About 17 september 1939 Page 6
|May 23rd, 2010||#51|
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Reserves :9 divisions
5th army :6 divisions
1st army :13 divisions
7th army : 6 divisions
Total : 34 divisions (12 active )
Active divisions :22,16,26,6,9,15,25,33,34,36,52,5,35
Source :Heereseinteilung 1939,P 178,179,18O,181
|May 23rd, 2010||#52|
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Panzercraker......Okay we had 100,000 men in the Army. Now they were scattered all over the world in different colonies. If you added up all the British Garrisons all over the world then you would see just how many men we had to send to Poland. Now with 100.000 men men scattered over a quarter of the world and the Germans had all there forces in a rather small area. there was no air transport as such in those days and the and it would take months to bring them all home. Then there 30.000 troops in North Africa trying to contain the Italians, as I said we did not have the man power to do every thing at once.
LeEnfield Rides again
|May 23rd, 2010||#53|
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I'll keep it simple, division is an organisation unit, it can number 1000 or 20.000, the amount of divisions means jack when they never exceeded 200.000 men.
Germany had the equivalent of 10 infantry divisions in the West with the armament of 2 infantry divisions between them which means most companies didnt even have AT guns.
Also there was one battalion of Pz Is so no wow there.
Umm how were the BEF supposed to get to Poland considering the amount of German territory they would have to have sailed past to get to Poland?
The mighty german navy that would've stopped them was where? See Norway.
|May 23rd, 2010||#54|
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I have given 2 sources on the German strength;the first :you are neglecting,the second :you stated that it is a neo-nazi forum (any proof ?),while your source is SAYING 'the German archives ....':what you are saying,is no proof,unless you can source your allegations.
The number of Pz is irrelevant,the Germans in the West having a defensive mission .
|May 23rd, 2010||#55|
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As for axis-history, its promoting nazi period as such and has some interesting neo-nazi and nazi revisionist members, for example David Irving-the holocaust denier is their honorable member.
The 100 guns refers to artillery pieces not AT guns, there were approximately 200AT guns in total.
Here's some facts for you, learn before you attempt to reply with another bright opinion of yours.
Germany had 43 so called "hollow" divisions in 1939 in the West, stretched from the Low Countries to Switzerland, in them there was 350.000 men, 210 artillery pieces, 300~ AT guns, 60 tanks and armored cars, approximately 800 machineguns.
French had amassed 650.000 men with 1200 tanks, 320 armored cars and more then 2000 artillery pieces.
By German archives i mean every book on the subject including The Heer the problem with you is that you never read any book and think that watching a 30 minute slice of Discovery Channel entitles you to sell your stupid opinions as facts.
Germany in 1939 was absolutely defensless in the West.
The French were stopped by mines, trees and propaganda newsreels.
I tend to agree that UKs options were limited but why propose an alliance in the first place? Why ask Poland to delay their mobilisation and limit polish strategic options if an ally can't provide assistance?
Brits could easily sell Poland artillery, tank battalions, the works but that didnt happen as well.
Last edited by Panzercracker; May 23rd, 2010 at 17:43..
|May 23rd, 2010||#56|
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You said that AHF is a neo-nazi forum :Max Hastings and Richard Hardgreaves posting on a neo-nazi forum ? Probably you never heard od them.Who is the ignoramus ?
You said avid Irving is a honorable member of AHF:that is blatant nonsens from an ignoramus :Irving has been totally debunked on AHF.
There are a lot of Poles posting on AHFrobably also neo-nazis..
For the rest:your posts are only insults,to hide your lack of knowledge and they are not bringing any positive on the resistance of the Polish army in 1939
|May 23rd, 2010||#57|
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If you agree than we agree that Germany was defencless with 200~ artillery pieces and unable to conduct any sort of defence in Sept 1939.
If you do not agree then we have a point where we can pick it up, unless you're trying to hide behind a figure of 22 divisions ignoring the fact that they typically had only 40% of strength and were armed with rifles only.
|May 25th, 2010||#58|
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Polish Expectations, British and French Promises info
Expectations of swift Allied action were also repeatedly reinforced by the British. For example, during Anglo-Polish General Staff talks held in Warsaw at the end of May, the Poles stressed the need for British aerial assaults on Germany should war break out. The British responded with assurances that the Royal Air Force would attack industrial, civilian, and military targets. General Sir Edmund Ironside then repeated this promise during an official visit to Warsaw in July. The Poles could be confident that Britain would carry out bombing raids in Germany once hostilities began.
I saw a ghost behind the door, when the kids were coming home from the war, with broken dreams and nothing more!
|May 25th, 2010||#59|
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The Reality: English and French Duplicity info
At the same time that Allied politicians and military officers were promising to help Poland fight a war against Nazi Germany, events going on behind the scenes revealed that the British and French seriously doubted their ability to effectively aid the Poles. Take for example discussions held by the British and French Chiefs of Staff between March 31 and April 4, 1939. A report issued at the conclusion of these talks entitled "The Military Implications of an Anglo-French Guarantee of Poland and Rumania" stated
"If Germany undertook a major offensive in the East there is little doubt that she could occupy Rumania, Polish Silesia and the Polish Corridor. If she were to continue the offensive against Poland it would only be a matter of time before Poland was eliminated from the war. Though lack of adequate communications and difficult country would reduce the chances of an early decision. ... No spectacular success against the Siegfried Line can be anticipated, but having regard to the internal situation in Germany, the dispersal of her effort and the strain of her rearmament programme, we should be able to reduce the period of Germany's resistance and we could regard the ultimate issue with confidence."
In short, while the Western Allies anticipated the eventual defeat of Germany they also believed that Germany would crush Poland before turning her forces to the west. This situation did not change substantially in the months leading up to the outbreak of war, despite considerable information that western governments received concerning increasing German military activity. No less credible a source than Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador to Germany, telegraphed numerous warnings to Paris of suspicious German troops movements. For example, on July 13, 1939, Coulondre wrote Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, that "This Embassy has recently reported to the Ministry numerous signs of abnormal activity in the German army and of Germany's obvious preparations for the possibility of an impending war."
Given what we now know about the months leading up to World War II one cannot help but agree with the conclusion of Polish scholar Anita Prazmowska: "After granting the guarantee to defend Poland, the British (one might add the French) failed to develop a concept of an eastern front. ... The result was that the ... guarantee to Poland remained a political bluff devoid of any strategic consequence."
|May 25th, 2010||#60|
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The final deceptions: August 1939 info
Indeed, Coulondre's warnings were to no avail. By August 1939, with German pressure on Poland increasing daily and a diplomatic solution to the crisis farther away than ever, Allied preparations for war remained minimal at best. Great Britain in particular appeared to be paralyzed by an inability to appreciate the gravity of the situation. Amazingly, the British had developed no coherent plan for offensive operations in the west, either in the air or on land. To make matters worse they also refused requests from Paris to devote air power to support the anticipated French offensive into Germany. And as far as aerial attacks on Germany were concerned, British military planners had actually retreated from their earlier promise to the Poles. By the end of August, thus on the very eve of war, the Chiefs of Staff in London had decided not to attack a wide array of targets in Germany. Rather they would limit aerial bombardment to "military installations and units which were clearly that, to the exclusion of industrial stores and military industrial capacity." Naturally, the Poles were not informed of this alteration in Britain's approach to strategic bombing.
Still the Western Allies continued to put a brave face on their diplomatic efforts to dissuade Germany from going to war with Poland. Considering the relative lack of military preparations, these efforts seem farcical now. For example, on August 15, Robert Coulondre cabled Paris concerning a meeting he'd had with Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. During this one-hour conversation Coulondre told von Weizsäcker "if any of the three Allies, France, England, and Poland, were attacked, the other two would automatically be at her side." Furthermore, Coulondre told Paris "To guard as far as possible against this danger [of war] which appears to me formidable and imminent I consider it essential:
(1) To maintain absolute firmness, an entire and unbroken unity of front, as any weakening, or even any semblance of yielding will open the way to war; and to insist every time the opportunity occurs on the automatic operation of military assistance.
(2) To maintain the military forces of the Allies, and in particular our own, on an equality with those of Germany, which are being continuously increased. It is essential that we should at the very least retain the previously existing ratio between our forces and those of the Reich, that we should not give the erroneous impression that we are 'giving ground'.
Again, Coulondre's call for proper military preparations by France would be in vain. Historian Anna Cienciala writes that General Maurice Gamelin, the commander of the French army, "had no intention to implement the French commitments made in the military convention [signed in May 1939]." Incredibly, Gamelin instead took steps to ensure that the Poles would resist the Germans, while not further committing French troops to action. In late August, Gamelin sent General Louis Faury to Warsaw as the head of the French Military Mission there. Prior to departing, Faury "was told that no date could be given [to the Poles] for a French offensive, that the French Army was in no state to attack, and that Poland would have to hold out as best she could. His mission was to see that the Poles would fight. ... [As] General Ironside [had] commented in July, 'the French have lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it'.
The British too had no idea of attacking Germany, although they continued to bluff in the hope that Hitler would back down. The Royal Air Force would not be deployed against German units in support of a French offensive and aerial bombardment in Germany would be limited only to clearly marked military installations (an unworkable proposition, both then and now, even with advanced technology). Yet London continued to issue its own false assurances to Warsaw by signing a formal Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland on August 25, 1939 that committed Britain to declare war on Germany should she attack Poland.
Finally, in the latter days of August, as war loomed on the horizon and Germany massed more than one million men along the Polish frontier, London and Paris pleaded with Warsaw not to provoke the Germans by fully mobilizing her armed forces. Trusting in their allies, the Poles did as they were asked. Consequently, when the German attack came, the Polish army was only partly mobilized, making it that much easier for the Wehrmacht to split Polish defenses and drive deep behind Polish lines.