redcoat

While Monty may have 'oversold' Operation Goodwood, there is no evidence that he claimed it was the planned break-out.

Here's a post I found on the Axis History Forum by a US poster Richto90 which h covers the facts about Goodwood far better than I could.

The myth that GOODWOOD was intended by Montty to be a "strategic breakthrough" first started a few days later and originated with AEAF commander Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a bitter enemy of Montgomery. All "sources" that parrot this nonesense usually use Leigh-Mallory (or the other Monty-basher in the RAF and SHAEF, Air Chief Marshal Sir Artheur Tedder) as a starting point for their disinformation.

Here's Monty's instructions to 2nd Army before Operation Goodwood:

"Notes on Second Army Operations
16th July-18th July

1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle.
To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank.
Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas.
A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank.
But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unstable the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.
3. The enemy.
There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:
21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division
1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division
12 SS Panzer Division
Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end.
4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July.
Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye.
5. Initial Operations 8 Corps.
The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy.
But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and dsepondency, and discover 'the form.'
6. 2 Canadian Corps.
While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville.
7. Later Operations 8 Corps.
When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands.
But not before 6 is done.
8. To sum up for 8 Corps.
Para 5.
Para 7.
Finally.
Para 6 is vital.

B.L. Montgomery
15-7-44"

Paragraph 1 is quite clear, nowhere is the idea of a "strategic breakout" bruted about. What is also noticeable is that GOODWOOD itself is actually embodied in paragraph 5, which also does not mention a "strategic breakout" - armoured cars "pushing south" hardly constitutes such a plan. Note also that paragraph 7 - the "cracking about" by 8 Corps - which is the only element that can even be possibly construed as a condoning an attempt at "strategic breakout" is actually only to occur once paragraph 6 is accomplished. That is important in that paragraph 6 actually describes operation ATLANTIC, the follow-on to GOODWOOD. And it was setbacks in that operation - not GOODWOOD that cancelled the "strategic" elements embodied in such vague form in paragraph 7.

Was the possibility that GOODWOOD could result in a "strategic breakthrough" considered? Yes. Was it counted on to do so? No

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If in doubt...... Panic!!!!!!!!