Ollie Garchy

A CHANGE OF OPINION: [I looked at Terraine's "A Time For Courage".]

(Thanks guys for the good comments! Also, please remember that most of my posts are written using my increasingly bad memory. I do not want to waste time checking everything.)

A SERIES OF OBSERVATIONS:

(1) SIMULTANEOUS GER/BR INTEREST IN TACTICAL NIGHT OPS: Night operations began to interest Bomber Command after December 1939. The "success" of No. 4 Group in dropping propaganda leaflets at night, low losses that stood in stark contrast to those groups operating in daylight against the German fleet on the coast, convinced BC to rethink policy. This rethinking was undertaken. German night actions, such as the bombing of Scapa Flow, helped influence the change.

(2) BOMBER COMMAND OPS AGAINST GER FLEET: Bomber Command operated moreorless exclusively against coastal targets in 1939/early 1940. John Terraine points out that the quasi-gentleman's agreement not to bomb cities helped save BC from a repeat of the "charge of the light brigade". That is, BC still focused on the "knockout blow", but the bombers were held back by a list of constraints.

(3) EARLY BR SUPPORT FOR STRAT BOMBING: The British Cabinet decided to initiate strategic air attacks against the Ruhr during the German invasion of France. A passage from John Terraine's book on BC is appropriate:

"It remained only for Churchill to sum up what was evidently a united Cabinet opinion in delivering a hard blow at Germany:

'He considered that the proposed operations would cut Germany at its tap root, and was hopeful that they might even provide an immediate contribution to the land battle. They should dispel French doubts about our willingness to suffer and also have a salutary effect on Italy. Finally, he considered that this was the psychological moment to strike Germany in her own country and convince the German people that we had both the will and the power to hit them hard. He accordingly suggested that operations should be carried out that evening.'

Pausing only to ask Duff Cooper to arrange that 'discreet reference should be made in the press to the killing of civilians in France and the Low Countries' by the Germany -- without, of course, any reference to the possibility of British retaliation, Churchill then steered the War Cabinet

'to authorize the Chief of the Air Staff to order Bomber Command to carry out attacks on suitable military objectives (including marshalling yards and oil refineries) in the Ruhr as well as elsewhere in Germany; and that these attacks should begin at night with approximately 100 heavy bombers.'

For the RAF representatives, this was a moment of consummation; Ironside tells us:

'I never saw anything so light up as the faces of the RAF when they heard that they were to be allowed to bomb oil refineries in the Ruhr. It did one good to see it. They have built their big bombers for this work and they have been keyed up for the work ever since the war began. Now they have got the chance'." (Terraine, p. 143)

AN IMPORTANT POINT: BC began it's "private war" against German industry that evening. It is yet another horrific example of how the British government abandoned the French state. Instead of tactical daylight or night attacks against German troop concentrations, supply lines, etc., Churchill's government redirected the bombers to pursue a longterm strategy of industrial attrition. There should not be any doubt here. Terraine clearly explains that the Ruhr campaign did not influence the fighting in France. The cabinet's illusions were only feable excuses...excuses that surface time and time again.

This brings up another point. The French government influenced the British decision to hold the bombers. The French reasoning was simple. The Luftwaffe could have retaliated by sending the bomber streams against Paris...a logical action if we regard the experiences of 1871/1914. The abandoning of their French ally allowed Britain to ignore this constraint. The timing of Churchill's decision (prior to the French surrender) was extremely cynical.

(4) CHURCHILL & MORALITY: Churchill had no illusions of the nature of strategic bombing. The prime minister argued in 1940 for a "knock-out blow" (the concept developed during the 1930s) using "absolutely devastating, EXTERMINATING attack". (emphasis mine) (Terraine, p. 260.) This philosophy cannot be reduced to the simple formula of "Germany started it".

(5) OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY: In leafing through Terraine's book, I do not get any indication of the "morality game"...ie., the attempt to place blame on either side for initiating the terror bombing of civilians. Instead, Terraine hints that the plans to kill women and children (on both sides) developed from a complex mixture of prewar planning, wartime events, and crude and escalating demands for retaliation. Seen in this way, the brutality of terror/ strategic bombing is similar to other darker episodes of WWII like the killing of POWs on the eastern front. [Doctrine or ideology combined with actual experience to increase the willingness to commit atrocities].

CONCLUSION: This framework fits well with my previous comments concerning the murky origins of WWII. I therefore retreat from any impressions that Britain alone held responsbility for the outbreak of terror bombing. Both sides used the other's bombing raids to justify their actions...actions that were intended from the outset. That the German Luftwaffe did not develop an adequate strategic bombing doctrine or capable weapons systems should not deflect attention from the desire to terrorize civilians and force the enemy to surrender. Nor should anyone hold Warsaw, Rotterdam or Coventry as events that fundamentally altered Bomber Command's "private war". Bomber Command clearly upheld a doctrine of saturation or carpet bombing that did not distinguish between military and civilian targets. Civilian targets (like marshalling yards, rail stations, and houses) in fact formed the basic target.