| You can call it a tactical disaster due to the fact that it was a defeat and that the British 1st Airborne Division paid for it with many lives. I do think that it was a defeat, but I also think that in the scope of WW 2, it was not a disaster. The victories that the Americans and Brits won by taking the bridges at Nijmegen (sp?) and Eindvoven were rendered useless by the fact that the Germans held the bridge at Arnhem. As the plan had called for the creation of a corridor that the Allies could use to cross the Rhine into Germany, the loss at Arnhem rendered the other victories useless. The allies ended up with a corridor that led nowhere.
It was a good idea, but I think that there were too many variables to try to control. The plan called for taking and holding one or two highways, and six bridges, creating a single easy to cut corridor. While the German forces in the immediate area were inadequate to deal with the planned attak, the resting German Panzer division changed the equation of forces in the Arnhem area. Personally, I believe that even if the Panzers had not been there, the corridor would have been cut sooner rather than later by other formations. Would it have shortened the war? Personally, I doubt it, but that's another thread.
Dean. |