtaining air bases in Southern Italy around this time that allowed these plants to be hit? After the oil went it was only a matter of time. |
Undoubtedly it was suspicious. The speed at which the Red Army was driving westwards after Kursk and (especially) after the Battle of Bagration I'm sure must have filled Allied war planners and leaders with dread. The Western Allies were desperate to get to Berlin before the Red Army and this was one reason why Operation Market Garden was launched. Thus the Western Allies were faced with having to defeat one enemy and plan for a possible conflict with a new enemy. However, I do not believe that the Western Allies were 'holding back' as such, rather that some very senior figures had one eye on the aftermath, when Germany was finally defeated.
@Lee Enfield. There were factions within the US Government of the time that were deeply favourable towards the Soviet Union. Harry Hopkins, a key architect of Lend Lease and FDR's unofficial emissary towards Churchill and Stalin was very pro-Soviet. Thus there was a great deal of political influence that saw Stalinist Russia in a good light. That might partly explain why Stalin won so many concessions that, in hindsight, were not strictly necessary. It can be argued that FDR was hoodwinked by both Uncle Joe and some of his own closest advisers. It can also be argued that many senior British and American politicians were war-weary and did not want to do anything that pushed or provoked Stalin in any way.