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Originally Posted by perseus Supostat
What do you think about the purges of the experienced military leaders by Stalin prior to WW2, where these not even more important? |
Controversary, purges had both positive and negative effects. Some Revolution-time stagnates in fact should be removed from their seats (and from military point of view there is no much difference were their shot or just retired), while due to purges also some talented commanders (for example Rokossovsky) were arrested and released only after beginning of the war.
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What about the Soviet armies dispositions on the eve of war. Did these unpreparedness hinder them, or actually help them, since many were well behind the front line and couldn't be immediately surrounded?
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Unpreparedness hinder them, because density of troops in first line was much too low for successful defense. Therefore Germans with such density of troops, as they were on June 22, 1941, could not be stopped.
Here are some maps with densities of troops:
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/oborona-b-1.jpg http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/oborona-c-2.jpg
There are more than 3 German corps vs. 1 Soviet Corps in directions of main offensives.
But this is not a mistake, since Soviets had no stable reason to concentrate troops more earlier. Concentrate troops just for fun, without political reason - it is expensive and diplomatically dangerous move.
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Did the winter war with Finland allow the Soviets to gain experience on 'how not to do things' and prepared them for the much greater battle ahead?
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No. Halkin-Gol and Lake Hasan did it, where large mechanized and air armies were involved (which was way what WW2 was). Winter war was too specific, it was closer to anti-guerilla warfare than conventional, symmetric combat.