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Originally Posted by Ollie Garchy The whole problem with this issue is that surprise as a principle of war is unimportant. I know that I will get flak on this issue, but I do not care. But, think about it...an operation starts, people react, it happens along a timeline whereby a military will respond at a certain point. The problem for the Soviets was not the clock. The problem has to do with the OODA loop. The Germans reacted to Soviet action at an early juncture, and continued this process throughout the war. It makes no difference what Comrade Stalin thought or did. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_Loop |
Whilst I see merit in this argument, I would also argue that surprise is still a vital principle of war. The OADC Loop would come into play after the initial surprise element and things would play out from there, as far as I understand it. It could be argued that there
was no element of surprise present in the German invasion of Russia, as the Soviets had some inkling of it (or must have realised that a German attack would happen at some point) and did very little to prepare for it. No matter what kind of treaty you have with a powerful neighbour whose ideology is almost an exact opposite, no matter how much you wish not to antagonize said neighbour, to not prepare for a possible invasion along a mutually shared border is simply folly.
As far as the early stages of Barbarossa go, German tactics successfully (in the main) disrupted Soviet ability to adequately respond at a higher level for several months after the start of the operation. Therefore, the Soviet OADC loop process was severely short-circuited, if it even existed at all. When an opponent has gained the initiative so quickly, local success aside, would the Soviets even be able to respond pro-actively? It seems to me that their responses would be purely reactionary at least until they were able to stabilize their lines and have time to think.