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Originally Posted by Supostat Lets say - lack of manpower was one of reasons why Germans failed to fulfill objectives, however lack of manpower was result of bad planning, i.e. underestimation of enemy. |
Well, the Germans could have used more manpower when things started to worsen from October onwards but if, for example, their logistical infrastructure had been up to the job to get say winter clothing to them in time, manpower would not have been a critical factor. The Germans lost many men to frostbite as well as to enemy action during Operation Typhoon. This is why I say that a lack of manpower was not really a reason why the Germans failed to secure their later objectives. The lack of manpower was as a result of other failings.
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Originally Posted by Supostat Well, couple of things: - Red Army was not as weak as there was lack of adequate plan (`what to do, where to run?` ©) and poor coordination between large units like armies and fronts. Moreover, Germans had initiative and in fact Red Army was forced just to react on Germans moves, not to carry out its own strategy.
- In case of an asap offensive on Moscow danger from right flank (on left flank Red Army had no forces enough, indeed) still would be there despite of dug in AGS. Since due to enclosing to Moscow the front line AGS should defend would stretch in hundreds of kilometers or even more. So, there already are two factors, decreasing AGS defensive capacities: a) long front line (which means there would not be very high density of German forces); b) short of time to prepare multi-level, echeloned defense (Red Army's defense lines in the half-circle of Kursk were prepared about three or four months, and Germans still managed amost to break them up in certain places).
- There is no chance to sit in trenches and fox-holes and defeat ALL attacks. The attacking side sooner or later will concentrate force enough to break up the defense. And again, due to flaws in planning, Germans also weren't able to attack EVERYWHERE, so in case of main assault on Moscow AGS most likely wouldn't be able to counterrattack Soviet South armies.
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The Germans would still be forcing the Red Army to be reactive rather than proactive, had they gone straight for Moscow after the win at Smolensk. There is a calculated risk in leaving the massed Soviet forces in the Donets Basin intact and hoping that the speed and shock of pushing towards Moscow will continue to leave the Soviets dazed and confused. There is of course a huge threat to the right flank of AGC with the Germans only having screening forces in place to defend that flank. But, it's the only way that the Germans can knock out the Soviet Union in 1941, and perhaps even at all. The Wehrmacht has to keep pushing on and not allow the Red Army time to breathe or get organized.
The same goes for AGS on the defensive, as this Army Group will be under much greater pressure than AGN. If the Germans went for an elastic defence doctrine, which they didn't on a big scale historically, that would have been a possible answer to manage numerically superior forces attacking them. Adopt the same tactics that Manstein used in the 3rd Battle of Kharkov. In any case, AGS might have to give ground but if the great prize of Moscow is seized it might be academic anyway. It just has to prevent a Soviet breakout and ensure also that it helps keep the Soviet Southwestern Front busy and off balance. Remember too that AGS was strong enough, with the help of Guderian's Panzergruppe 2, to take Kiev and destroy the above mentioned Front. On its own it would be strong enough to defend itself and probably push on towards Kiev on its own. There would be no left pincer to close the encirclement but that wouldn't matter.
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Originally Posted by Supostat There also should be considered that Kiev was much closer to border than Moscow. Therefore: - Assault on Kiev could be launched faster what also means less time for defending side to organize defense and refit its forces with new units;
- Germans could attack Kiev with greater number of forces, and status of those forces was higher as it could be in case of assault on Moscow. Kiev was half as far from border as Moscow was, and when Germans could reach Moscow, the number and status of their forces will significantly decrease due to casualties (still no reinforcements) and attrition...
So I do not have any background to think that Moscow could be taken as easy as Kiev was. |
Moscow would be harder than Kiev to take, there's no doubt there, assuming the city was defended. You can also argue that taking Kiev was the sensible thing to do at the time. Traditional military thinking states that flanks must always be secured although Hitler's reasons were more concerned with seizing natural resources rather, although he was also obsessed with destroying enemy armies in the field. However, the Germans had to gamble in this case and push towards Moscow because it would be the only way to end the war quickly, which was essential for them. I'm not even sure if it's possible as I really need to look at the logistical aspect before I can say yay or nay. If they don't have the logistical capacity then they would fail as they did historically, Kiev operation or no Kiev operation.